
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
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Introduction

The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) is the source and supplier of the majority of terrorist groups that hide behind the religion of Islam. Since it was founded by Hassan Al-Banna in 1928, the Brotherhood has been working in the field of politics, often indirectly because it is either politically banned or it hides behind the curtain of daawa, raising the slogan "Two Swords" for its daawa.



The Muslim Brotherhood is a political group from the very first moment of its establishment, relying on organized secret activity, violence, and social networks to ensure its survival, strengthen the resolve of its members, and renew their vows of blind obedience at times of weakness and defeat.

The group continued to alternate between "jurisprudence of empowerment" and "jurisprudence of vulnerability" throughout its history, according to the requirements of the stage it is going through. After the group was able to rule – or seize power in – Egypt for the first time in its history in 2012, it unveiled its true face and sought to control state institutions and divert their orientations at the expense of the Egyptian people.

With the people's rejection of the group's rule, its violence was manifested in the terrorism it practiced against the Egyptian people and their symbols, aiming at threatening their security and denying them opportunities for growth and stability.

The Muslim Brotherhood's work against the Egyptian state is the fact that is being confirmed daily since the organization's ouster from power in 2013. This terrorist group fights development and stability, seeks to destroy, spreads chaos, and has networks of communication, funding, and violence that enable it to spread and have influence. The organization has historically proven to learn from its mistakes, which is telling of what its networks can do in the next stage to achieve its goals.

This is why the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies presents this publication that provides an analytical study of the factors of the Brotherhood's spread and influence and an outlook for the future of the group and its potential strategies.

The Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies


الإخوان المسلمون
بالشرقية

Editorial

Egypt began a new phase in its history by rejecting the rule of a group. The people vehemently revolted on 30 June 2013 to express their courageous rejection of the Muslim Brotherhood's rule, and they endured its terrorism as a result of this rejection.

Since then, the state has been building, and the group at home and abroad has been destroying. The things the Brotherhood is focused on destroying are the morale of the Egyptians and the trust between the people and the state.

The Brotherhood could not continue its destructive efforts without states and agencies supporting it. Together, they embody the "axis of evil" that targets Egypt. Many questions come to mind, such as: What does the Brotherhood want? When will it stop its terrorism? Doesn't the world see this terrorism? What is the group's means of fighting the Egyptian state? How can a group have such an influence? What is its funding resources? Why doesn't it use these resources to build instead of to destroy? Does it use its violence against influential countries as it does in Egypt?

This publication attempts to provide answers to these questions by discussing some ideas.

The study tries to show the aspects of the anti-Egyptian tripartite axis "the Brotherhood, Turkey, and Qatar" through three axes. The first is concerned with the major countries supporting and sponsoring the Brotherhood, which increases the group's ability to influence.

The first topic (The Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey: Intertwining interests) shows the connection between the Brotherhood project in the region and the Turkish project, focusing on the common interests between the two parties, and analyzing the most important factors affecting the future of the Brotherhood in Turkey. This axis is complemented by the second topic (The relationship between the Brotherhood and Qatar), which answers questions about the history of the Brotherhood in Qatar, the role of their leaders, their relationship with the international organization, and the funding of the Brotherhood in Qatar.

The study tracks the spread of the Brotherhood in Western countries, which have provided them with safe havens since the 1950s and again after 2013, despite the concerns about the social problems prevailing with Muslims in these countries, such as identity conflicts, racism and crimes of hate associated with them. These countries still refuse to designate the Brotherhood as a terrorist group, and its relations and offices remain secure in Western countries.

The second axis has four prongs. The third topic in this publication (The MB in the UK: A Special Case) discusses the establishment of the group in Egypt in 1928, and the continued link between the Brotherhood and the United Kingdom in general and the British intelligence service in particular. London is currently an important headquarters for the international Brotherhood organization and the main center of its movements.

The fourth topic (The Brotherhood in France... Islamicized) is concerned with the French state, explaining how the French society views political Islam groups, on top of which is the Brotherhood, in French literature, which shows the Brotherhood's reliance on slow infiltration to expand in and influence European societies.

The fifth topic (The MB in Europe between safe existence and cautious restriction) explains the status of the Brotherhood in Europe and how it enjoys the freedom of movement and acceptance in European societies. The French people and government, however, began to realize the potential threat posed by political Islam groups led by the Brotherhood, and began to resist this threat. The topic sheds light on France's ability to advance the path of forming a European anti-Brotherhood trend.

The sixth topic (Washington and the Brotherhood: Mutual infiltration and extended bets) attempts to interpret the relationship between the Brotherhood and the US by reviewing the experience of the Democratic and Republican parties in dealing with the group, and the differences between them. The topic also deals with the controlling determinants of the future of relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and the US.

The third axis is concerned with analyzing the most important networks on which the Brotherhood relies in its spread and continuity in four topics. The seventh topic, entitled (The MB's secret cell and its relationship with intelligence apparatuses), seeks to explain the deep-rooted organized secret activity of the Brotherhood, its concealed means of violence and other secret practices in the economy, information, and influential connections.

The eighth topic (The Brotherhood's funding networks) on their most important financial sources, which shows their penetration into the economies of countries in the region and beyond, and makes them direct their wealth to achieve influence and seek power.


The ninth topic (The media: The Brotherhood's weapon against states) presents the most dangerous means the Brotherhood relies on at present to use public opinion in a way that suits their interests.

The 10th topic is (The role of Muslim Sisters in the Brotherhood's strategies). This paper shows the concealed role of women in the Brotherhood, and highlights the impact of their dual role since the group was founded. In addition to being active members, women are also responsible for raising children, who form the next generation of the Brotherhood.

In the last part of the study, the 11th topic (The Brotherhood's challenges of presence and exclusion) presents a vision of the reality of the group and the challenges and problems it faces from within and in the surrounding environment. The conclusion of this study (The Brotherhood: What's Next?) presents an outlook for the future of the group at its great moment of defeat at home and its attempts to stage a comeback.

The Hegemony Project

The Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey, and Qatar trio



The Arab region was in a state of liquidity as a result of the absence of an active regional order for several decades, which allowed a number of countries to plan projects to extend their hegemony in the Arab world. Qatar wanted to play a role way larger than its capabilities, and this took place in tandem with Turkey's projects for the area. Regional shifts since 2011 provided the opportunity for Qatar and Turkey to implement their projects. The axis clarifies the Turkish-Qatari project to dominate the Arab world via a religious ideological discourse presented by the Muslim Brotherhood that has considerable proliferation and influence in the region and shares the same aspirations. This is why Turkey and Qatar supported and sponsored the Brotherhood and pushed its members into the decision-making circles of many regional countries. This subject is analyzed in two topics:

- **The Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey: Intertwining Interests**
- **The Relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar**



The Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey:


Intertwining Interests

Dr. **Dalal Mahmoud**
Director of the security and defense program at the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies

The Egyptians' revolution against the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) rule on 30 June 2013 was the moment of exposure for the group in the state where it originated. Violence and fights to acquire power are the original goals of the MB. The ideology of the group shows the intertwining of religion, political power and violence. This was apparent since Hassan Al-Banna founded the group in 1928. He established it as an Islamic political organization that aims at applying Islamic law in daily life and restoring Islamic rule based on his views and thesis in understanding contemporary Islam, where he said: "Islam is a doctrine and worship, nation and nationality, religion and state, spirituality, and Quran and the sword". Therefore, the scope of the group's movement was always ambiguous, and they declare that they represent the borderline between daawa and politics, but their history proves that they use daawa to practice politics and assume power.

Since the exposure of the group in Egypt, a new chapter in a historically repeated strategy that combines apparent vulnerability





and underground conspiracy has started. The removal of the Brotherhood from power and the declaration of their group as a "terrorist" group marked the beginning of a major phase of fracture. Its impact was doubled by the relative success of the Egyptian state's efforts in striking many of the Brotherhood's network veins in Egypt and, which affected its basic structure.

Consequently, the group tended to show weakness and claim it is a daawa group and has nothing to do with politics, while at the same time it has become a basic participant in the Egyptian state counter-axis, headed by Turkey, in an attempt to besiege Egypt with crises, conflicts, practicing psychological warfare against its people aiming at undermining the state and its regime and destabilizing it, until there is a new opportunity for the group and its sympathizers to jump into the political scene once again.

Turkey's Motives against Egypt

It is possible to understand the Brotherhood's hostility to the Egyptian state (regime and people) after their ouster from power in 2013. The people's rejection of them till now is apparent in the absence of response to their calls for demonstrations against the regime. But understanding Turkey's targeting of Egypt raises questions, and understanding this targeting requires going back to 2002, when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) assumed power in Turkey. This was when it was a parliamentary system and Recep Tayyip Erdogan was the head of government. This government had a regional project, which is to extend Turkey's influence in the Arab region, taking advantage of the regional leadership vacuum and the Arab countries' involvement in their domestic issues and intra-regional conflicts.

The Turkish project aims at enhancing Turkey's status for the United States and the European countries by expanding its influ-

ence in the region, as the region represented an expanding, open and limited competitive market for Turkey with its strong and diversified economy at that time.


Turkey's project is based on three pillars: Its economic strength that depends on the centrality of its role in energy projects run by major countries to transport gas from the Arab region or from the Caspian region via Turkey, which means that Turkey was planning to be the regional center of gas transport to Europe, in addition to its strategic importance both regionally and internationally. The historical relations that made Turkey (the former Ottoman Empire) bear some features of Arab identity, albeit more arrogant, is the ideological framework based on the rule of political Islam, although this framework did not appear clearly in the early years of Erdogan's rule, but was confirmed after the June 2013 revolution.

This project went through two phases concerning the policies that Turkey relied on to implement it. The First Phase (2002-2013): During this phase, Turkey followed new internal and external policies; a new reformative economic policy to revive the Turkish economic conditions, reorganization of localities and trade and students unions and restructuring state institutions until it finishes with the military institution. Externally, the principle of the Turkish policy was to have "zero conflicts" regionally and start a new phase with all countries in the region based on cooperation and peace, with a serious tendency to join the European Union. Along these policies the Turkish soft power had a role in promoting the Turkish model in the region. The Turkish media and drama – with their contents that do not all agree with Arab values and traditions – were widespread on Arab screens.

This policy helped Turkey achieve internal empowerment (according to the Brotherhood's ideology), and regional influence. With the events and changes witnessed in the region, known as the "Arab Spring Revolutions," the Turkish regime's chances of implementing its regional project increased. Conflicts spread in several Arab countries, and the Brotherhood came to power in the biggest Arab country in 2012 and Egypt came close to containing them. The Brotherhood accept the Turkish ruler to be a caliphate to the Muslims, and the indications of his caliphate to the Muslims and his Brotherhood trends appeared in his visit to Cairo in 2011, where he called on Egypt to follow the Turkish secularist model. The Muslim Brotherhood called on him in the same meeting to become the caliph. Two official meetings were held between him and former President Mohamed Morsi in the year in which Morsi ruled, during which he concluded 27 agreements with Egypt, most of which were not of common or equal interests for the two countries.

The Second Phase (June 2013-present): The repercussions of the June Revolution, that extended to the efforts of the reconstruction of the national state and increasing its capabilities, were not welcomed by the Turkish state. The repercussions didn't only affect Egypt's domestic affairs, but extended to hinder the progress of the previously mentioned Turkish project.

The June Revolution hit the three pillars of the Turkish project, which made the Turkish regime reveal its true intentions and its extreme ideological nature. Thus, it changed its policies to achieve the Turkish project in the region, which had a negative impact on all of Erdogan's ambitions and his Western and Arab aspirations. The goal of the Turkish regime is to weaken Egypt and destroy its national project, so that the opportunity will once again arise to implement Turkey's project.



Egypt an obstacle against the Turkish project in the Arab Region

What took place in Egypt after 2013, in terms of reform, development, realizing stability, increasing citizens' sense of security, and the successful fight against terrorism, shows Egypt's determination to regain its regional position, which makes it the objective equal to Turkey, but a more acceptable option to be the most influential power regionally and perhaps internationally at a later stage. The Turkish regime considered this situation a defeat for the Turkish project of regional hegemony and a blow to its pillars. On the ideological level (the rule of political Islam), the rule of the Brotherhood – the source of extremist ideology – in Egypt meant the continuation of the Turkish project under the caliphate of Erdogan as a caliph of Muslims accepted by the group, and the revival of the Ottoman Caliphate, as a summoning of the historical dimension in relations between Arabs and Turks. Consequently, the defeat of the Brotherhood in their stronghold and home of origin, Egypt, and then the pursuit of them in other Arab countries was a defeat for the ideological principle of the Erdogan project.

On the historical level, Egypt's restoration of its power enables it to regain its leadership in the region and the difficulty to contain it, whether alone or with an alliance of effective and influential Arab countries in the region as well. This undoubtedly contradicts with the dream of the new Ottoman caliphate, and perhaps the historical memory of Turkey does not forget its military defeat by Egypt during the rule of Mohamed Ali Pasha with the forces of the Ottoman Sultan Mahmoud II in the first wars of the Levant (1831-1833), during which the Egyptian forces reached eastern Anatolia, and almost took control of Astana had it not been for European intervention to preserve the sick man of Europe. With the building of

the modern Egyptian state during the rule of Mohamed Ali, it was strongly believed in Turkey and other countries that the Egyptian state, if strengthened, would threaten the interests and influence of the greedy ones.

On the economic level, the continuation of regional conflicts in the region and their various developments hinder the stability of economic conditions and the completion of projects to supply Europe with gas. This, in addition to other factors, limits the openness of Arab markets to Turkey and forces it to search for alternative markets in Africa and Asia on one hand. On the other hand, the gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean region, and the relatively stable security and economic conditions in Egypt, increase its chances of being a regional center for liquefying natural gas and supplying it to Europe, in conjunction with the reservations of Eastern Mediterranean and European countries on Turkish military harassment in Cyprus, and its efforts to impose its presence as an actor in this region to benefit from these discoveries.

The Muslim Brotherhood leads political Islam groups for the interest of the joint project with Turkey

To achieve its goals in Egypt after 2013, Turkey relied on two basic methods. **The First Method** is access to the Egyptian vital sphere, especially in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, but it was unable to achieve its goals in this area easily, and Egypt made no concessions before Turkey. The Egyptian deterrence was completely successful in curbing Turkish ambitions in Libya, and the Egyptian diplomacy with international actors – especially the Europeans – succeeded in pushing for a settlement, whether in Libya or in the Eastern Mediterranean, which shows the efforts made to curb Turkey's ambitions that are at the expense of the countries in the region and their interests. **The Second Method** is the Brotherhood. Turkey used the group to revive the idea of the "caliphate" and lead political Islam groups in the region, either to gain power or participate in it. By all means, the Brotherhood is an extension of Turkish influence in regional countries.

The common interests and visions between the Brotherhood and the ruling regime in Turkey towards Egypt were the basis of confirming the correlation between the two parties, and the dimensions of this relationship appear in several aspects, most notably:

The ideological dimension: It shows the intellectual background of Erdogan and his affiliation with the political Islam movement, influenced by his upbringing in the schools of imams and preachers, and his apprenticeship at the hands of Najmuddin Erbakan. His acceptance of the Brotherhood was announced on 17 February 2017 during a speech in which he said, "The Muslim Brotherhood is not considered a terrorist organization, because it is not an armed organization, but rather an intellectual organization." He was working to improve the group's image and gathering its leaders in the region to start a new path to achieve clear and specific goals under his leadership.

Utilitarian dimension: There is one goal agreed upon by the two parties; the group found in Erdogan a leader who could help it in its project to establish an Islamic caliphate and "mastering the world" as Hassan Al-Banna said, and Erdogan wants to restore the "Ottoman Caliphate" project through the Islamic project.

The widespread popular protests that took place in several Arab countries in 2011 provided the opportunity to achieve this goal, from the Turkish-Brotherhood point of view. But with the group's frustrations regarding the collapse of the project to escalate politi-

cal Islam to power, Turkey sought to expand its influence in the region, taking advantage of the Brotherhood, its popular bases, spurred branches, and wide capabilities.

On the other hand, Erdogan's use of the group to realize the expansionist dream of the caliphate meets the Brotherhood's benefit. The Brotherhood realizes Turkey's regional and international position and its symbolism related to the group's historic project for the leadership of the modern Islamic caliphate, and they see in Turkey the way to their ultimate goal – power.

Therefore, the Brotherhood's association with the various circles of power in Turkey is a fundamental goal of the group, and Erdogan provides the Brotherhood with this opportunity, to the extent that he is described as the executor of the Islamization process for the Turkish regime. The MB is a group that desires the state and not a relationship with the leader. This has always been the case, according to Arab experiences. The Islamization and consolidation of the religious model in Turkey is the Brotherhood's bet, not Erdogan.

The future of interdependence between Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood:

The previous dimensions show that the relationship between the Brotherhood and the Turkish regime is based on interdependence. There are several manifestations of this, including:

1. Erdogan is using the spurred branches of the Brotherhood in the region to implement his expansionist policy in the Middle East and make tangible achievements that he builds on domestically in light of the decline of his popularity and the deteriorating Turkish economy. Erdogan backs the Brotherhood to allow them to play the roles assigned to them that help achieve Turkey's interests. The relationship between Erdogan and the Brotherhood's branches to achieve Turkish interests is manifested in several examples, such as in Libya, where the Government of National Accord allows Turkey to explore for gas and the military cooperation between the two sides. Another example is Rachid Ghannouchi, head of the Tunisian parliament. The Brotherhood also has some influential roles in other countries such as using the Reform Party in Yemen to negatively influence the work of the Arab coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen, and their role as communication channels between Turkey and various terrorist organizations in Syria, Libya and Asia.

2. The danger of the Brotherhood in Turkey is increasing for its attachment to the head of the regime, opine observers who monitor the Brotherhood's penetration into and growing influence in Turkish society, to the extent where some Turkish officials fear that the group threatens the secular democratic system in Turkey, given the presence of many aspects of Islamization along with the regime's oppression, suppression of freedoms, and persecution of the opposition. These aspects are in line with the desired Brotherhood ruling model. Some Turkish opposition parties believe that Erdogan is gifting the Brotherhood with a polarized and divided nation and social vacuum that is being charged with extremist ideology, in addition to undermining the prestige of the military institution. This enables the organization to take advantage of state institutions in a way that is difficult to get rid of.

3. In previous years, Turkish authorities allowed the establishment of multiple Brotherhood associations and institutions in Turkey, the most prominent of



which are: The Social Weaving Association, which is led and managed by Turkish preacher Nur Al-Din Yildiz, known as the Mufti of Erdogan, and the Al-Hikma Association, headed by the Egyptian member of the Brotherhood Abdul-Aziz Ibrahim, one of the leaders of the Education Committee in the group, whose goal is to recruit Turkish and Arab youth, especially the refugees in Turkey and job seekers.

Turkey also established the Union of Islamic Civil Organizations, which includes more than 350 Brotherhood-affiliated organizations in the world, and is entrusted with receiving relief funds, donations and zakat. The union is the link between Brotherhood institutions to move the group's funds in the Middle East and the Islamic world. The union also partners with the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, the Federation of Islamic Organizations in France, and other international institutions affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in the West.

These Brotherhood institutions have a dual role. They consolidate the presence of the Brotherhood in Turkey, deepen their penetration into Turkish society, and pave the way for a Turkish foreign policy to access Arab societies and countries through Brotherhood branches already located in these countries and have their own grassroots in.

The future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey

Despite Turkey's embrace of Brotherhood members who fled Egypt and the group's media platforms in Turkey that uses Brotherhood elements against the Egyptian state, this safe haven faces many challenges that may threaten the future of the Brotherhood in Turkey. The most significant challenges are:

1. The increasing strength of the domestic opposition against Erdogan. Turkey's opposition forces agree on the need for Erdogan to relinquish power for Turkey to return to a parliamentary system with a strong economy, because Erdogan works to concentrate power in his hand by placing his relatives and family members in leading positions. Erdogan is facing rifts among the ranks of the Justice and Development Party in objection to his administration.

Turkey's economic deterioration was exacerbated by Erdogan's irrational management of the Covid-19 pandemic crisis, which made the Turkish economy vulnerable to the repercussions of the pandemic, particularly because the Turkish economy depends on the tourism and transport sectors, which were dealt a deafening blow by the crisis, according to a European Commission report. The regime's relationship with the Brotherhood and their harm to Turkish relations with Egypt and other Arab countries are key files for the opposition, especially with their penetration in the Turkish institutions, as previously stated.

2. International opposition against Turkey's hostile and provocative policies is taking shape. France is leading a European trend to curtail Turkey, Egypt is working to distance Turkey from Libya, and recently tensions between Turkey and Russia have been renewed due to its stance towards the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as it is almost out of American control. Erdogan has relied heavily on his hostile foreign policy – towards the Arab region and the Eastern Mediterranean – to make an achievement that raises his popularity or solves Turkey's internal problems, without making a clear achievement that reaps quick results. He damaged the Turkish image and foreign relations to the extent that he may resort to make compromises to settle its tense regional relations, the Brotherhood being one of them, especially in relation to Egypt.

3. The Brotherhood realizes that staying in Turkey is not a permanent alternative. Therefore the group adopts two methods to overcome this dilemma. The First Method: Searching for alternative places for the group where they have influence or friends, such as South Korea, where some of the group's youth moved due to the presence of some of the group's investments in the country, which gives them relative freedom of movement. The Second Method: It is the serious work to integrate into Turkish society, and the race to obtain Turkish citizenship, for fear of deportation in the future or Turkish rapprochement with the Egyptian regime which may result in their extradition.

"The Muslim Brotherhood's continued attempts to harm the Egyptian state would not have Persisted throughout the past seven years without their relationship with Turkey.

In sum, the Muslim Brotherhood's continued attempts to harm the Egyptian state would not have continued throughout the past seven years without their relationship with Turkey, and the Turkish project towards the Arab region could not have materialized without its relations with the Brotherhood and their penetration into Arab societies. This means that the consequences of these correlations still exist. They did not, and will not, disappear except with a change in the Turkish regime or its orientations and policy tools towards the Arab region. But the most important aspect is the existence of a strong public awareness that supports the state's efforts to confront this counter-axis and its destructive policies and undermines its efforts to harm Egypt.

The Relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood & Qatar

Tharwat Al-Kharbawi
Islamic thinker

Looking into the motives that prompted Qatar and its emir to take hardline stances against Egypt, some analysts suggested the move was the result of Qatar's affiliation to the US. After all, Qatar is a base for American forces, from which the US launches some operations.

This affiliation was not denied, therefore there are much deeper roots, with links leading directly to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the terrorist organization that has close ties with the US and even closer relations with the UK.

For those who do not know, the British intelligence is a pioneer in the fields of espionage and the establishment of dependent and loyal regimes. The American intelligence is a follower in methods and style, and even in the leadership to British intelligence. After losing the United Arab Emirates (UAE) following the emirate's unity under the leadership of Sheikh Zayed, the British intelligence transferred the bid to Qatar as a dependent emirate in terms of loyalty and management. The UK oversaw oil exploration in the emirate when black gold wells were discovered.



When the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia demanded in the 20th century to annex Qatar as part of the Al-Ahsa region in Saudi Arabia, the UK rejected; as it used to consider Qatar its base through which it controls the entire Gulf region. Qatar's independence from Saudi Arabia and the UAE makes it a tool for UK – and the US, of course – to threaten the entire Gulf region whenever it wants. For the UK to create a permanent state of tension in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it handed over three UAE islands to Iran when it ended its occupation of the UAE, and these islands are still under Iranian sovereignty.

UK was the beginning, and the US was the end, and in between was the Brotherhood. It is not surprising that the Brotherhood follows in terms of its formation and auspices the British Kingdom and in terms of management and direction the US. This analysis is not a personal point of view; historical facts attest this conclusion. When Brotherhood members fled Egypt in the 1965os and 1960s, many of them went to Qatar, and there the Brotherhood established a strong organization that turned into a mainstream for the ruling and influential elite there.

The Beginning of the Muslim-Brotherhood Organization in Qatar

The situation of the Brotherhood in Egypt worsened after the rise of Gamal Abdel-Nasser and the revolutionary regime. The British ordered the Brotherhood to go to Qatar to find shelter and support. In Qatar was a Gulf king from the House of



Yusuf Al-Qaradawi

(the Brotherhood's mufti)

1. He was born in 1926 in Gharbiya governorate. He graduated from the Faculty of Fundamentals of Religion, Al-Azhar University. He is former chairman of the International Union of Muslim Scholars.
2. He joined the MB in 1942 and is the group's first ideologue. He was offered the position of MB supreme guide several times.
3. He attended meetings of the International Organization of the MB as representative of the MB in Qatar
4. He was arrested several times in Egypt between 1949 and 1961 due of his anti-government activities with the MB.
5. In 1961, he traveled to Qatar where he served as the director of the Secondary Religious Institute. Nevertheless, he remained as a spiritual leader of the MB in Egypt.
6. In 1977, he laid the foundation for the Faculty of Sharia and Islamic Studies in the University of Qatar and became the faculty's dean until 1990. In 1989, he founded the Research Center of Sunna and Biography of the Prophet at the University of Qatar.
7. He participated in developing the educational and cultural structure of the Brotherhood, and his articles were published in MB magazines.
8. He authored books on "Islamic education," the most important of which are "Islamic Education and Hassan Al-Banna's School" in 1979, and "The Muslim Brotherhood's Seventy Years in the Call, Education and Jihad" on with the history of the group since its inception to the end of the 20th century.
9. He has many inciting fatwas that call for violence. He stated that suicide operations against civilians are "heroic acts of martyrdom". He also stated in his book "The Jurisprudence of Jihad" that "fighting aggressors" is a "duty" for Muslim masses.

Omar Al-Telmesany, the Brotherhood's supreme guide. The Brotherhood welcomed Sheikh Al-Ansari, and gave a lesson in the presence of Sheikh Al-Qaradawi at the Khedr Al-Touni Mosque in Nasr City, which was a new mosque that the Brotherhood took control over.

During the visit, Al-Ansari pledged allegiance to the supreme guide on behalf of the Brotherhood of Qatar, and Al-Telmesany instructed him to receive the allegiance of the Brothers of Qatar on his behalf. Thus, Qatar's Brotherhood became members of the International Brotherhood Organization. I have attended part of this visit at the Brotherhood's headquarters in Souk Al-Tawfiqiya Street, when later I took Sheikh Abdullah to meet a "Brotherhood battalion" in the neighborhood of Zaytoun, where he gave a lesson mostly about his history, education and memorizing Quran when he was a child, where he learnt it with the help of some scholars in the Noble Sanctuary. He admired Hassan Al-Banna and expressed his desire to meet him. The meeting never took place, nonetheless. Then he talked about his admiration of Omar Al-Telmesany and how he felt he was like a brother from a different mother.

One of the most important Qatari Brotherhood figures is Jassim Mohamed Sultan, one of the Brotherhood's top leaders in Qatar, who joined the Faculty of Medicine in Cairo in the mid-1970s and was a colleague of Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh and Essam Al-Arian, through whom he knew about the Brotherhood. He was not interested in studying medicine, but more interested in the study of humanities, philosophy and history. He had an organized mindset. He had a passion for reading, acquiring knowledge, and exchanging ideas with senior writers and intellectuals. When he returned to Qatar in the early 1980s he joined the Brotherhood and got acquainted with Yusuf Al-Qaradawi. But he stood against some actions in the history of the Brotherhood, like the assassinations carried out by the group in the 1940s, and their disagreement with Gamal Abdel-Nasser, not conducting intellectual reviews, not discussing the ideas of Hassan Al-Banna, and he was influenced by the ideas of Sayed Qutb. He believes that the ideas of Sheikh Mohamed Abdo could be a good start for the Brotherhood in the 1970s, because if they had adopted and developed them, the Brotherhood would have become a regenerative intellectual movement, in his



opinion, but they did not, because their upbringing did not allow them to renew at all.

The Muslim Brotherhood's shift from an organization into a stream Qatar

Sultan believes that the idea of an organization has become outdated, and that the Brotherhood should abandon the political work and start over from the innovative intellectual work. He also believes that the idea of bringing down the state adopted by Sayed Qutb is an evil idea. Sultan demands in his intellectual project that the modern state start from its understanding of Islam from the viewpoint of "Maslaha", or public interest. Wherever the Maslaha is, God is present, which is why copying must be abandoned and replaced by reasoning.



The importance of Sultan is that he began to think in the late1990s about the necessity to dissolve the Brotherhood Organization in Qatar, and said that it was not necessary. Sultan was at that time occupying a major leadership position in the organization in Qatar. Later, he hosted a group of leading Islamic thinkers from all over the world, whom he held fruitful conversations with. Among them was Dr. Abdullah Al-Nafisi, the Kuwaiti thinker who broke from the Brotherhood ranks and made the mother group in Egypt furious with his book "Papers in Self-Criticism."

Al-Nafisi held a series of meetings with a number of Qatari Brotherhood youth in the presence of Sultan and concluded that the decision to dissolve the Brotherhood in Qatar is the greatest decisions taken by the group throughout its history. Al-Nafisi wrote about this experience. In 2000, Sultan and a group of Qatari Brotherhood youth announced the decision of dissolving the Brotherhood organization in Qatar. The number of Qatari members during that period was more than 500 regular brothers, in addition to supporters, sympathizers, and their families. What was important is that the decision was issued by the consultative council of the group in Qatar. Dr. Al-Qaradawi objected, resented their decision, and supported the Qatari group that decided to continue in the organization. The MB in Egypt objected too, saying



the decision was hasty and unwise. Essam Al-Erian issued statements against Sultan and accused him of being reckless. The MB in Egypt claimed, in statements by many of its leaders, that the Qatari Brotherhood was not an organization in the common sense, but rathere a current admiring the Brotherhood's intellectual model, and that the Brotherhood has no organization in Qatar. These statements were announced to belittle the matter before the Brotherhood's youth, and to frustrate any separatist movements. Thus, Sultan is considered the first dissident from the Brotherhood organization in the modern era, and in the Gulf state in general, followed by the Kuwaiti Abdullah al-Nafisi. It is believed that Sultan succeeded in dissolving part of the organization.

After the organization was dissolved in Qatar, the Guidance Bureau convened in Egypt in 200 to discuss the matter. The final say at that time was to Hajj Mustafa Mashhour "Abu Hani," who decided that the matter should be as in Kuwait, meaning that the Qatari Brotherhood who rejected the decision to dissolve the organization would remain in the organization, seek to restore the organization once more and include new members. The responsible person would be called "the deputy", as he will be the deputy for the supreme guide in Egypt in managing the Qatari organization, and the popular name of the deputy brother who was chosen in 2000 was "Abu Abdullah".

There is another Brotherhood organization that has nothing to do with the Qatari organization called the "Egyptian Organization". First, brother Sami Abdel-Jawad Al-Haram, Al-Qaradawi's brother-in-law, was the head of the Egyptian Brotherhood there, and when he returned to Egypt, Sheikh Essam Talimah became Al-Qaradawi's secretary and in charge for a short period of time. There is also the unified organization that includes brothers from different nationalities, including Palestinians, Sudanese, Yemeni, Nigerians, Algerians, Tunisians, and so on.

The Brotherhood succeeded in containing this disintegrating rebellion, and pushed the ruler of Qatar to give them wider powers and appoint them to sensitive government positions. The influence of Yusuf al-Qaradawi helped them there, especially as he raised and educated the current emir of Qatar when he was a young boy. This is an old custom of emirs, to bring a polite educator and teacher

to their children, teaching them elementary education until they grow up, and that is why the emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad, was so close to his mentor Sheikh Al-Qaradawi and considered him his spiritual father.

Qatari Brotherhood leaderships

The details of MB members who fled Egypt are known. They include Al-Qaradawi, Wagdi Ghoneim, Assem Abdel-Maged, Ayman Abdel-Ghani, and others, but we do not know yet the leaders of the Qatari Brotherhood. They were headed by Sultan, who was close to Essam Al-Erian, Abul-Fotouh and Helmy Al-Gazzar. Sultan joined them in the Qasr Al-Aini Faculty of Medicine. Among the leaders who later appeared and had a remarkable influence was Sheikh Abdullah bin Turki Al-Subaie, the father of Khalifa, who was on the lists of terrorists. Also among them was Sheikh Eissa bin Hareb, who was the minister of Islamic affairs and endowments, and who died about a year ago, and Mohamed bin Salem Al-Kuwari, the head of the supreme judiciary and the minister of justice, who is also the son of one of the previous leaderships, Sheikh Salem Al-Kuwari, who was a Qatari ambassador. Mohamed Al-Kuwari is the cousin of one of the Brotherhood's leaders included in the terrorists lists, Salem Hassan Khalifa Al-Kuwari. Abdul-Latif Al-Kuwari, is also on the terrorists lists. Other members include Mohamed bin Abdullah Al-Ansari, the son of the sheikh and founder of the Brotherhood of Qatar, who held leadership positions in the Qatari Ministry of Education, and he is the one responsible for education in the Qatari Brotherhood organization.



Abdullah Al-Ansari


(the nucleus of the MB in Qatar)

1. He was born in Al-Khor, northeast of Doha, in 1914.
2. He memorised the Quran at an early age by his father, and he studied the basic principles of Sharia.
3. He traveled to Saudi Arabia where he worked as a teacher, an imam, a preacher, and an assistant to the Qatif judge. Then he was appointed as a teacher and director of a school in Saudi Arabia.
4. He returned to Qatar in 1948 and established the first religious institute in Qatar. He also occupied a number of positions, including manager of the first primary school in Qatar, and the last of which was the director of the Religious Affairs Department.
5. He joined the MB due to his close relationship with Al-Qaradawi.
6. In the mid1980-s, he came to Egypt with Al-Qaradawi to meet Sheikh Omar Al-Telmesani, supreme guide of the MB at that time, and pledged allegiance to him on behalf of the group in Qatar.
7. He was a member of the founding council of the Muslim World League, a member of the International League of Islamic Literature, and a founding member of the Islamic Daawa (Calling) Organization and Islamic Council of South Africa.
8. He passed away in 1989 in Doha.

But does the Brotherhood have a fixed headquarters in Qatar? The answer will seem strange concerning the inclusion of the rulers of Qatar, as the Brotherhood has no fixed headquarters. The headquarters are mostly in the homes and palaces of some brothers, or in the headquarters of companies they own, especially contracting companies, doctors' clinics, and charity and education associations' headquarters and companies operating in these fields. Most of these companies and societies are already included on terrorism lists, but the Muslim Brotherhood has worked in Qatar in three circles: the Qatar Brotherhood circle, the Egyptian Brotherhood circle, and the Unified organization circle. Each circle has its own headquarters, but the three work under the same administration.

Al-Jazeera was created by Intelligence Services

It is not a simply regular relation between the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar. This correlation should play an active role in bringing down the Arab world, so the Brotherhood's media administration's plans were to control the collective mentality of the Arab peoples. There was a role for both Qatar and the Brotherhood to bring down Arab regimes. British intelligence developed a plan for this matter, and in 1994 it presented it to Sheikh Khalifa the father, but he rejected it. So, immediately the UK ordered the overthrow of the rejectionist sheikh and replaced him with his son Hamad bin Khalifa to start the most dangerous game in the modern era.



The game is mastered by two of the most dangerous institutions in the world in the modern era: The Tavistock Institute and Chatham House, both of which are affiliated to the British intelligence. **Tavistock** Institute specializes in the sciences of mental programming and managing the collective mindset of the masses and peoples. This institute actively contributed to prepare the ground for the January 1979 Khomeini revolution against Shah Reza Pahlavi in Iran. Through the experiences of the Tavistock Institute, a system was set for Qatar to manage Al-Jazeera channel. It provided the Qatari government with its leading experts in the fields of influencing masses and managing their collective movement. Egyptians who worked in that channel know the media courses the channel provides with the aim of influencing the masses.

The original name of the Chatham House Institute, which has the upper hand in laying the groundwork for Al-Jazeera in terms of analyzing news and documentary filmmaking, is the Royal Institute for International Affairs. The institute is based in London and is affiliated to the British Intelligence. Its mission is to analyze information and prepare researches on the Middle East. It includes a group of Brotherhood members led by Maha Azzam, and it gives an annual international award, which was given to some lead-

ers of the international Brotherhood organization, such as Rachid Ghannouchi, Sheikha Mozah. The award was once given to Hillary Clinton.

The Chatham House developed the media plans of all the documentaries prepared by Al-Jazeera, and during the Arab Spring revolutions, it was the one that devised the analysis for news bulletins, whereby Al-Jazeera broadcasters read them according to the way they were trained.

The Tavistock Institute provided Al-Jazeera with two leading Israeli media experts who, along with a social psychologist, Stephen Herschel, led the "media invasions" of Al-Jazeera during the Arab Spring revolutions and the presidential elections in Egypt, where all their efforts were aimed at directing the masses to vote for Mohamed Morsi.

Rooting the Relations between the MB and Qatar

Qatari rulers were greatly influenced by the Brotherhood under the auspices of the British intelligence. The relationship between Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad, who assumed power in Qatar from 1972 to 1995, and Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi and Sheikh Abdul Halim Abu Shaqqa was bolstered before he became the emir of Qatar. When Khalifa became crown prince, he brought Al-Qaradawi and Abu Shaqqa to educate and raise his son, Hamad bin Khalifa. So, the Brotherhood took advantage of this opportunity and brought up Sheikh Hamad on the Brotherhood's ideology. They taught him the history of the group and the messages of Hassan Al-Banna. The book Al-Qaradawi wrote explaining the letters of Al-Banna was a compilation of the lessons that he gave to Sheikh Hamad.



Jassim Mohamed Sultan

(ideologue of intellectual reviews)

1. He is a prominent former leader in the Brotherhood in Qatar.
2. He joined the Faculty of Medicine, Cairo University in the mid1970-s. He was introduced to the Brotherhood's ideology due to his close relations with Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh and Essam Al-Erian.
3. He was well cultured and mainly interested in the study of humanities, philosophy, and history.
4. He returned to Qatar in the early 1980s to join the Brotherhood due to his close relationship with Al-Qaradawi.
5. He criticized the Brotherhood's ideas, especially concerning violence and assassinations, and their failure to carry out intellectual reviews and their adherence to the ideas of Hassan Al-Banna and Sayed Qotb.
6. In the late 1990s, he discussed the necessity to dissolve the Brotherhood in Qatar, and he was able to do so in 2000.
7. He is the first dissident from the Brotherhood in modern times.



When Sheikh Hamad became the emir of Qatar after he had turned against his father, he brought Al-Qaradawi and the Brotherhood sheikhs with him to the palace to raise the young prince Tamim, born in 1980. Tamim's absorption of the Brotherhood's ideas was intense. He lived for the idea of the caliphate and he was convinced he was more entitled to the caliphate than any other ruler, as if the caliphate would be given to "Al Khalifa." Tamim turned against his father, Hamad, and a year ago, Tamim brought Sheikh Al-Qaradawi to the palace to raise and educate his son Hamad bin Tamim, born in 2008, following the Brotherhood style, and to prepare him to be the crown prince of the Muslim caliph Tamim bin Hamad. The old sheikh Al-Qaradawi seems not to tire of those tasks.

Funding the Muslim Brotherhood in Qatar

The Brotherhood's funding in Qatar comes from several parties and means, the first is the monthly contributions, which is about 10 percent of each individual's total income. Then zakat money and charities on the basis that the work of the Brotherhood, as they say, is for the sake of God and it is one of the channels of spending zakat. The third source is donations from rich individuals and business leaders, with an annual rate of five percent of the profits of the companies to which the group contributes, which are distributed on the three organizations according to the needs of each organization. It should be noted that the Brotherhood of Qatar sends the Brotherhood of Egypt 30 percent of its budget, and to the international organization 10 percent.

During Tamim's rule, the circumstances drastically changed. Financing increased to $2 billion, and the billions pumped by Tamim played a big role in supporting terrorists in the region, as if Tamim was with one hand controlling the billions of gas to ignite wars, kill, and finance terrorist camps in Sudan and Libya, and with the second hand controlling the Brotherhood and moves it to break up the region, while the British intelligence is controlling Tamim himself.

It is worth mentioning that there was an old Brotherhood project, based on the financing of Saudi Shiite movements secretly, to help




change the form of government in Saudi Arabia. The aim of the Brotherhood was to make Saudi Arabia a constitutional monarchy, and the triangle of the Brotherhood's plan was a spearhead, which is the leadership of the international organization of the Brotherhood in London, because it is the mastermind and the international organization is the one that coordinates directly with the intelligence services, the focal point, which depends on Qatar and its financing, and the management of the movement, which is based on the Iranian intelligence and its movement with the Houthis and the Shiites of Bahrain.

"The Muslim Brotherhood has worked in Qatar in three circles: the Qatar Brotherhood circle, the Egyptian Brotherhood circle, and the Unified organization circle. Each circle has its own headquarters, but the three work under the same administration.

In conclusion, the issue is not, as some imagine, about human connections or even organizational links between the Brotherhood and Qatar, but a correlation that has a common goal of controlling and destabilizing the region. The Brotherhood follows Qatar that provides them with shelter, and both are tools for a larger scheme to dismantle the region.

The Brotherhood is supported by a number of intelligence services and Qatar doesn't belong to the Arab world because of its emir Tamim Al Thani.



Infiltrating Societies:
The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategy in the West

Two decades ago, the Brotherhood's "Grand Project" was revealed. The project is a strategy adopted by group members residing in the West to be empowered in Western communities and gradually change them. Western countries didn't realize how dangerous the strategy is and didn't take adequate measures to ward off the danger or halt the moves of political Islam groups controlled primarily by the Brotherhood. Recently, however, Western countries comprehended how dangerous the strategy is with the appearance of parallel communities that started to form within them by political Islam groups led by the MB, which may further divisions and spread hatred in Western countries.

The axis zooms in on the Brotherhood's expansion in the West in four topics:

- **The MB in the UK: A Special Case**
- **The Muslim Brotherhood in France... Islamicized**
- **The MB in Europe between Safe Existence and cautious Restriction**
- **Washington and the Muslim Brotherhood**





The Muslim Brotherhood in the UK:

A Special Case

Mujahid Al-Sumaidaie
A researcher in terrorism studies

The Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) relationship with the United Kingdom (UK) is no longer a secret for Islamist movements. It is also an open secret that the Brotherhood tries to impose itself as an Islamist political solution to dominate Islamic regimes by claiming it represents moderate Islam, hiding terrorism under its wings. The group was the birthplace of many leaders of terrorist organizations, such as Ayman Al-Zawahiri, who was a member of the MB and is now the leader of Al-Qaeda terrorist organization after Osama bin Laden, as well as many Brotherhood members who left the group to become leaders in the Islamic State (IS) in the Syrian city of Raqqa and leaders of factions fighting alongside IS.

Historical Overview

The Muslim Brotherhood's link with the British goes back to the decades of British and French domination over the Middle East and when ethnicities and opposing ideologies were exploited to implement Western interests and agendas in their countries. The



MB presence in the UK



1956 The UK secretly contacted the Brotherhood to gain information about Nasser. The contacts were uncovered by the British Embassy in Cairo.

1990 The British government provided political asylum to the majority of Brotherhood members.

2002 British Foreign Office maintained contact with Brotherhood members.

2005 A series of documents revealed by the British press confirmed the strong relationship between the UK and the Brotherhood.



2011 A British Foreign Ministry delegation visited the Brotherhood's administrative office in Alexandria.

2014 It was revealed the MB managed more than 100 million pounds in Britain.

2015 The House of Commons rejected a request from David Cameron, British prime minister, to declare the Brotherhood a banned terrorist group in the UK.

2017 The UK designated Hasm and the Brigade of the Revolution as terrorist organizations.

Brotherhood is one such movement whose secret links with the UK dates back to the beginning of World War II, or in 1941. These movements did not conceal their funding by colonial Britain, giving them the ability to single out the uniqueness of building a religious ideology based on the implementation of Western agendas and to use religion to carry out these agendas.

In his Memoirs of "The Call and the Preacher" (Mudhakkirāt Al-Daawa wal-Daiyah), Hassan Al-Banna referred to receiving EGP 500,000 in financial aid from the Suez Canal Authority, owned by French and British governments at that time, as a contribution to the construction of a Brotherhood mosque in Ismailia. The grant helped build the Brotherhood group. There is a lot of historical evidence that proves the MB's relationship with the UK. At a time when Britain was negotiating to evacuate its troops from Egypt, the Brotherhood led by the second leader Hassan Al-Hudaibi officially met with the British ambassador to Egypt at the British Embassy. The government at the time accused the Brotherhood of obstructing the negotiations of British troops' evacuation from Egypt. When president Gamal Abdel-Nasser came to power in Egypt, Western support for the Brotherhood to blow the Nasserist project in Egypt was one of the most prominent British alliances of the era. Part of Britain's expansionist policy was to find a Western ally in Egypt, and it was a successful strategy.

Many Brotherhood leaders have moved to Europe since the end of the 1950s and founded many Islamic centers that helped the group develop its relations with Western governments, including, for example, Said Ramadan who founded the Islamic Center in Geneva in 1961 to become the International Center for Brotherhood Leadership in Europe, according to Mark Curtis's 2014 book "Secret Affairs: Britain's Collusion with Radical Islam". Ramadan is the group founder's son-in-law.

The Brotherhood was able to take Britain as a safe sanctuary and establish a network of important political and social relations within British society that helped it expand in Britain by establishing the Muslim Association of Britain, founded by the Egyptian Kamal Al-Halbawi, the group's former secretary. Today, the group has 11 branches across Britain.

The 1960s saw a bitter conflict between the Brotherhood in Egypt as a result of Britain's support for the Brotherhood, where the Cairo government accused them at the time of masterminding a coup against the regime with the help of Britain, especially after Egypt's support for the Abdullah Al-Salal coup against the monarchy in Yemen, which was backed by Britain and Saudi Arabia. Following the attempted coup, many Brotherhood leaders were executed, including Sayed Qotb, one of the Brotherhood's most prominent theorists.

The UK's relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood

Relations between the UK and the Brotherhood have fluctuated over the past decades, as the kingdom has dealt with the Brotherhood on the basis of interest, and a covenant between them called the "covenant of security", which provides the Brotherhood with the opportunity to work in the UK as long as they do not challenge its security, meaning that the UK doesn't become a target of terrorist attacks. This covenant was not immutable, as the UK deals with the Brotherhood according to the variables of the national interest, moving them when the interest requires so, and leaving them to their fate when the need no longer exists.

The Brotherhood in the 1960s and 1970s was a major cause of unrest in Egypt. This was used by Britain to confront the socialist and communist tide in Egypt, in an attempt to ruin Egypt's relations with the Soviet Union. The Brotherhood was used as a tool for pressure, as many sources indicated that it sometimes forged leaflets in their name to label the Egyptian army as infidels because it uses the arms of the Communists whom the group deems infidels, especially in Yemen when leaflets were handed out in the name of the Brotherhood to the Yemenis to fight the Egyptian army. This was among the most prominent examples of the Brotherhood's use of incitement in Egypt.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the UK became a hub for global jihad organizations, and the Brotherhood was part of these organizations. They were granted asylum in the UK and were allowed to establish Islamic centers that promoted their ideology to the extent at some point London was called Londonistan, due to the large number of Islamist groups in London.

However, the UK was alarmed following the 2005 London Metro bombings, when 57 people were killed. The UK's relations with the Brotherhood were going back and forth, as the Brotherhood often uses their political relations within the British government to stop any decision that could pose a threat to their presence or political influence in the UK.

The UK continued its policy of turning a blind eye to the Brotherhood on its soil, and



in some cases it dealt with ambivalence regarding the issue of the Brotherhood. In 2015, the House of Commons rejected a request by then prime minister David Cameron to designate the Brotherhood a banned terrorist group in the UK, but the House of Commons rejected the request and considered the Brotherhood a group that represents moderate political Islam.

In 2017, the British government designated Lewaa Al-Thawra (Brigade of the Revolution) and Hasm (Decisiveness) as terrorist movements. The two armed groups are affiliated to the Brotherhood. However, the MB claims the two groups are splinter cells from terrorist organizations as they target Egyptian security personnel and civilians with direct killings. It is worth noting that these two movements represent the arms of the Brotherhood to liquidate opponents, and they played a role in suppressing the Egyptian revolution that led to the overthrow of the Brotherhood's rule in 2013.

Muslim Brotherhood funds in the UK

Terrorism neither feeds on extremist ideas nor on grudges and hatred. It depends on money that helps it to adapt in any environment or to penetrate societies targeted by terrorism. The UK is an important center for the Brotherhood's money.

Sayed Ramadan was the first to establish the financial empire of the Brotherhood when he arrived in Geneva in 1958 where he established the Islamic Center in Geneva. Since that time he began the establishment of the financial empire of the Brotherhood in Europe. Switzerland was the headquarters, because of its complex mechanisms in tracking money as well as the high protection of investors by Swiss banks. Then, the Brotherhood began to build charitable institutions and companies that act as an umbrella to raise money for the Brotherhood to cover their expenses in Egypt.

In 2014, it was revealed that, in the UK alone, the Brotherhood manages more than 100 million pounds sterling. The Brotherhood established 23 charitable associations in Europe, 10 of which were in the UK. The 23 associations were controlled by three leaders of the Brotherhood. The first was the assistant of former president Mohamed Morsi, Essam Haddad and his son Jihad Haddad who were arrested on espionage charges in 2013. The second is Ibrahim Al-Zayat, who descends from an Egyptian father and a German mother, speaks Arabic and German fluently, and is accused of funding terrorism in a famous money laun-

dering case in Germany. He runs a large financial institution there, which made Germany an incubator for the Brotherhood in Europe. Sources indicate that the Brotherhood under the leadership of Al-Zayat run in Germany 30 active associations, 511 mosques, 1,091 meeting places and 2,137 Islamic associations. The third is Ibrahim Mounir, the man responsible of the General Secretariat of the International Brotherhood Organization, and is suspect number 30 in the same case of Sayed Qotb in 1965. Mounir was sentenced to death in the same case, then the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, but he was released in 1975, which makes him an extension of the ideology of Sayed Qotb and carries the same ideology of labeling society as infidels and ignorant and using violence to achieve the goals of the organization. Mounir, the main arm of the Brotherhood, who runs the organization from the UK and controls several important files for the international organization by reason of his control over the London office, is now the acting supreme guide of the Brotherhood after the arrest of Mahmoud Ezzat. The organization in Egypt turned to organized secret activities and is being run from abroad.

The UK and the terrorist Brotherhood

> **"There is little evidence that the experience of power in Egypt has caused a rethinking in the Muslim Brotherhood of its ideology or conduct. UK official engagement with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood produced no discernible change in their thinking. Indeed, even by mid 2014 statements from Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood-linked media platforms seem to have deliberately incited violence."**
>
> From a report by the committee of Sir **John Jenkins**



Muslim Brotherhood associations in the UK

Islamic forums and organizations are part of the political and economic composition of the MB and the bases to spread and establish control over Muslim communities abroad. Another basis is raising funds through donations and the use of these funds to build financial institutions in areas where government control is weak, such as the Al-Taqwa Bank founded by Youssef Nada in the Bahamas and is linked to the Al-Taqwa Foundation, which was founded in Lugano, Switzerland. The foundation was directly linked to the bank, which was closed after the discovery of its association with the executors of the bombing of 11 September 2001.

Several states confiscated the money of Youssef Nada because he was implicated in terrorist activities. In 2002, Nada appeared before an Italian court for funding some



groups with relations to Al-Qaeda organization, in addition to funding Hamas and the Armed Islamic Group with more than $60 million funds from Al-Taqwa Bank. He was removed from the list of supporters of terrorism for lack of evidence on his direct involvement in supporting terrorism. However, the documents seized from the house of Youssef Nada by the Swiss police are so important that they include Brotherhood literature and plans on empowering the MB in governing and controlling the world, especially the West, papers on manipulating the law in Europe to consolidate their presence, and how to build safe havens for the funds to support Brotherhood movements around the world. The most important of these bodies are listed hereunder.

The Islamic Association in Britain

It is one of the associations run by the MB in the UK. It was established by Kamal Al-Halbawi in 1997, and after his split from the Brotherhood, the Iraqi Anas Al-Tikriti ran the association in 2005.

Islamic Relief Worldwide

This is a relief association established in Britain in 1989 by Ibrahim Al-Zayat, Ahmed Kazem Al-Rawi and Mohamed Omar Al-Alfi. It has an estimated financial liquidity of £21.4 million, and was later run by Essam Al-Haddad in 1992 until 2013, nine days after the removal of Mohamed Morsi. The resignation of Essam Al-Haddad came at the request of the organization's management for fear that the organization's funds would be traced and confiscated, and therefore he resigned.

Tic International ltd

This is a wholesale clothing and footwear trading company created by Hani Abdul-Jawad Al-Bunni and Mohamed Omar Al-Alfi. The declared cash is £258,000.

West of England Trust ltd

It is a holding company established in 1994 to be the parent company of several compa-

nies. The names of the founders are undisclosed, but the information available about the company proves that the company was liquidated. It went bankrupt and was voluntarily closed by the founders. Its financial liquidity was £17 million.

Europe Trust

A credit company founded in 2003, with an estimated financial liquidity of £267,000, Europe Trust was founded by AbduloShahid Al-Ashaal, Ibrahim Al-Zayat and Ahmed Kazem Al-Rawi. The latter is the brother of Dr. Essam Al-Rawi, a member of the Muslim Scholars Association in Iraq that was established after the occupation of Iraq, a body also known for its direct contacts with the Brotherhood and its direct support from them. Dr. Essam Al-Rawi was assassinated in 2006 in Baghdad near his house in Daoudi district.

Jordan Company Secretaries Limited

It provides services to British companies, such as regular maintenance work. The company was established in 2007 by Abdul-Shahid Al-Ashaal and Michael White Weil. The company was dissolved on 13 October 2020 with a liquidity of EGP 630,000.

Tiseer Welfare Trust:

This is a company that provides education, training and patient care services. It was established in 2007 by Abdul-Shahid Al-Ashaal, Mohamad Ali Hassanein, and Khurshid Khalifa. Its available liquidity is £6,000 and is still active.

Muslim Youth Forum:

The Brotherhood also runs the Muslim Youth Forum in Britain, which controls 42 organizations that bring together young people from more than 26 Muslim origins and communities in Britain, in addition to the Finsbury Park mosque, in agreement with the British government.

In sum, the Brotherhood's penetration into British society was so influential that they were able to prevent the British government from issuing a decision against them, by blocking it by the House of Commons. By using the House of Commons, the MB was able to prevent the passage of laws that criminalize or make the Brotherhood a banned terrorist organization in Britain. The main reason is due to the Brotherhood's relations with politicians in the UK, as well as the way the Brotherhood represents itself as a moderate political Islam organization, which accepts Western solutions, and in support of the West. In fact, the group works to liquidate its opponents by various means, including assassination.

The Muslim Brotherhood has worked since its inception at the beginning of the last century to build various financial empires in various places as an international organization dreaming of imposing its hegemony over the world. Therefore, it established religious associations and organizations in the US, Europe, and East Asia. These empires work on collecting money from donors to use them either in terrorist activities or to support instability in the country of origin to cause any confusion that helps them re-present themselves as a ready solution for the country's leadership.

The UK was deeply involved in building the Brotherhood's economic organization at the beginning of their emergence, and it still is a fertile ground



for managing funds and money laundering operations between Europe and the country of origin.

If Egypt wants to stop the Brotherhood, it must stop the financial organizations that the Brotherhood is working to build in Europe, particularly in Germany and the UK, and halt the group's exploitation of freedoms they enjoy in these countries to destabilize the countries that they have influence in. Draining the financial sources of terrorism is the way to stop the activities of this terrorist group.

The Muslim Brotherhood in France ...

Islamicized

Jasim Mohamed
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It seems to me that the study of the Islamists' expansion in western European countries in general, and in France in particular, requires not only analyzing the discourse, strategies, working methods and the supporting public, if any, but also the paths of these societies and the conditions of Muslims there, but the way to do so is difficult.

It is certainly difficult to follow all what French academics produce, but it can be said that the prevailing studies tend to address the issue, conditions, discourse and projects of the Islamists alone, without knowing much about the conditions, perceptions and discourse of French Muslims who do not belong to any faction of the Islamists. In general, this information comes from researches of specialists in public opinion studies and surveys, and electoral geography, who are not experts in Islamic affairs, but their writings help shape a perception of the paths and components of society.

This paper is concerned with the contents of two of the most prominent French





Macron's latest speech

- Described Islam as "a religion that is in crisis all over the world"
- Emphasized impartiality by state institutions.
- Strengthening control of associations.
- Structuring the educational system.
- Countering Islamic isolationism.

books on the expansion of Islamists and the beginning of the implementation of their project based on the control of neighborhoods and cities, and on expanding their influence to push the largest number of Muslims to break with the rest of society and be hostile to it, while providing a critical reading to shed light on the environment in which this expansion is taking place.

"French Islands" an Approach to understanding the Muslims status in France

To achieve the goal of the study, a very interesting book, "The French Islands" by Jérôme Fourquet, will be discussed. It was published last year and is considered by many academics to be the most important book published by France in the past five years. Fourquet says the book is an examination (and confirmation) of philosopher Marcel José's ideas. His main idea is that in the last 50 years France has witnessed the complete collapse of the intellectual, cultural and social system that formed its backbone for hundreds of years and that guaranteed the solidarity, harmony and cohesion of society, which is the Catholic system. A while later the counter-system (the communist system) that was fighting the Catholic system collapsed.


Fourquet says that society is now divided into islands and is regularly fragmented. He measured this collapse by the change in the numbers of births bearing names referring to the history of Christianity, the most important of which is "Mary", the decline in the number of priests, worshippers and baptisms, the decline in the choice of burial and the high rate of cremation, and the change in public opinion about divorce, homosexuals, virginity, abortion, tattoo painting, etc. He refers to factors that have facilitated fragmentation, including the success of the elite in isolating itself from society, the inability to lead by example, the collapse of major newspapers, the fragmentation of the media system, and the multiplicity of social sites, etc.



The book presents a study of the situation of French Muslims based mainly on statistics and opinion polls. We could temporary just say that the development of their situation is similar in some areas to the development of the rest of the national community and contradicts it in others, such as the rates of worshippers who refuse to drink, or who stipulate bride's virginity, are the same rates as those who are conservative towards non-Muslim marriage, and homosexuals. We will present some of the conclusions of this study that allow us to shed light on the books we are discussing.

Muslims as seen by François Pupponi

We begin with "The Emirates of the Republic," by François Pupponi, a left-wing cadre who grew up in one of France's poorest cities and was a mayor for 20 years. This small town relatively close to Paris is a city of immigrants (mostly Moroccan and African Muslims, recently joined by Pakistanis, Turks, Jews from North Africa and Christians from the Levant) and French displaced persons (from the countryside to the outskirts of Paris). Pupponi saw the "leap" of the extremists (the first faction was Turkish) on it and on factions of its Muslim youth and the resistance and terror of the people. He decided to be the spokesman of the people whose point of view does not reach the left-wing elites living in fancier neighborhoods that judge, make directions and know nothing, the people who are not interviewed by the media because they do not speak French and cannot find the appropriate vocabulary to express their opinion. He tells us that this is what led him to write "The Emirates of the Republic".




Pupponi describes the "religious situation" of Muslims in his city before the arrival of the extremists in 2014, saying: Half of them are religious (he means, like the French classification, that they are regular and diligent in worship), everyone chooses Islamic names for their children, everyone celebrates Islamic holidays, like how the French of Christian origins celebrate Christmas.

Most of them describe themselves as "French with Islamic culture," and do not like to limit their identity to Islam.

They see Islam as a religion of tolerance and openness. They consider themselves an integral part of the "French family", despite their nostalgia for the original homeland or their village, but their loyalty is to France, and they live and behave like the French.

In Pupponi's book, extremists suddenly appeared as if they have grown up as an intruder, and he says bluntly: "They have nothing to do with the Muslims of France", they are "different". Their strange attire is proof of their separation from the French environment and their rejection of it. Elsewhere, Pupponi mentions that they are either French born in France, undutiful children or grandchildren of immigrants, or Turkish or Moroccan immigrants who arrived in France in the recent years. Unlike other Muslims, they are keen to wear a completely different style – the Salafi shirt, beard, abaya (garb), hijab (headscarf), or niqab (full face veil). In Pupponi's city they number between 100 and 150, and in all of France between 72,000 and 150,000, according to his definition of extremism. If we compare these numbers with the number of individuals considered by the security to be danger-



ous, we find that two or three percent of the Islamicized may turn into terrorists, which is a really high percentage.

Polarization of the poor between Extremists and Leftists

Pupponi says the way out of poverty is success in education. He adds that the problem in his city (and elsewhere) is that those who succeed in studying ascend socially and leave the place, and those who fail to follow this path remain in the same location. The most intelligent of them enter the field of political (preferring extreme left-wing parties), civic and the cultural action, others work in small jobs or are unemployed and live on government support. Some of them are involved in the hash economy and market, and some slip into crime. He says that Islamists and radical leftists target these groups. Leftists tell them that France is a racist state that hates blacks and Arabs, and they talk about systematic discrimination by the state, and the Islamists tell them that it is an infidel state that hates Islam. The accusations of the two parties are invalid, but there are those who believe them. Whatever the case, most of the terrorists who came from the suburbs were criminals and thieves who "repented" and assumed that they followed the path of jihad.

In a quick comment, adding to Pupponi's discussion, there are some indications that girls are more successful than men in terms of success at school and university studies, which allows them to leave poverty and live in fancier neighborhoods. This contributes to the discontent of boys against society and the educational institution, as well as mem-

bers of their families who reproach them with their inability to make achievements like girls, so it is easy to attract males, and statistics indicate that in many cities Fourquet found that men make up 52 per cent of Muslims in the poor neighborhoods, while women represent 56 percent of Muslims in the neighborhoods of the middle and upper classes.

However, the main concern of the vast majority of Muslims remains the social ascendancy (not the break with the society that represents the essence of the Islamists' project). Also, the social ascendancy requires the completion of studies and obtaining a university degree, then most of them seek to work in state agencies that do not exercise discrimination in appointment and promotion (unlike the private sector and some state agencies), the most important of which are the military, police and Ministry of Education, which guarantee a stable income.

Back to Pupponi. Of course, not all extremists are terrorists. They call themselves preachers. Pupponi says that they took advantage of the vacuum left by the decline of the Communist Party and played the role of activists roaming in the city. About 150 or 200 Islamists succeeded in completely subjugating neighborhoods in a city of 60,000 people and instilling fear in them. They mainly aim at subjugating and persecuting Muslim women and men, but they harass and disturb everyone. Who is responsible for this?

The press and the media tend to accuse mayors, be they right-wing or left-wing, of seeking to reach an electoral agreement with Islamists that guarantees them a presence in local councils or in some committees, and this presence in return allows them to build client networks and tighten their grip on certain sectors of Muslims. Sometimes Pupponi rejects this accusation and at other times admits its validity. It is concluded from his writing that the main reason is the inaction of the representatives of the central authority, the governors and the national police; where mayors find themselves without power to support them, and some of them actually seek some compatibility with the Islamists.

Pupponi denounces the radical left-wing and some leftist groups who have become the godfathers of the Islamists, and the reasons for this blatant bias differ from one faction to another. Some of them hate the injustice of French society, others have not abandoned the comprehensive revolution project, and there are those who say that it is not permissible to criticize the religion of a minority, the members of which are among the vulnerable (as if the criticism of the Islamists is an attack on Islam, and we will get back to



What was expressed in French writings about political Islam groups in France is not the object of interest to intellectuals alone, but also of political circles in France, prominent among whom is French President Emmanuel Macron, who gave a historic speech on 2 October 2020, in which he declared that France must "fight against separatism" which seeks to "create a parallel order" and "repudiation of the republic".



this point later). Also, among them there are those who see that the decline in the numbers and importance of the working class forces the left-wing to search for a new electoral base in which Muslims and the children of immigrants are their backbone. Pupponi believes that these are committing a crime when they act as if the 150,000 extremists represent 8.5 million French people or French residents with Muslim names, and as if the extremists represent the correct interpretation of religion. It is noticeable here that Fourquet believes that this the number of Muslims in France is an exaggerated figure, and that the percentage of Muslims is less than this, although it has steadily increased.

Reading between the lines of Pupponi's book

Despite the importance of what was mentioned in Pupponi's book, some comments can be observed. First: Most studies say that Salafi and Islamists' activity began in France in the second half of the 1990s, but it seems that this activity neglected some regions in the beginning, and it is known that the French hate or at least fear what is different, while they welcome integration and Francization, which explains Pupponi's focus on costume trauma. Second: Pupponi's book seems to confirm that there is a problem with the discourse and behavior of any outsider. Third: Certainly, Pupponi can be accused of underestimating social injustice, mistreatment of blacks and Arabs, civil discrimination against them, and the impact of poverty, and we refer here to the fact that injustice and discrimination is the most important argument put forward by the godfathers of Islamists. I do not think that Pupponi – when he was a leftist mayor for a very poor city – ignores the dark side of reality. I think that he realizes it, but he also sees that the Islamists are not seeking to solve it but rather to use it to create or break between Muslims and the rest of the people. He believes that the real problem-solver of the poor is the left-wing, the real left, not the left of the upper class neighborhoods.

Pupponi's assessment should be reviewed. He practices realistic politics, but he is not



an expert on Islamic affairs. We can believe him when he says that Islamists are a minority that has its own understanding of religion and a political project that is after spreading sedition in France, isolating Muslims from the rest of society, and applying Sharia in some regions. They also have a political tactic based on the aggressive presence in the street and constant pressure on everyone, especially unveiled Muslim women. But we see that it is not true when he assumes that Muslims have no real problems with the prevailing culture in society, and with the laws that permit, for example, abortion, same-sex marriage, disparaging and belittling religions. We also believe that the criteria that govern his evaluation – which are standards that many French people believe in – do not help to understand Muslims and their discourse. For example, Pupponi believes that only the Islamists are the group that believes that the Sharia of Allah state the punitive measures and that it is superior to the statutory law. Pupponi's attack on the concept of punitive measures without fully understanding it, gives arguments to those who want to silence him, accusing him of Islamophobia. In general, the issue of punitive measures is liable to provoke tension and sedition, regardless of the good or bad intention of those involved. In the same regard, we notice in his book expressions or sentences that are not accepted by a faithful Muslim, such as, for example, "A religion coming from the seventh century", meaning that the Sharia is not valid in the modern age.

France moves to limit the influence of Islamists

What was expressed in French writings about political Islam groups in France is not the object of interest to intellectuals alone, but also of political circles in France, prominent among whom is French President Emmanuel Macron, who gave a historic speech on 2 October 2020, in which he declared that France must "fight against separatism" which seeks to "create a parallel order" and "repudiation of the republic". He said: "In this radical Islamism a proclaimed, publicized desire, a systematic way of organizing things to contravene the Republic's laws and create a parallel order, establish other values, develop another way of organizing society".

Macron referred to the French state's responsibility for the expansion and impact of this trend for Muslims and neglecting to develop the phenomenon of "ghettoization" of neighborhoods", according to his description. He meant gathering people according to their origins so that they are unable to integrate or move up the social and economic ladder. The French president's speech concerning the approach of some political Islam groups coincided with steps taken by officials to draft a bill against "separatism", which is expected to be referred to parliament early next year, and other strict measures. Macron proposed a set of measures, such as requiring any association requesting state assistance to sign a laïcité (secularism) contract, imposing tight supervision on private religious schools and strictly limiting home schooling.

The French president said that the state would have the power to intervene if local authorities made unacceptable concessions to the Islamists, such as "religious lists" in school canteens or separate access to swimming pools.

The MB in Europe between

Safe Existence and Cautious Restriction

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The Brotherhood group is both a secret and a public organization. Its ideology and the largest part of the organization are known, but its objectives and many of its movements are secret. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has a comprehensive project, "Mastering the World", and insist on the rule of Islam, interpreting everything in life from birth to death and all activities from worship to scientific research according to Islam. However, they do not make public the methodology of implementing their project. This duality is what raises different European attitudes towards the group.

It is not entirely clear whether in Europe they are following a systematic and detailed plan to spread their ideas, tighten the grip on Islamic societies and communities, and remove the holders of other perceptions and interpretations, or do they only adept at seizing opportunities, look closely at what is happening and try to exploit it, with the help of their cadres, where many of them devoted themselves to daawa and political work. Nonetheless, their plans for empowerment in Europe and the world were found in Yusuf





Nada's house in the aftermath of 9/11, but they seem more like general outlines than a detailed plan. On the other hand, there are some constants in their behavior, including piety, supremacy, claiming oppression and aggression to be empowered.

The beginning of the MB in Europe:

This can be seen in a Brigitte Marshall book, some interviews with Lorenzo Vidino, and an article by Guido Steinberg. The Brotherhood has been present in Europe since the 1950s. They set off from Switzerland and Germany to spread to most of Western Europe. Germany was the main center. The Brotherhood initially chose universities as a field for their work and targeted immigrant Muslim students to join them, as many Arab students have gone to German universities to study engineering and medicine. On the other hand, the Brotherhood cooperated with Western intelligence services to collect information about Soviet activity in the Middle East and its arming of Arab regimes.

Said Ramadan used Western money to build mosques in Germany and spread the work of the organization. It seems that most governments did not pay attention to the Brotherhood activity in Europe before the Iranian revolution, whether it had interests in the Middle East, or before 9/11. In other words, the Brotherhood enjoyed two or four decades of calmness to build their organizations and networks.

The Brotherhood remained safe in European societies even after they became involved in politics in many Arab countries and came to power in the home country (Egypt) in 2012. The importance of their actions in Europe increased after they were declared a terrorist group in many Arab countries after 2013.

France, the Muslim Brotherhood threat and Political Islam Groups:

European countries are beginning to sense the threat that political Islam groups pose to European societies, and France has begun to confront this threat, raising the problem of their influence. When President Emmanuel Macron came to power, his position on political Islam was unclear but he was aware that terrorism and illegal immigration were ma-

jor threats. However, many of his statements seemed to embrace some of the sayings of the defenders of Islamization. One is that there is no such thing as a national culture (French), that colonialism is a crime against humanity, and that French secularism has been disturbingly radicalised to become a "revenge" that fights religions and does not stand neutral.

And now he has gone from one extreme to another and has come to regard the "separatism" that the Islamist project carries and its deliberate tendency to extremism as a major threat to the future of France and the cohesion of its society. He discussed this "threat" at length in a speech on 2 October which was preceded by a Senate report in July from which Macron took excerpts in his speech.

Both the speech and report expressed that danger is not limited to terrorism but extends to the Islamist project that deliberately seeks () to tighten its grip on neighborhoods and cities, and impose Sharia law at the expense of man-made laws, for the Islamists to pave the way for changing and controlling the rules of the game in France. It is a project adopted by a minority of France's Muslims, but this is a tireless vigilant minority that exerts constant pressures and makes activities that have a profound negative impact on the cohesion of society and the daily life of citizens.

France against the Islamist project, not against Islam

This French approach has both advantages and disadvantages, and its advantages are manifested in several issues, most notably that it avoids resolving the issue of the Brotherhood's position on violence and terrorism: are they directly involved in violence and terrorism, are they just content to create an environment that legislates it, or are they fighting this terrorism? On the other hand, it explicitly states that the Brotherhood project cannot be reconciled with the founding values and concepts of the French Republic. This approach answers who accuse the French state of using double standards, tolerating Catholic, Protestant and Jewish, and being anti-Islamic, and saying that the latter is the only one that does not accept the rules of the game, and actively seeks to break with the rest of society as a prelude to subjugation, and to impose a logic that makes full loyalty to religion and the only valuable sect that governs the relationship with other citizens of the homeland. On this issue, President Macron also clearly enjoys the support of a majority that grows with every act of terrorism.

But this broad approach of confrontation has some drawbacks, the first of which is: the state has been accused of being hostile to Islam and all Muslims despite the French president's keenness to distinguish between Muslims and Islamists, as some suggest that the words of Macron or the Senate reveal a lack of scrutiny. For example, the Senate report condemns Islamists, whether those who practice terrorism or devote themselves to daawa. The report is concerned with the Islamists' understanding of religion, but it is easy to claim that it targets Islam. In another example, the president considered that any believer has the right to see that the laws of his religion are better and superior to man-made laws, as long as he does not use this as a means to refuse to apply man-made laws. A considerable number of religious people of all faiths rejected the principle of equality between men and women but abide by the provisions of man-made laws. The lack of scrutiny leads to the rejection of seemingly legitimate demands for Muslims under the pretext of fighting sectarianism, such as with the hijab or halal meals in schools and universities.



of certain tools and resources that may not be available to the state in general and in the present circumstances in particular. The confrontation, as envisaged by the Senate Committee, requires a double effort from the police, internal and foreign intelligence, bodies concerned with monitoring places of worship and foreign funding, ministries of education, higher education and housing, the development of provinces, cities, sports, and localities, as well as the work of the ministries of foreign affairs, defense and health. It may require the establishment of new bodies or the revival of old bodies and funding Islamic culture awareness programs. When President Macron said the state will commit to protecting the defenders against terrorism, he pledged more than the resources available for such a comprehensive confrontation.

The third is the result of the draft laws and actions taken against associations that convey hate speech and against groups seeking to separate the greatest number of Muslims from the rest of society, that may challenge their constitutionality as anti-freedoms, and the judiciary may intervene to monitor by political forces allied with Islamization and from certain sectors of the state and its members who fear the consequences of the confrontation on the internal peace and their lives. Last but not least, masses of intellectuals will reject it for various reasons, including the need to respect cultural pluralism and freedoms. According to them fighting Islamists is a persecution of Muslims and the vulnerable, the popularity of Muslims is due either to the state's failure to get rid of the colonial legacy and from its stances towards the Arab, the brown and the black, or to a legitimate desire to cling to identity and heritage.

It is linked to the fact that confrontation requires addressing the crises that have led to many being inclined to extremism and rejecting the values of the society in which they live. Here, the views of experts and those concerned differ. There is no room to delve into the debates of the French political and university groups, and I will suffice by saying that some of these problems do not have a quick solution, like the problem of racial discrimination. For example, there is a cultural gap between the religious (mainly

Muslims, but this also applies to Catholics and Jews) and the rest of the French (irreligious and non-practicing people). This gap is constantly widening, and increases as the law expands the scope of freedoms. Opinion polls have shown that 28 percent of France's Muslims believe in values that are incompatible with the values of the republic and the spirit of its laws. They also believe that Sharia law supersedes them, and the percentage among young people is much higher than this.

In general, the liberal model, whatever it is, has historically been unable to address minority problems without slipping into grotesque authoritarianism, unless it adopts a political formula that acknowledges sectarianism. It is based on guaranteeing the political rights of all citizens while protecting them from state interference in their private affairs. This means that the state cannot, for example, fight discrimination against a certain group without resorting to some form of repression.

> **"There is a gradual emergence of a kind of consciousness about the real role of the Muslim Brotherhood in shaking stability and their relationship with jihadist organizations.**

Islamists' practices rejected in France:

Both the Senate report and President Macron's speech listed the rejected practices. Some of these practices show the depth of misunderstanding and suspicion and the wide extent of the confrontation . The general principle, according to the report, is that citizens are equal, in contrast to their choices. Choices that violate the freedoms of others, disturb public order, or affect the values of the republic are rejected. The concept of public order is wide, while the concept of the values of the republic is over-narrowed.

The report indicates that Muslims have the right to practice their rituals and change their behavior to conform to the teachings of their religion as they understand it, but they are keen to adopt this behavior in the public sphere and in public services that are supposed to be neutral places. Of course, Muslims will respond that the authorities tolerate crosses and signs of belonging to Judaism, and the state will respond that these Christian and Jewish religious signs do not mean rejecting the values of the republic, a response that has something of significance but is not accurate.

According to the report, the Islamists spread a discourse that states the necessity of separation from the rest of the French nation; if the believer wants his faith to be sound and free of impurities. They also reject the right of a French Muslim to change his religion or leave his religious milieu. The report said that renewing religious discourse is not a purely Islamic matter because it affects the relationship of Muslims with each other and with non-Muslim citizens, but at the same time it says that the state must avoid interfering in the debate between Muslims, that is, it must avoid favoring an interpretation at the expense of the other.

The unacceptable behaviors, according to the report, are conveying hate speech through mosques and religious schools, not recognizing equality between men and women, seeking to prevent mixing between them in schools and youth centers, raising children, especially girls, with the education that undermines their dignity and keeps them away from the rest of the nation, putting pressure




on parents in order not to enroll their children in government schools, urging children and adolescents to clash with teachers over some curricula, seeking to create an "Islamized" environment in some neighborhoods that apply Sharia law and are not subject to the laws of the republic, prohibiting the sale of pork and alcohol and exerting pressure on unveiled women, etc. There is also the expansion of offering and selling books that promote extremism and exaggerated interpretations and fighting the emergence of moderate interpretations, and last but not least, there are issues of foreign funding, the presence of foreign imams in France, and the attempts of some countries, especially Turkey, to use their people and loyalists to destabilize internal stability.

All this and others target the Brotherhood and other actors, and the Brotherhood is sometimes mentioned specifically, with difficulty to determine all their activities and the depth of their penetration into Islamic bodies. The media talks about the Brotherhood coverage, and Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin announced his intention to dissolve some associations, including those that are considered Brotherhood tools, and the escape of the head of one of them and his request for political asylum in Turkey has drawn public attention.

Is France leading an European trend against the Muslim Brotherhood?

It seems that Macron's decisions (confronting Islamism and Turkey) do not explain the same motives and calculations. Facing Islamization is explained by its effective role in destabilizing and disturbing public security, and confronting Turkey is a rejection of its role in Syria and Libya, its harassment in Greece and Cyprus, and its practice of an extremely rough policy based on blackmail. However, the confidence of the two decisions and the confusion in the interpretation of Macron's speech, gave a chance to the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey to claim that France launched a Crusade against Islam and that whoever is allied with it is



betraying religion. This Turkish Brotherhood discourse allowed Macron and his supporters to claim that the problem of Turkey and the Brotherhood is not with the person of President Macron, but with the civilized model of France. The French saying is more accurate than the Turkish.

The ambiguous point is the role of Turkey and the Brotherhood in the terrorist attacks that struck France and Austria. It is clear that the inciting discourse played a big role in pushing terrorists to act, but the French government did not speak of a direct role for the Turkish state apparatus in preparing for these incidents but accused a Brotherhood activist in the incident of killing French teacher Paty. In contrast, some experts said that the attack by Turkish nationalists on Armenians in a French city was often carried out with Ankara's blessing. In any case, Turkey has tools that allow destabilizing France, with the presence of half a million Turks in the country and the increase in the role of Turkish elements in these attacks. On the other hand, France is striving to deal with the threat coming from within, despite the popular support and the French adherence to the secular model.

> **"It seems that Macron's decisions (confronting Islamism and Turkey) do not explain the same motives and calculations. Facing Islamization is explained by its effective role in destabilizing and disturbing public security.**

Here, a question arises about the position of the rest of the European Union on the confrontation between France and political Islam groups, on terrorism, and if Europe is going to classify the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. It is too early to answer this question, but there is a gradual emergence of a kind of awareness of the real role of the Muslim Brotherhood in destabilization and the nature of their relations with

the jihadi organizations. This urged Austrian Chancellor Kurtz to declare the necessity of combating and criminalizing all Islamist factions. There is no room for monitoring and evaluating all indicators, but German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke for the first time about a struggle with Islamist terrorism after the Vienna attacks. Most European leaders were avoiding describing terrorism as Islamist, linking it to extremism instead. Observers wondered if the close ties with Austria that urged Merkel to make this change.

In general, we do not believe that the proposal to designate the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization will meet European consensus now. There are several countries, the majority in Eastern Europe, that have not been hit by terrorism until now, and do not want to open the door to something that does not concern them, according to their perception. In addition, some observers write that France and Austria are special cases, due to the poor conditions of Muslims living there, and for their active participation in the war against the Islamic State. Whatever the evaluation of this perception, there is no doubt that it exists.

Finally, declaring war on the Brotherhood, of course, affects relations with sectors of European Muslims, and with Turkey and other Islamic countries. This leads to saying that the Turkish and Qatari inciting behavior will play a role in the decision, whether to take the decision or avoid it, and stressing again the German pivotal role. So far, the German authorities have sought to avoid a clash with Turkey, for reasons the most important of which is the importance of the Turkish community in Germany and the ability of the Turkish president to move it. Therefore, Berlin is expected to reject any decision designating the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization despite Merkel's hatred of the Turkish president.

However, matters are more complicated than it appears. Former French president Sarkozy established excellent relations with Qatar and gave the Brotherhood freedom of movement despite his strong hostility to the Turkish president and his bad relations with him. Is it possible to envision a scenario in which European countries are fighting the Brotherhood and offering concessions to the Turkish president, or vice versa? This seems unlikely now, but experience warns us against rushing to determine anything.


Washington and the Muslim Brotherhood: Mutual Penetration and Extended Bets

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The stance of former US president Barack Obama's administration from political Islam groups, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) group, is a turning point in the image of the US among the peoples of the Arab region who suffer from this and other groups. The Obama administration sought to justify the contradiction in the US stance between the Brotherhood and its terrorist practices and other terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, with some intellectual issues, such as the difference between intellectual extremism and violent extremism, and therefore it acknowledged the existence of extremist but nonviolent groups.

With the transition of power to the administration of the Republicans represented by President Donald Trump in 2017, the US declared that it is not dealing with these groups, but had a clear stance that they only deal with governments. Trump introduced a new counter-terrorism strategy, and continued to fight terrorism in the region, yet the US did not designate the Brotherhood a terrorist group.





With this similarity in the two administrations' stances of not including the Brotherhood on the US list of terrorist organizations, the questions arise as to how partisan differences between the Democrats and Republicans affect the relations between the US and the Brotherhood, and to what extent the current regional changes can affect these relations. This paper is concerned with the relationship between the US and the MB, recent developments, and the future of their relationship.

Extended communication

With the US assuming the leadership of the Western camp after the end of World War II, the first apparent contact between the US and the Brotherhood was a meeting between Hassan Al-Banna and Philip Ireland, the first secretary of the American Embassy in Cairo on 29 August 1947. Al-Banna asked Washington to form a joint office to combat communism, according to Mohsen Mohamed in his book "Who Killed Hassan Al-Banna?" The Brotherhood's relationship with Washington was bolstered in the mid-1950s, especially after the decision to dissolve the group, after some MB members attempted to assassinate former president Gamal Abdel-Nasser in the attack known as the 1954 "Mansheya incident".

Brotherhood elements fled Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s to European countries, where they enjoyed stability. Their economic activities depended on the establishment of companies and banks in Europe. They also spread in European societies through charities and other civil society organizations. Communication between the Brotherhood and the US was mainly through the European gateway, with the presence of influential cadres in the US.

Despite the Brotherhood's return to the public scene in Egypt in the late 1970s, it was in 1982 that broader communication between the US administration and the Brotherhood leaders was noted. Omar Al-Telmesany was warmly received in the US. After his return, he announced at a meeting of the Guidance Bureau on 15 September 1985 that the US administration decided to support religious groups, which is

consistent with its policy in Afghanistan at this stage through associations and its embassies in Islamic countries.

From then on, the Brotherhood became active in the US, and they were able to establish a supporting lobbying group through the organizations they founded or their infiltration into some research centers. Abdel-Rahman Al-Amoudi is the most prominent example of the MB's activities at American institutions. He is a Brotherhood member of Eritrean origins, and he became an advisor to president Bill Clinton. Al-Amoudi pushed for the appointment of his deputy, Sami Al-Erian, at Bush's presidential campaign and Suhail Khan, a man with wide connections with the Brotherhood, in the White House Public Liaison Office.

In the 1990s, the US and the Brotherhood grew closer. The relationship between the Clinton administration and the Brotherhood appeared to be more extensive, in the midst of his inclination in favor of the Bosnians and Albanians against the Serbs. According to some reports, Hillary Clinton invited some leaders of Islamic societies in the US to attend a Ramadan Iftar event in 1996, in addition to increasing talk about the "Clinton Foundation" hosting a number of Brotherhood figures, including engineer Jihad Al-Haddad, the son of Brotherhood leader Essam Al-Haddad, a member of the Guidance Bureau.

The Brotherhood worked hard to develop relations with the US, according to published documents about the empowerment plan (the Salsabil case 1991/1992), which is the group's plan to seize power. The most dangerous thing the empowerment document presents is the Brotherhood's vision of methods to deal with global powers, especially the West and the US. The document stresses the importance of notifying the West and the US, in particular, that the Brotherhood does not represent a threat to their interests, and that it is in the interest of the West to deal with the Brotherhood when the empowerment plan takes place, because the Brotherhood represents a force characterized by stability and discipline.

The 11 September incident was a pivotal point in Washington's relationship with the Brotherhood. At that time, Washington realized the need to open more effective channels with the currents of political Islam. These relations came as a priority to the intellectual and research community in Washington, among which are the Brookings Institution's project on US policy towards the Islamic world, which included a group of periodic regional meetings and conferences. Its first conference was in Doha in 2002 in the presence of the elite of American politicians and prominent Islamic leaders, such as the deputy of former US secretary of state Martin Indyk, author Thomas Friedman, Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, and others.

The strategy of the administration of president George Bush Jr failed when it relied on the use of the military tool, and focusing on "democratization", facing an impasse with the Islamists at the forefront of the political scene in some countries. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice considered that the increase in extremism in the Middle East resulted from the narrow political horizon.

A number of analysts believe the Bush administration put into practice a contradictory strategy bearing the seeds of its own annihilation, as it sought to impose democracy and change regimes in countries where political Islam currents, especially the Brotherhood, lead the opposition camp, and fueled the growth of political Islam and the associated terrorist organizations, because of the polarizing discourse and the talk about pre-emptive war. In spite of what appeared to be a stance of



rejection of Islamist currents by the Bush administration, their momentum expanded and increased their strength. They were also involved in the political process led by Paul Bremer in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The Obama administration tried to overcome this shortcoming by differentiating between moderate and violent Islamist currents, while working to integrate and involve Islamist currents in the political scene. With the arrival of the Brotherhood to power in the wake of the Egyptian 25 January 2011 Revolution, Washington intensified its contacts with the Brotherhood, in order to expand the ground of mutual understandings, according to what was revealed by the leaked messages of then secretary of state Hillary Clinton. The Brotherhood's failure pushed the Egyptian public to topple the organization in the 30 June 2013 Revolution, which led to the confusion of the American stance regarding the situation in Egypt.

The confusion and contradiction in the American policy towards Egypt were evident in the period following the designation of the Brotherhood as a terrorist group in Egypt. Despite the increase in violent and terrorist attacks carried out by the Brotherhood and its associated groups, the White House expressed in 2014 that it is "deeply troubled" with the death sentence of 682 supporters of the Brotherhood, including the group's supreme guide, Mohamed Badie, and called for the annulment of the death sentences. In early February 2014, the US State Department confirmed in a statement that communication between the American Embassy in Cairo and the MB was ongoing under the pretext that Washington seeks dialogue with all parties of the political process in Egypt. The statement stressed that the US does not classify the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. Relations remained tense between the Obama administration and the new regime in Egypt for some time, before the US understood the real situation on the Egyptian ground.

The Muslim Brotherhood between the Democrats and Republicans

The perpetual communication between the Brotherhood and various US administrations despite the partisan differences between the two major US parties has become the subject of discussion at the current stage, in line with the renewed electoral atmosphere every four years. In fact,

this stage presents a model to highlight the limits of the influence of the US president's political affiliation on the US stance toward the Brotherhood.

For the Republican Party, President Donald Trump presents a model for the conservative current. Therefore, since his ascent to power, he adopted a right-wing nationalist discourse and a realistic policy of interest, and at the forefront of his new policy the term of political Islam, especially with the increasing intensity of popular rejection of him and his failure to engage in the political game, meaning that Trump's stance is an ideology concerning this file. Washington has strengthened ties with regional actors, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, that have designated the Brotherhood as a terrorist group, while taking hesitant steps toward Qatar and Turkey, which support the Brotherhood. Therefore, there was more speculation the Trump administration has the tendency to consider the Brotherhood a terrorist group.

On 11 July 2018, the Congressional National Security Subcommittee organized a series of hearings on the "Global threat of the Brotherhood," with the aim of identifying the risks the Brotherhood poses to US interests around the world. Clearly, many at the hearings wanted Washington to classify the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, along with other Islamist movements, such as Hezbollah and Hamas.

Speaking at a seminar at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in response to a question about whether the Trump administration intends to take that step, that the Trump administration was still evaluating the move to ensure that it is done "correctly." Pompeo explained "We're still trying to figure out how to do it. There is no doubt that there are terrorist elements within the Brotherhood, who are on the list of terrorists, and we are trying to ensure that we include them in the right way, and to ensure the legal basis for doing so." After President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi's visit to Washington in April 2019, the White House directed national security officials to pursue the demand to declare the Brotherhood a terrorist group.

For Washington to designate the MB as a terrorist organization, it would prevent its members from entering the US, and prevent anyone in the country from supporting or dealing with them. It seems that the Trump administration was forced to postpone this decision for several reasons. The first is the influence of the pro-Brotherhood pressure groups, and the second is pressure exercised by some organizations such as Human Rights Watch, which considers the Brotherhood a political and social movement. The third reason relates to the difference in the American elites' view of the Brotherhood between those who see them as a moderate group and others that regard them as an extremist group. The fourth reason is related to political money linked to the Brotherhood that tries to influence the American media's position from the group.

As for the Democratic Party, the majority of analyses tend to emphasize the warmer channels of communication between the Brotherhood and the Democrats which are based on the flexibility the administration of Bill Clinton and Hillary Clinton exercised with the figureheads of the current, as well as the policies of the Obama administration that didn't object to the rise of political Islam to power. Accordingly, some reports indicate that Brotherhood members in the US have strengthened their network of relations with the Democratic Party, and gained access to the Democratic candidate Joe Biden's campaign, which opens the door to the hypothesis of a new



Brotherhood alliance with the Democrats in the Middle East, and to use the group's arms as pressure cards to achieve American interests in the region.

The Brotherhood began to enter the anti-Trump Democratic election campaign through the withdrawn Democratic candidate, Bernie Sanders, as the "American Thinker" magazine indicated that Senator Sanders included in his electoral team members of the Brotherhood, such as the Libyan board member of Fairfax county Abrar Omeish, the daughter of the leader Essam Omeish, who worked as a co-chair of the Sanders campaign in Virginia.

Following Sanders' withdrawal, the Brotherhood tended to support Biden, being "Obama's heir". Biden strengthened his campaign's relationship with MB elements. He delivered a speech before the 57th annual conference of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), one of the Brotherhood's branches in the US. He also spoke in a virtual session of the Brotherhood's "Engage Action Organization," which its leaders said in an interview in the "Politico" newspaper that it will support Biden in the elections.

However, the Brotherhood and Biden's campaign have differences. The MB criticized Biden's campaign for having disavowed the support of the Palestinian-American activist, Linda Sarsour, after her anti-Israel statements. Also, Andrew Bates, a spokesman for the Biden campaign, said in a statement: Biden has been a staunch supporter of Israel and a staunch opponent of anti-Semitism throughout his life, and it is clear that he condemns its views and opposes the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement (BDS), as does the Democratic Program.

Based on the above, some analysts point out that Biden's victory will give the Brotherhood a kiss of life to rebuild their power and influence. However, the matter requires a precise dismantle of the nature of relations between Washington and the Brotherhood. First of all, by following the American policy, it becomes clear that there is no official policy or clear line for Washington's relationship with the Brotherhood, as relations went back and forth based on the nature of American interests and the regional and international atmosphere, regardless of the nature of the Amer-



ican administration, even if Democratic administrations tilted to a more compromising policy.

The determinants of future relations between Washington and the Muslim Brotherhood

Regardless of the winner of the US presidential elections, future relations between the Brotherhood and Washington will, arguably, depend on an equation including a number of variables that will determine the US policy towards this organization which is fighting for survival. This can be explained as follows:

1. **The position of the Brotherhood in the US:** This variable is related to a number of issues led by the strength of the Brotherhood organization and its associated groups in the US, which clearly means the presence of a lobby for the Brotherhood in the US, especially with the increasing migration of a number of Brotherhood cadres from the Middle East to American cities and universities since the end of the 1960s, who turned to be a consultative structure with its branches and extensions within the American think tanks for decades. The group was able to establish a number of organizations in the US in order to achieve its goals, and these organizations were divided into two types: The first type: Social organizations aiming at spreading and strengthening the Brotherhood ideology, the most prominent of which are the Islamic Society of North America and the Muslim American Society . The second type: Political organizations aiming at presenting themselves as the voice of American Muslims snd influencing American foreign policy

according to the interests of the parent group, the most prominent of which are American Muslim Council, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, and the American Muslim Political Coordination Council. Among the clear indications of the Brotherhood's influence on American media and think tanks is the frequent talk about the Brotherhood member Mustafa Qasim, who died in prison while serving a 15-year prison sentence in the case of the armed Rabaa sit-in dispersal. In addition, the Carnegie Foundation's letter to the US administration, on 28 August 2020, denounced the court ruling against the Brotherhood-linked human rights defender, Bahi Al-Din Hassan, who was sentenced to 15 years in prison for spreading wfalse news, incitement against the state, and insulting the judiciary.



The Relationship between the MB and the US does not follow a single path, but rather works according to an equation that contains a number of variables.

Accordingly, it is clear the future of relations between Washington and the MB will depend on the strength of the organization and its ability to adapt or employ regional and international conditions to rebuild itself.

2. **The declining strength of the organization in the home state**: The Brotherhood faces a number of challenges. In its leadership, the group announced in a precedent the appointment of Ibrahim Mounir, who resides in London, as the new acting supreme guide, in a clear contradiction to the classic doctrine of the group that it adopted since its inception, which is based on the fact that the supreme guide must manage the group's affairs from Egypt. This precedent attests to the challenges the MB faces. Having its leadership abroad leads to difficulties in structuring the organization. The group's organizational structure is being renewed to meet the current challenges. The group announced the abolition of the General Secretariat, replacing it with an administrative committee to assist its head Ibrahim Mounir. This confirms the weakness of the organization and its structure. Based on previous experiences, the group has the ability to overcome challenges and rebuild itself.

3. **The group's status outside the home state:** Given the status of the Brotherhood outside Egypt, its position in the Arab arena is greatly challenging. The Arab Quartet (Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain) designated the Brotherhood as a terrorist movement.

Syria took the same decision in 1982, and the group was dissolved in Jordan by a court ruling in 2020. Although Sudan has not banned the group, the post-revolution Sudanese state seeks to dismantle it. In the same context, Mauritania has worked to undermine the group's influence and close its affiliated associations. The group was also unable to penetrate Lebanese society due to the sectarian political and demographic composition of the state. However, one cannot turn a

blind eye to the group's continuing activities in a number of Arab countries, where the group has influence over some of the Libyan state institutions, not to mention the group's political presence in the parliaments of Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Kuwait.

4. **Regional and international developments:** This variable is closely related to the international and regional factors that stimulate the growth of political Islam currents, including the Brotherhood. At the forefront is the rise in racist discourses, whether hostile to others or hostile to Islam. This discourse is increasingly taking place in the West. Additionally, the increasing number of conflicts, especially those bearing religious, racial or ethnic dimensions, whether in the region, such as the Libyan, Yemeni and Syrian crises, or outside them, such as the issue of the Uyghurs and Burmese Muslims, and finally the clash between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in addition to the crisis in the Gulf, in which the Shiite Sunni clash affects the capabilities of the region.

The Palestinian issue remains at the forefront of causes that the MB exploits to convince the public of its discourse. Therefore, the Gulf's normalization deals, especially in the UAE, with Israel may represent an appropriate entry point for the group to export a discourse that distorts Arab regimes, and make the group appear as an appropriate alternative that is capable of revenge for the cause. The effect of this factor will increase if the Palestinian domestic front sees inflamed developments or Palestinian-Israeli clashes take place.

5. **US administrations' perceptions:** When it comes to the MB, US administrations operate according to the same goals, albeit with changing tools. The US administration generally tries to maintain open channels with all parties, including the Brotherhood, to ensure that they are being used whenever US interests arise. Accordingly, some administrations believe that their contact with the Brotherhood will be instruments of pressure on some regimes and will allow them to guarantee their loyalty once they come to power. It will also allow them, through the Brotherhood, to communicate with other extremist and violent organizations. Therefore, the administration adopts the theory of "integration leads to moderation" sometimes, which means that integrating Islamists into the political game will lead to their conversion into moderate groups that believe in democracy, as opposed to the administration's tendency, at other times, to emphasize the need to exclude Islamists, and to narrow down radical discourse, while some administrations prefer to follow a dual line between opening back channels with the Islamists in parallel with strengthening relations with the regimes that are closing on them.

6. **The connection between Qatar, Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood:** Qatar's growing support for the Brotherhood, as well as the links between the Turkish regime represented in the Justice and Development Party and the Brotherhood, have been evident over the past two decades, as Qatar and Turkey seek to strengthen the Brotherhood to bring them to power because this will help them achieve their regional projects. This has become increasingly evident since the outbreak of the Arab Spring.


Following the 30 June 2013 Revolution, Turkey became a major arena for the organization, to where many of its leaders and members fled and directed their military, political and media activities against their own states. Qatar plays a major role in securing financial support for their activities, as well as their broad media support by using their manipulative media sources, especially Al-Jazeera, to defend them and promote



their project. Accordingly, it seems that the strength of the organization is closely related to the continuation of this tripartite partnership, which guarantees its ability to survive, expand channels of action, and defend their project.

In sum, the relationship between Washington and the Brotherhood is more institutional than it appears, and the main difference between the Democratic and Republican parties in the relationship with the Brotherhood is in the pattern of the relationship and whether it is direct (the Democratic Party) or indirect (the Republican Party), and it is irrelevant to limiting the spread and influence of the MB. The basic variables in the region, which mainly affect the group's strength and spread, are what could change the pattern of relations between the two parties. In short, the relationship between the MB and the US does not follow a single path, but rather works according to an equation that contains a number of variables.

Accordingly, it is clear the future of relations between Washington and the MB will depend on the strength of the organization and its ability to adapt or employ regional and international conditions to rebuild itself. There is no doubt the US administration will seek to communicate with any strong player – regardless of their identity – for the sake of rebuilding itself and increasing its power.



The MB's
Multiple Networks and Tactics

The Brotherhood has been operating for almost a century during which it has witnessed setbacks in the mother country, Egypt. The setbacks occurred as the group's political goals and continuous effort to reach power – convoluted by a religious cover and fake victimization – were unveiled. The Brotherhood, however, sought to extend a strong infrastructure that allowed it to survive and influence. It was aided by political and economic developments that provided the appropriate conditions for the group to spreading its ideology. The organization didn't adopt this strategy in Egypt only, but it developed its tools and relations to adapt, expand, and survive. Here is where the Brotherhood's networks come in. The group's networks are tackled in four topics:

- **The MB's Secret Cell and its Relationship with Intelligence Apparatuses**
- **The Muslim Brotherhood's Funding Networks**
- **The Media: The Muslim Brotherhood's Weapon against States.**
- **The Role of Women "The Sisters" in the Muslim Brotherhood Strategy**



The MB's Secret Cell

& Its Relationship with Intelligence Apparatuses

Dr. **Mohamed Megahed El-Zayat**

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Secret activities are carried out to keep an organization safe from confrontations with rivals and security forces. Secrecy helps entities protect certain measures from being known in and outside their group.

Covert activity occurs when individuals create exclusive cells in which they exchange ideas that may be illegal or inconsistent with the norms of society. They gain new supporters by contacting them individually. They are subject to leadership and administrative structures that govern their work. They also avoid revealing these ideas to ensure control over the members.

Religious groups have resorted to organized secret activity, justifying this with several reasons, including:

A. Avoiding arrests and security prosecution, and providing protection for the organization's leaders and the organization itself from the regimes that consider the organizations' activities a threat to the state's national security due to their adoption of radical ideas.





B. Building confidence among the members of the organization, ensuring that the members of the organization respect their leaders and obey them blindly, as well as ensuring unity and immediate summoning and response.

C. Making their supporters believe that they are distinguished from the rest of society.

D. Guaranteeing the leadership's domination over the members, and not giving them the opportunity to discuss ideas contrary to theirs.

Types of secret activities of terrorist organizations

Covert military activity:

Military secret activity is an integral part of terrorist groups' work. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was one of the first groups to pursue military secret activities by establishing a secret cell, or a special apparatus, in 1939, which relied mainly on armed force in achieving the group's objectives. The idea of military secret activity came back strongly in the 1970s, especially after the emergence of the Jihad Group and Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya (the Islamic Group), which was revealed after the assassination of president Anwar Al-Sadat, when armed secret activity became an essential part of the work of extremist Islamic groups. The secret activity has impressed many groups, from the MB to the Islamic Group and Jihad, the organizations of Yehia Hashem, Mohamed Al-Borai, Saleh Seria, Shukri Mustafa, and other groups.

Clandestine economic activity:

The funding of terrorist groups relies on secret economic activity via companies established in one country and transferring funds to other countries to evade monitoring. Terrorist organizations also rely on donations received under the cover of charity and cashed by associations established by the MB as a cover to receive funds abroad to transfer them to the countries where their activities take place. These organizations also rely on the donations of several loyal businessmen

or those who believe in their ideas to fund their activities.

To explore the nature of the Brotherhood's secret activity, its economic and military work are herein addressed.

First: The MB and its surreptitious economic activity

1. The group's keen interest in providing funds since its emergence goes back to Hassan Al-Banna who said that money is the mainstay of the daawa, and that there is no daawa without its leaders and soldiers sacrificing their money. So, money was associated with the continuation of missionary work in the group's ideology, and many experts' estimates were reflected according to this rule from the beginning to present. Economic expert Abdel-Khalek Farouk confirmed in his book on the economies of the Brotherhood in Egypt and the world, that the resources of the Brotherhood are estimated at EGP 8 billion annually.

2. The Brotherhood and its supporters have established a so-called financing portfolio. In short, it is the establishment of commercial projects in the name of an unpopular member who does not occupy an administrative position, and through its revenues individuals or previously determined goals by the group's leadership are funded.

3. The group does not announce the amount of its financial transactions to be out of the reach of the oversight of bodies in all countries it is present in, due to the presence of suspicious financial operations that take place in the group, which makes them strongly insist on maintaining the secrecy of their financial accounts, especially because expenditure items are related to being spent in secret activities that no one knows about, even though regulations are governing the group's activities, expenditures, and objects of expenditure. Further below, we demonstrate the most important funding sources of the Brotherhood that are used to finance its overt and secret activities.

4. The Brotherhood relied on several sources from outside its elements to fund its secret activities. Since the inception of the movement, it used all available means to continue its activity, applying the saying "the end justifies the means", to the extent that it relied on funding from outside parties that the Brotherhood considers hostile. This was revealed by British researcher Mark Curtis in his book "Secret Affairs: Britain's Collusion with Radical Islam", where many documents, declassified by the British government, explain Britain's relationship with the group. Many sources also refer to multiple relations with the intelligence agencies of several countries, especially the British and American agencies in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, it is indicated that the group was carrying out intelligence and espionage work for the benefit of the two countries.

All of this means that the Brotherhood does not oppose any source of funding from any party to achieve its objectives through secret activity, whether to obtain funds or disburse them.

The MB's sources of funding for covert operations

Many sources confirm that the Brotherhood runs a hidden financial network around the world that is little known about. On this scale, names of some of those responsible for funding the group have come to light, including Ibrahim Kamel, founder of Dar Al-Maal Al-Islami Trust, and its offshore companies in the Bahamas. There is also



Youssef Nada, Ghalib Hemmat, and Idris Nasreddin with Akida International Bank in the Bahamas. It should be noted that some of these leaders are not only active in the Bahamas but also spread their companies in other regions, especially Western and African countries.

In this regard, several points should be noted:

A. The Brotherhood has relied mainly on the economic and commercial projects it has established in many countries, especially those that lack regulatory bodies, such as some African and Asian countries, Latin America, and through associations that provide cover for these projects.

B. The Brotherhood also depends on the donations it receives under the guise of charitable work and the International Islamic Relief. The main goal of these associations is to collect contributions and donations from members to finance the cell's activities the world over. This is proved by the Brotherhood's establishment of charity associations as a cover to collect funding abroad to transfer them to countries in which it practices its activities. Some sources confirmed that the MB has established 13 associations in the UK which are controlled by leaders of the

group, on top of them: Essam Al-Haddad, Ibrahim Al-Zayat, and Ibrahim Mounir, as well other associations in Switzerland, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Africa, Nigeria, and Ghana. Some reports indicate that money transfers from one country to another were carried out through travelers from these countries, and thus money is delivered hand-to-hand, to prevent monitoring the transfer of these funding through the global financial system, which confirms the use of these funds in illegal activities.

C. Charities and zakat represented an important part of funding for the group following the security clampdown. MB sheikhs issued a fatwa (religious edict) that whoever wanted to give charity or pay the zakat from their own money, the group was a priority, the money being spend in a cause for the sake of God, and that the group works for this cause, thus the group has allowed taking money from the poor and those in need for funding its activities and getting out of the impasse of security restrictions on group activities.

D. Funding secret activities of the group also depends on donations of several businessmen loyal to the MB and those who believe in its ideology, through donations from some companies operating abroad. These funds are used in their overt and secret operations by the secret cell. Brotherhood businessmen's foreign investments are also relied on to present the Islamic model in managing projects and economics and to obtain support to help the group in its activities. The most prominent countries in which the group invests its money are Qatar, Korea, Japan, London, Switzerland, and Turkey.



Generally speaking, the Brotherhood's financial network of holding and affiliated companies, shell banks, and other financial institutions run across many countries, most notably: Panama, Liberia, Switzerland, Cyprus, Nigeria, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Ghana, and Nigeria. Most of these institutions are registered under the names of people such as Yusuf Nada, Idris Nasreddin, and Ghalib Hemmat, who present themselves as MB leaders. It is noticeable that some of these institutions are run by individuals from countries in which the group does not have much activity, which is in line with its approach of covering up its secret activities.

Second: The MB and covert military activity:

The secret cell of the Brotherhood was known in the circles of power as the secret apparatus, and the public image of the MB was linked to this secret apparatus, which the government media portrayed as a terrifying terrorist organization, especially after the paramilitary organization of the Muslim Brotherhood's attempt to assassinate late president Gamal Abdel-Nasser in 1954. The plan was prepared since the emergence of the group in 1928 and it was to contain individuals who approached the group regardless of their affiliation or capabilities. The main goal was to draw the largest possible number of members to the group. This apparatus is a mili-



tary system established by the MB in Egypt in 1939, and its goal is "to prepare selected elite of the Muslim Brotherhood to carry out special missions, train for military operations against the external enemy and to eradicate the military literacy of the Egyptian people at that time." The founders aimed at creating the organization to fight the British occupation in Egypt and to confront the Zionist-Jewish project in Palestine.

During the MB's first years of creation, it set several goals, the most important of which are:

A. Fighting for the sake of Allah. This is the battles the Mujahideen carried out against Zionists in the battlefield on Palestinian land.

B. Fedaayi (risking life voluntarily) actions that were carried out by an individual or a group against the enemy (British colonialism), which were called by some as political assassinations.

C. Protecting the daawa from the attacks against it by parties and plans to eliminate it.

The relationship between Qotbism and MB clandestine operations

The Brotherhood has raised the slogan of "Hakmia" (meaning that God is the only one who can judge every single action of people as He wills), which is the literal application of the ideas of Sayed Qotb and Abul-Ela Maududi. The Hakmia adhere to the rule of the Brotherhood, believing that if they rule then it will be the rule of God, but the way to reach this goal remains the real criterion and the missing link to understanding the extent to which the MB is influenced by the ideology of Sayed Qotb. The declaration of adopting these ideas or refusing them is not reliable proof to confirm that the MB embraced jihadism or not, for three main reasons:

1. The diversity of the members of the MB and their cultures made some of them believe in these ideas, while others rejected them. Therefore, some members were completely immersed into the ideas of Qotbism, others were not. Thus, the Brotherhood witnessed many defections and disagreements concerning this ideology and its penetration into the ranks of the group at all levels, whether from leaders or ordinary members.

2. Denying the ideas of Sayed Qotb from the approach and ideology of the Brotherhood, because of their fear of the security prosecution for adopting takfiri ideas and that these radical ideas have reduced the allure of the group to include and recruit new members. This was obvious in the low rate of recruitment in the Qotbist current, which affected their presence and spread on the ground, unlike the MB and Salafists at the time, so the group is hiding its inner side which is contrary to its appearance.

3. It is possible to embrace parts of the ideas of Sayed Qotb and not all of it. Therefore, rejecting all and not the part is what is appearing before the societies in which they live, while there may be a rejection of a part and not all of the ideas. So, some leaders, including Dr. Mahmoud Ezzat, were interested in defining their relationship with the ideology of Sayed Qotb. They told the media that they cherish and respect his ideas, but they do not disbelieve the ruler, which means that they are committed to the basic line of the MB.

Regarding the relationship between Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya and the MB and the ideas of Sayed Qotb, Dr. Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh (a co-founder of the Islamic Group) emphasized in his book "A Witness to the History of Egypt's Islamic Movement" that after joining the MB, some differences appeared concerning some religious matters between members of the two groups, especially since the group saw that the MB is not conservative enough in some issues, and those who made the atmosphere less tense between the two parties were the fundamentalist leaders of the special apparatus, who were associated with the extremist ideas of Sayed Qotb. Abul-Fotouh stressed that during this period there were two main currents in the MB: The special apparatus, and a current that follows the ideas of Hassan Al-Banna. The existence of these two currents in the MB continued until 1984, when the group decided to abandon violence and walk a path of peaceful action for reform, which is a clear evidence of the continued adoption of extremist Qotbism within the MB group since 1965.

"Observing the nature and style of the secret activity of the MB throughout its history in Egypt, some recurring characteristics can be noted.

It is clear that the role of Sayed Qotb in changing the group's ideology cannot be overlooked. Qotb drove the group to resort to violence as a means to reach its goal. Thus, the recipient and implementer of this ideology was the group's secret cell responsible for the use of violence to achieve the interests of the group. Violence was abandoned due to the control of the ruling regimes at that time. The MB realized the necessity of the secret cell. As a result, all information related to it became largely unavailable due to its special nature and its tasks that are based on Sayed Qotb's ideology in using violence as a first means to achieve the goals of the MB.

Observing the nature and style of the secret activity of the MB throughout its history in Egypt, some recurring characteristics can be noted, the most important of which are:

The duality of movement between overt and covert operations at all levels (political, economic, and military).

- The opportunism to conclude interim alliances with political forces to benefit from and then bypass them in later stages.

- Welcoming the engagement in the plans of global intelligence services, creating common interests, presenting themselves as a local ally, and carrying out intelligence work for their benefit.

- The method of secret military activity throughout the history of the group's special apparatus was based on creating sub-organizations to practice terrorist acts and later holding them responsible for violence and claiming the MB is a peaceful group. This has been repeated in recent years, from Jihad and the Islamic Group to Hasm Movement and Lewaa Al-Thawra terrorist organizations.

- Through its secret military arms, the MB has been party to all of the conflicts and crises in the region; in Libya, Yemen and Syria, and it became more involved in Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Ottoman strategy and is still betting on British and American intelligence.

All the terrorist military methods of the terrorist factions in Sinai and Syria in particular repeat the same approach of using explosive belts, explosives, and car bombs that the group has been pioneering in since it has emerged.

History has proven that whenever the Egyptian state releases detainees from the Brotherhood and offers a measure of understanding, this does not prevent the MB from the duplication of covert and overt actions at the same time.

- **Recently**, new stages of the Brotherhood's secret activity have been developed, especially after the 30 June Revolution, including the establishment of what is called a "portfolio" in villages and popular neighborhoods through individuals who were previously not monitored by security teams, and the formation of small projects, through which unmonitored activities are funded (pensions for detainees' families or funding, etc).

Security services monitored the development of a new practice called "the organization's transport facility," which is the recruitment of individuals to carry out operations of transferring information or materials used in terrorist operations through various means of communication. It also monitored the funding of certain Brotherhood members working abroad (Saudi Arabia) to buy tuk-tuks in villages and popular neighborhoods to do that job. In general, the strong security strikes that were directed at the group by the Egyptian security forces, such as the killing of Mohamed Kamal, and the arrest of the mastermind who oversees the Brotherhood's secret activities on the economic and military levels, Mahmoud Ezzat, have shaken the group's cohesion and dealt the group's military activities a deafening blow the repercussions of which will emerge later.

The Muslim Brotherhood's Funding

Networks

Amr Farouk
A researcher specializing in Islamist groups

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has been spending tens of millions of dollars on terrorist activities, its channels and electronic committees to bring down the Egyptian state since the 30 June 2013 Revolution. Earlier it had spent tens of millions of dollars to assume power and implement its empowerment project, to reach "Mastering the World", as proposed by Hassan Al-Banna, and complete the scheme of the international organization to infiltrate the Arab region and Europe.

The group worked, since its founding by Al-Banna, to find various financial paths that would give it the ability to survive, through collecting donations, charity funds, and establishing projects and economic institutions, until its budgets has become almost equal to the budgets of major countries, as it gained huge amounts of money over tens of years.

The Brotherhood found Islamic associations, centers, and mosques at home and abroad an important means to make money, by exploiting religious sentiments, and

55 million euros
Qatar's support for MB terrorism in Europe



Koen Metsu
President of the Belgian Temporary Parliamentary Committee for the Fight Against Terrorism

said

"Qatar pumped more than 55 million euros to the MB in Europe, to continuously finance mosques and schools that spread extremism."

obtaining the lion's share of the donations, grants and charity funds in the Arab and Islamic world, in addition to using various political issues and covering them with religious concepts, such as the Palestinian cause, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kashmir, Kosovo, and other policy junctures in which the group found its way to induce Islamic and Arab societies to their illegitimate orientations.

Sources of the Brotherhood's financial network

The group's large sums of funds and the variety of its sources have made it use many legitimate and illegal methods to complicate the route and movement of the sources of funds away from security and political control by decision-making circles in various Arab and European countries, and to make tracking the funding of its suspicious activities difficult, as well as its support for extremist and radical movements that are often acting on its behalf and carrying out acts of armed violence consistent with its subversive agenda in the region.

The financial and economic empire of the Brotherhood went through many stages for the main group in Cairo, and the international organization, which was officially announced to be formed in 1982 by Mustafa Mashhour, and was the beginning of the launch of charitable and social institutions that became the means to raise funds and recycle it through economic projects that generate continuous profits which support the group's orientations and various activities in the West.

First: Monthly contributions

Since the founding of the MB organization, Al-Banna worked to expand the ways of raising funds from the members of the organization under a number of various designations, as a kind of domination and control of their financial capabilities, and to make them under the command of the organization, relying on the so-called "monthly contributions" taken from members, estimated at about 8-10 percent of the per member income. This way apply to various organizational regulations, except certain individuals stipulated in the group's financial regulations.

According to a study by Dr. Hussein Shehata, professor of accounting at Al-Azhar Uni-

versity, who is responsible for managing the financial and accounting affairs of the Brotherhood, the group's funds amounted to nearly EGP 0.5 billion per year from the members' contributions alone. This is is the first item in the group's budget, paid by 400,000 regular working members in the activities of the Brotherhood families and divisions spread in all governorates, according to the latest internal statistics of the group in 2008.

Second: Donations and charities

Throughout the group's history, Hassan Al-Banna and Brotherhood leaders have been interested in obtaining Muslims' money, both its members and from outside the regulatory framework, under various designations, from donations, charities, zakat (alms), and grants, in order to promote the group's activities at home and abroad, according to legitimate advisory fatwas authorizing such financial practices.

Perhaps the beginning was with what was presented by Abdel-Hakim Abdin, a member of the Guidance Bureau, and what was approved by Al-Banna within the organization's financial regulations, under the name "Dawa Share," which is a financial policy for members of the group and sympathizers. It is based on taking out a regular share from the financially capable individuals on a monthly or annual basis, or at least 20 percent from the financially capable revenues, in addition to the monthly contributions.

This project was not successful at the beginning, but since the expansion of the international organization, it was approved in a way that allows those financially capable to spend on the group's activities and projects, due to the difference in the financial capabilities of individuals, and the joining of businessmen, merchants, and rich figures with the ability to donate continuously.

According to the study of Dr. Hussein Shehata, the group receives a percentage of the profits of the Brotherhood businessmen's companies, that are listed under the item of donations, which reached EGP20 million in 2012, paid by Khairat Al-Shater, Hassan Malik, Medhat Al-Haddad, Mamdouh Al-Husseini and Ahmed Shousha. On the other hand, Dr. Abdel-Khalek Farouk revealed, in his study on the economy of the Brotherhood, that the total zakat turnout from the organization members and sympathizers amounted to EGP5 billion in 2012.

Third: Islamic institutions and organizations abroad

After the death of president Gamal Abdel-Nasser, the group worked openly to establish Islamic centers abroad under dozens of banners, which allowed it to collect funds and obtain donations, charities and financial grants from Arab and Islamic minorities and supporters of various Islamic currents, to support the Brotherhood's activities, covert or otherwise.

The Islamic and social centers and associations were established in the West, and they were concerned with fundraising in general, as well as the Islamic organizations operating under the relief item. They represent an important part of funds and donations in more than 72 countries around the world, in addition to the money coming from the countries that sponsor the Brotherhood, and the money coming from some institutions and entities supporting the Brotherhood abroad and have a relationship with the intelligence services and international decision-making circles, which use the Brotherhood as a tool to achieve interests in the Middle East and the Arab region, most notably:



- A number of organizations were established in Europe for these goals, and they raised funds through members' contributions, donations and grants from European citizens, including: The Centre Socio Culturel des Musulmans de Lausanne [Muslim Cultural Center in Lausanne] in Lausanne, Switzerland, established in 2002; the Foundation for Cultural and Social Impact, established in 2010; and Föderation Islamischer Gemeinshaften in der Schweiz (Federation of Islamic Communities in Switzerland), established in 2006.

- In the US there is the MAS Foundation, CAIR and ISNA, which are legitimate institutions that represent the Brotherhood in the US. There is also the Muslim Youth Organization. The Brotherhood depends on these institutions to collect funds.

- The international organization established the Islamic Relief, which is one of the most prominent Brotherhood institutions in collecting funds from various countries in the world. Its activity extends in about 40 countries, and many international reports said it is one of the most prominent arms that fund the Brotherhood's terrorism in the world. Egyptian authorities refused to establish a branch of the Islamic Relief in Cairo during the period of former president Hosni Mubarak, which prompted them to employ the Islamic Relief Committee of the Egyptian Medical Syndicate and the Arab Doctors Union, and to use that committee as an alternative to the organization's branch in Cairo. The work of that committee was supervised by Dr. Ahmed Al-Malt, the Brotherhood's deputy guide at the time, Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh, and Ashraf Abdel-Ghaffar, former assistant secretary-general of the Doctors Syndicate and one of those charged in the case of money laundering of the Brotherhood's international organization.

Fourth: Investment and economic projects

(A) In Egypt:

The Brotherhood's sources of fundraising were not limited to the monthly contributions by its members or donations and charity, but they tended to recycle and develop these funds to achieve their goals,

including: concealing the truth about the sources of capital, concealing the financial movement and the aspects of the activities that the money is spent on, as well as propagating the Islamic economic model according to the group's vision and orientations. Al-Banna worked since the group's foundation to establish companies and factories, such as the Islamic Transactions Company, which established a copper plant and another for tiles and cement, the Arab Company for Mines and Quarries, the Arab Advertising Company, the Spinning and Weaving Company, and the Trade and Engineering Works Company.

With the return of the Brotherhood to the scene in Egypt in the 1970s, they worked to make the financial empire of the organization by expanding the establishment of companies, factories, and popular trade enterprises. This led to the freedom of movement, daawa, and political and economic activities. That stage witnessed the birth of businessmen affiliated to the Brotherhood and its project, as well as the establishment of a large number of companies, factories, private schools, educational centers, hospitals, printing and publishing houses, and information technology companies. According to some writings on the economy of the Brotherhood, the annual revenue collected for the Brotherhood organization in Egypt from private projects is estimated at no less than EGP 8.2 billion.


(B) Abroad:

Following the clash between president Gamal Abdel-Nasser and the Brotherhood, the group tended to open large areas in the Arab region and in Europe, as it worked on horizontal and vertical expansion in making the Brotherhood's system of entities, whether intellectual, political or economic in the West in general.

The international organization has a number of companies and economic institutions in different continents supervised by the international organization members, the most well known of whom is Ibrahim Kamel, founder of the Dar Al-Maal Al-Islami Trust (DMI). Its headquarters is in Nassau, the Bahamas. Yusuf Nada, Himat Ghalib and the Yusuf Al-Qaradawi family established Al-Taqwa Bank, which was closed after the attacks of 11 September. Its headquarters was also in Nassau in the Bahamas. Likewise, Idris Nasreddin established the International Bank of Al-Aqida and Akida International Bank in Nassau.

The Brotherhood made this network of banking companies, insurance companies, and marine companies a cover for opening bank accounts, and facilitating money transfer and laundering, due to the difficulty of tracking the paths of these funds, which are protected by banking secrecy laws. That is in addition to several companies across the European continent, including the company Stahel Hardmeyer AG in Nachlassliquidation, which was founded in March 1967, and its capital exceeds 18.3 million Swiss francs. The company operates in the field of wholesale trade and cotton textiles, and it has subsidiaries in a number of countries, including Britain and the British Virgin Islands. Also, the BS Altena AG company, which was established in 2010, works in the field of long-term real estate, according to a report published by the Center for Assistance and Strategic Studies in Washington.

Parallel to the beginning of the modern Islamic banking occurrence, the Brotherhood succeeded in building a solid structure of "offshore" companies, which have become an integral part of their ability to conceal and transfer money around the world. These are companies that are established in a country other than the country in which they operate. These companies



are shrouded in ambiguity which makes them far from censorship.

The Brotherhood's financial network includes holding and subsidiary companies, shadow banks, and other financial institutions spread in Panama, Liberia, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Switzerland, Cyprus, Nigeria, Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay.

Many European intelligence reports warned from the growing influence of the Brotherhood in Europe, due to the expansion in establishing economic and social projects that aim at infiltrating European Union countries and influencing them.

It is impossible to ignore the document revealed by the Western security services, known in the media as "The Conquest of the West: The Secret Project of the Islamists", that were found in the villa of Yusuf Nada, dating back to 1982, and published by the Swiss Sylvain Besson. The document included provisions on funding and financial support, such as collecting sufficient funds for the continuation of the jihad, seeking to posses most of the bank's capital, which enables them to manage and control it and create cover within a legal framework for investments to maintain the secrecy of financial transactions.

These projects were also stated in the Muslim Brotherhood's "Civilization Jihad" document, which was written in 1991, under the title "An Explanatory Memorandum: On the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America", stressing the necessity of adopting the concept of empow-

ering the Brotherhood in Europe, which requires the presence of institutions affiliated to the group in the media, political parties, and economic entities, such as banks and companies.

Fifth: The pattern of owning economic projects

The movement of funds and financial assets in the Brotherhood, according to the open and hidden ownership, falls under several levels within the organization, the most important of which are:

1. Economic entities, institutions and projects that are 100 percent owned by the group, and their representatives manage them with "counter deeds", whether they are members of the MB or not, to evade confiscation and security prosecutions by Egyptian agencies.

2. Entities, institutions and economic projects in which the group's funds are mixed with the money of its leaders from businessmen, or sympathetic businessmen, and in which representatives of the group's funds also have "counter deeds".

3. Entities, institutions and economic projects that belong to the leaders of the organization in particular, but the group has a share in them from the profits, which ranges between 7 percent and 10 percent. So, the organization becomes part of these funds in the profit accumulation, or the recycling of funds.

> **"The Muslim Brotherhood's financial file is one of the most important factors in combating terrorism and extremism. Financial resources gave the organization the ability to penetrate societies and its institutions.**

Since the 1980s, the Brotherhood has adopted in its economic institutions what is called "counter deeds", as a legal formula to escape from the financial confiscation in case a clash takes place with the political regime by concealing the affiliation of some economic entities and transferring the ownership of its companies and institutions to businessmen close to the organization, provided that the group owns the largest portion of its shares, or to be divided equally, and a large percentage of its profits are directed to funding its activities in Egypt and abroad.

Since the fall of the MB rule in June 2013, the group's designation on terrorism lists, and the confiscation of its property judicially, following its involvement in funding terrorist activities, Egyptian security agencies have been discovering many companies and institutions that are directly affiliated to the Brotherhood, and are considered an important source of money transfer through multiple and devious ways to hide their true identity and loyalty to the Brotherhood and their associates.

Sixth: Qatari funds

Doha has played an active role in funding the Brotherhood and its affiliated centers and institutions at home and abroad. According to a number of studies and surveys that have tracked the funding of a number of organizations affiliated with the international organization, it revealed the size of



these funds and re-spending them on intellectual projects that are being implemented with the aim of passing the Brotherhood project in the West, and in the Arab region, such as the European Institute for Human Sciences and the Union of Islamic Organizations of France.

Islamic institutions funded by Doha played a dual role in receiving funds and re-passing them on to other entities, with the aim of complicating the difficulty of accessing real capital and its source, through the official arm of the "Qatar Charity", and contributing to funding extremism and terrorism in European countries and dozens of French cities.

According to the book "Qatar Papers", by French journalists Georges Malbrunot and Christian Chesnot, Qatari funds are not carried out through illegal operations, but they use crooked and complex methods that make it difficult to track the movement of these funds, especially since the recipient institutions use these grants in economic projects with the aim of laundering these funds through exchange companies, real estate companies, and educational institutions.

In April 2016, Doha established Jusoor Fund in France with the aim of diversifying the funding institutions of the Brotherhood centers, which became an active partner in the implementation of the Qatar Charity strategy, and is a key partner with Amal Association, a Brotherhood organization in Europe responsible for overseeing the construction work of these organizations.

Ayoub Abul-Iashin, one of the Qatari regime's men in Europe, supervised the establishment and management of the Jusoor Fund. He also serves as a Qatari intermediary in the funding operations of a large number of Brotherhood organizations in France and Europe.

The main donors of Jusoor are: Ahmed Al-Hammadi, director of the Al-Ghaith project, Sheikh Mishaal bin Salman, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem Al Thani, Sheikh Hammad Abdul-Qadir, director-general of the Islamic Dawah Organization in Qatar, Salah Al-Hammadi, and a number of Kuwaiti personalities as well. Besides, about 10 women are involved in collecting donations, zakat and charities.

In summer 2017, disputes flared between French banks, the Amal Association, and the Jusoor Fund as a result of the refusal to accept financial transfers from the Gulf, especially Kuwait, due to their suspicion regarding the source and objectives of these funds.

By the end of 2017, French officials severely criticized the Jusoor Fund, and its director Ayoub Abul-Yaqin, for directing some of the funded activities to competitive economic activities, such as: establishing shops, medical clinics, educational institutions, and other profitable institutions, which is in violation of the French law.

Following the Arab Quartet boycott of Qatar, and the inclusion of the Qatar Charity in Doha on terrorist lists among 12 Qatari organizations, as well as the US administration's tendency to put Qatar Charity under surveillance, suspected of funding terrorist activities, Doha decided to change the name of the Qatar Charity branch in Britain, which Ayoub Abul-Yaqin is responsible for, to Nectar Trust, at the end of 2017, to escape security pursuit, and to track the movement of Qatari funds and funding abroad.

Intelligence documents revealed that Qatar Charity had funded the activities and movements of Yemeni societies and organizations, foremost of which were the Qatari Al-Karamah Organization, and Rights Radar organization, run by Khaled Al-Hammadi, as well as the SAM Organization for Rights and Liberties, run by Tawfiq Al-Hamidi and Nabil Al-Salahi, and Tawakkol Karman Foundation. These organizations provide human rights and legal cover for Al-Qaeda and extremist groups in international forums.

That is in addition to the Qatari Bank, Masraf Al-Rayan, funding a group of centers and institutions affiliated with the Brotherhood in Britain, in addition to a bank account that funds satellite channels belonging to the Brotherhood and owned by an imam of a mosque in Britain.

Seventh: Islamic slaughterhouses

Since the beginning of the Brotherhood's presence in Europe, the group has invested "halal butcheries," or "halal slaughterhouses," most of which are affiliated to Islamic associations and centers affiliated with the international organization.

The halal slaughterhouse is subject to fees and taxes that are shared by the supervising societies with the local authorities and other authorities in the countries of immigration and Muslim communities, with revenues of about $7 billion annually. Halal slaughterhouses have become a huge network in Europe controlled by leaders of the organization, and ultimately pouring the profits into the treasury of the group and its international organization.

Eighth: International scholarships

The Brotherhood took advantage of freedoms in the West, and proceeded to establish organizations and institutions that receive funds from some parties that support the promotion of human rights paths and political orientations, in addition to the fact that some decision-making circles have used the Brotherhood and its leaders abroad to garner the votes of the electorate.

The right-wing I&D Party in the European Parliament revealed that the European Union has paid 36.5 million euros to groups with links to the Brotherhood, whose agenda includes the Islamization of Europe. A member of the European Parliament's Budget Committee, Joachim Kuhs, said, "The European Union funds organizations that have close ties with extremists



organizations linked to terrorism such as the Brotherhood."

This was discovered by I&D Vice President Nicholas Bay by researching the European Union's Financial Transparency System for the years 2014-2019 on the main European Brotherhood organizations, and in these five years, the European Union paid a total of 5,422.678 million Euros to the European Network Against Racism, which includes in its membership the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations (FEMYSO), an organization affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Financial corruption in the Muslim Brotherhood

Despite the existence of formal regulations governing the group's activities and expenditures, these regulations did not prevent the Brotherhood's leaders from ensuring the secrecy of their resources and spending, which opened the door for members to expose many violations on social media platforms and accuse the leaders responsible of seizing a large amounts of money as a result of the absence of oversight and accountability. The former member of the Brotherhood's Shura Council, Dr. Abdel-Sattar Al-Meligi, believes that there is mystery surrounds the sources of the Brotherhood's funding and the real budget, as a result of some leaders of the Guidance Bureau controlling it, and that the group receives huge donations from abroad and at home, and no one knows anything about it. There are no committees to count and oversee these donations and grants.

The most important chapters on the violations and financial embezzlement of the Brotherhood organization are related to the movements of the Egyptian Brotherhood office abroad through the media activity represented in benefiting financially from holding political conferences and seminars, and door-knocking campaigns for official and unofficial entities in European capitals with the aim of promoting Brotherhood issues with the Egyptian regime.

In addition, communication meetings with decision-making circles and politicians in the West to defend the group's issues are made, as well as contracts with public re-



Qatari Funding: A Bank Check From The Charity Qatar Association To An Extremist Association In Europe

lations companies to improve the image of the group abroad in exchange for distorting the Egyptian state, and legal consulting firms are contacted to file a lawsuit against the Egyptian political regime.

The file of establishing satellite channels, electronic committees, and news sites targeting the Egyptian state is also considered among the files that witnessed major financial violations, coordination and contracting with international human rights centers and organizations with the aim of issuing reports and fabricated statements against the Egyptian state, as well as the file for establishing media offices for the Egyptian Brotherhood league abroad to promote for the Muslim Brotherhood file in Egypt.

Financial differences a cause of splits in the group

Financial corruption in the Brotherhood is one of the most important reasons for the split of many of its members, which was witnessed by Brotherhood members on many occasions. The corruption that began in the early years of the group increased with the increase in the size of the organization, as well as its investments and funds, until it became the subject of discussion recently. The most prominent examples of these splits are:

- Amir Bassam: Brotherhood members loyal to the "Kamalyin" front leaked an audio recording attributed to a member of the Brotherhood's Shura Council, Dr. Amir Bassam, who fled Egypt, in which he revealed the extent of financial irregularities within the Egyptian Brotherhood organization fleeing to Turkey.

- Essam Sultan: In the mid-1960s, there were a number of key Brotherhood cadres who questioned the Brotherhood's financial file, including lawyer Essam Sultan, who spent 16 years as a member of the Brotherhood and one of the closest members to the group's historical symbols, as he said in an interview: "Of course, there is a huge financial corruption in the organization, because there is no control over the sources of expenditure, there is no fixed budget, and there are no exclusive figures on the size of the contributions, donations, or transfers that come from abroad."

- Abdel Sattar Al-Meligy: He is one of the Brotherhood's leaders who split from the group and a leader of its Shura Office, who detected financial irregularities and collected them in a letter entitled "Brotherhood funds from where and to where?", and sent it to the Guidance Bureau demanding to know the outlets for disbursing the group's funds.

In conclusion, the Brotherhood's financial file is one of the most important factors in combating terrorism and extremism. Financial resources gave the organization the ability to penetrate societies and its institutions and work to change its intellectual, cultural and religious identity in a manner that is identical and consistent with the literature of the Brotherhood project.

It is necessary to follow financial and economic systems and modern technological foundations that enable the state to track and prosecute Brotherhood money and the confiscation of its funding and spending. Security cooperation and coordination with all countries to form platforms for financial monitoring and following-up with the modern means the Brotherhood uses to collect, recycle and spend money in its terrorist activities is necessary to besiege Brotherhood financial flows that support terrorism, while continuing to boycott the countries that sponsor extremism and terrorism and expose them before the international community.

The Media:

The Muslim-Brotherhood's Weapon against States

Dr. Hani Nassira
Egyptian writer and academic

Mahmoud Qassem
A researcher at the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies

Amid the global, regional, and national crises, the coronavirus pandemic and its repercussions, climate change, and regional conflicts, the ideological and fundamentalist discourses – which are also in crisis in the Arab and Islamic worlds and on an international level – were able to manipulate these predicaments for their own benefit.

The Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) extremist media discourse is not confined to the group's statements or its official platforms only. It has become a vast network of satellite channels and agencies amid severe regional polarization, in which the axis of moderation – at its core lies Egypt – is present on one hand, and the axis of extremism on the other functions in a wide space of funding, sponsors and harboring states, such as Qatar, Turkey, and Iran, each extending from satellite channels to various social networking sites, in the hotbeds of conflict, from Libya to Syria to Yemen and Sudan, to achieve its own and shared agendas. The organization's many voices, discourse patterns and functions of this discourse vary amid combined and complex global and





regional developments, and a difficult and unprecedented Arab phase, in particular.

Despite the multiple and diverse sources and patterns of the media discourse of the terrorist Brotherhood group and the multiplicity of its arms and media partners, from Qatari and Turkish sources, that share them in the contents and objectives of the discourse and its functions, their priorities may differ. They might share or distribute roles, but the central goal remains disrupting the image of legitimacy, fabricate news and incite protests to question the performance of the Egyptian regime, its leadership, president, government, and parties – opposition or otherwise.

The content of the media discourse of these platforms and various media organizations may differ, but they share one goal: sensationalism, confusion, distortion, attempts to incite protests and revolutionary sentiments, integrate the Brotherhood into the Egyptian opposition and go beyond its recent history, as presented here:

First: Incitement – Exploiting crises to provoke public opinion

The MB lies in wait for any new government decision or statement on the economic, social and political situation to fuel public opinion, regardless of how logical the decision is, the logic of its supporters, or the legal and regulatory violation sought by the decision.

Of course, some government decisions, especially those related to society, economy, and life, are prone to criticism, just anywhere in the world, in light of globalization, market laws, and the ongoing global and financial crises. Perhaps some decisions might be incorrect and inaccurate in their implementation and the official and government media may fail to convince the public opinion with these decisions, despite public awareness of the ambush of the counter-media networks to create a state of protest and insurgency against the regime through persistent interpretations, fallacies, and exaggerations.

The MB has exploited and employed various media platforms (satellite channels or social

media, in addition to dozens of news websites funded by Qatar and Turkey), taking advantage of the implications of some decisions, such as the economic reform program, to provoke and incite the masses.

Second: Attempt to undermine confidence

The Brotherhood's media discourse, with its direct and indirect platforms, has been trying to question any political path or position of the state, calling for a popular boycott, and trying to discredit the relationship between the state and society, which is portrayed as a rejection of the regime or its legitimacy and a prelude to the revolution against it, which is what the group is used to do since their ouster from power. The Senate elections were a new means for the Brotherhood's continued approach to distort the image of the state and obstruct the constitutional and electoral entitlements by promoting several statements, most of which revolved around the low rate of participation in the elections, and their attempt to focus on the idea of public reluctance to participate. However, the National Elections Authority announced turnout was 14.23 percent in the House of Representatives elections and seven percent in the Shura Council elections.

Here are some examples of the opinion of the traditional and new Brotherhood media and platforms:

- Egypt signed the maritime demarcation agreement with Greece on 6 August 2020 that angered Turkey and considered it a violation of its sovereign and maritime rights. So, the Brotherhood media supported by Ankara questioned the importance of the agreement for Egypt, and said that the agreement violates and harms Egypt's rights in the Mediterranean in favor of Greece and was signed only to annoy Turkey. The MB media also claimed that Egypt has given a large part of its wealth-rich borders to counteract the legitimate Turkish influence. This was seen, for example, in a video on the YouTube channel of the Al-Sharq TV channel, in which a Brotherhood member, Hisham Abdullah, talks about documents allegedly leaked from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealing Egypt's transfer of its rights in the Mediterranean, under the title "Exclusive: Leaked documents from the Egyptian Foreign Ministry" regarding the border demarcation agreement with Greece.

- Shedding light on some electoral propaganda that insults the candidates and elections, such as the sentences "words, not actions" or some electoral symbols, such as "the banana fruit symbol", in addition to the focus on some electoral conferences that included a large audience despite the preventive measures due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

- Promoting the notion that the Senate represents a waste of state resources, saying that it cost EGP 4.5 billion and was established to distribute loyalty and that the media for seven years has been talking about the Shura Council being of no use and just a waste of money before the current tone changed.

Thus, there are many forms of selectivity aimed at questioning the contents of the Muslim Brotherhood's discourse and media message towards the internal and external political path, which continues in all channels.

Third: Distraction, the regional arena, and multiple goals

Another important example is the distracting and distorting discourse that uses issues in the region (Libya, Syria, Yemen, the Gulf, and the Arab Maghreb) and the world to distort the Egyptian regime and its policies, in an attempt to distract the viewer and hold



the Egyptian regime accountable for all crises and issues, as if it has a magical solution to all the issues of the nation and the region. Examples include:

- The use of some sensitive issues like the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, where MB media seeks to draw the Egyptians' attention towards it as the only important issue, with no regard to other important regional issues that Egypt deals with in various directions. The MB media does not hesitate to portray a contradiction between itself and the interest in the Libyan affairs, highlighting it as the priority, echoing their famous phrase "The Egyptian national security is in the south, not in the west." It is no secret the MB media supports Turkish actions in the Libya through continuous attempts to distract Egyptians away from them, as if they are of no importance compared to the issue of the Renaissance Dam.

- Broadcasting exclusive photos to Al-Jazeera channel about the final shape of the dam and the advantages that Sudan will reap from the dam in an attempt to split the Egyptian-Sudanese ranks and cause a rift between them.

Fourth: Inciting revolution

Perhaps this pattern is the one that combines the various media messages provided by the Brotherhood's different platforms, both the direct and indirect, in an attempt to motivate people to go out on the street, turn against the state and clash with the state and security apparatus, by calling for



a revolution and revolutionizing the state of anger and tension that afflicts the Egyptian street towards some crises, such as the state of economic stagnation, which followed the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic worldwide, in an attempt to mobilize public opinion. The MB exploits economic reform measures, which had a clear outcome, by calling for revolution and breaking the law.

The Brotherhood's committees began, in what could be described as an annual habit, its calls to incite public opinion and to demand their supporters to come out against the Egyptian state. Among the features of these calls was the attempt to return fugitive contractor Mohamed Ali to the scene again through his calls to demonstrate and bring down the regime despite his lack of influence, his intellectual, political and strategic weakness, and the weak presence in the elite or public consciousness in Egypt, which also shows the state of hopelessness among the pro-Muslim Brotherhood arms who were unable to propose a suitable person for their goal. It is as if the group lacked leadership, and exhausted its alternatives.

Fifth: Employing religion

In light of the crisis of the Brotherhood and its different wings and generations, the manifestations of its crisis multiplied in the accusatory speech between the various leaderships, youth, and wings, which forced the group to return to the missionary religious discourse, betting on the religious sentiments and ideological belief of these rules. In its struggle with the state, the group tries to employ religion to stimulate the masses. There are many examples of this pattern, the most prominent of which are:

- The group tries through its media outlets to distort the minds of simple people by spreading the rumor that the state is fighting Islam and its heritage, employing the state's serious attempts to revise and renew the heritage in a way that does not violate the constants of the Islamic religion or its righteous jurisprudence.

- The draft law on the independence of Dar Al-Iftaa from the Al-Azhar institution has been exploited, and transferring its subordination to the Council of Ministers was raised in the House of Representatives. The group considered this an attempt to demolish the mecca of Islam in Egypt, Al-Azhar Al-Sharif.

- The MB's acting Supreme Guide Ibrahim Mounir said on 19 September 2020 that the group's work and jihad against the Egyptian regime are part of the religion of God and in its defense and a jihad for all the divine religions, and that the an-

guish and affliction the group suffers is divine and they will be rewarded for it.

Finally: The media between draining the state and draining the group

It is important to pay attention to the fact that the MB's media discourse is trying to restore the group's effectiveness and existence in the Egyptian political life, to fabricate a revolutionary state of a coup against the regime, distort it and undermine it, not only before its citizens but also in its relations with the region and the world. For this purpose, it uses all possible tools of distortion, fabrication, contradiction, and national slogans that hold Egypt responsible for every mistake or problem in the region. It also uses religion, its sentiments, and sectarianism to confront the regime and target Egyptian peace.

Despite the broad content of the Brotherhood's media message and its partners, it shares a major goal that its supporters declared after the fall of their rule on 30 June 2013, and that is "to drain the state until it falls." Everything that its satellite channels, platforms, and social media accounts provide targets Egypt, but this is what hope looks like for a group in crisis.

To face the MB's media discourse, a counter-drainage strategy is not required. Rather, good media management of the crisis is needed, by adopting diversified, counter-media arms, and paying attention to the regional and international affairs that the group and its supporters employ at home and abroad against Egypt with slogans holding Egypt responsible for everything, ignoring the contexts of reality, its laws, changes, and challenges.

The group is deeply involved in harming Egypt. Although it has dozens of branches around the world, it employs all its supporters and arms to target the Egyptian core that overthrew its rule and aborted its dreams, and employs all the contexts of the region to confront it, which enables the use of the same contexts against the group and its allies. The Brotherhood is a group with many faces and practices. Its position in Afghanistan is in support of the US against the Taliban, and in Iraq, it supports the US and Iran's extremists against the Sunnis and Arabs. Added to its position in Egypt, with the Palestinians, there is its different position on Syria and Algeria. If anything, these contradictions show the Brotherhood's distance from clarity.



The Role of Women


"The Sisters" in the Muslim Brotherhood Strategy

Tokka El-Naggar
A researcher at the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has recognized the pivotal role of women in the organization at an early stage. Hassan Al-Banna established the Muslim Sisters branch in 1933 and since then the role of women in the organization has evolved from missionary activity, through recruitment, to confronting Egyptian security forces after the 30 June 2013 Revolution, participating in terrorist attacks by inciting violence, providing funds, and delivering information.

In light of Egypt's decisive measures against the MB, the group is likely to increase its dependence on the Muslim Sisters in a desperate attempt to target the security and stability of Egypt. This raises important questions about the perils of women joining terrorist organizations, as well as the evolution of the role of the Sisters within the terrorist Brotherhood group, and the escalation of their terrorist activities following the 30 June Revolution.





The perils of women joining terrorist organizations

The real danger of women joining terrorist organizations is the central relation between women and society. Women form a network in which they lie at the ceter. They play multiple roles, including the role of a mother, sister, daughter, or wife. They have the ability to communicate with and influence half of society. Women are more likely to accept radical or extremist ideas than men, due to their reliance on the driving emotion of vengeance and the desire for revenge.

Terrorist groups are aware of the symbolic and strategic importance of women, so they have used them optimally, by undertaking multiple roles such as recruiting, collecting donations, delivering information, and sometimes carrying weapons. The symbolic importance of women contributes to legitimizing terrorist groups, due to their success in attracting a large number of women, while the strategic importance of women is evident in women's embrace of the ideas of the organization, which means the ideological transfer of these ideas to future generations when they raise their children. Not to mention they can avoid many searches that men are exposed to, as there is a different treatment of security to women, due to religious, cultural and social considerations. In Arab and Islamic societies, women enjoy privacy that keeps them above suspicion.

The Brotherhood developed an organizational structure for the Muslim Sisters to activate their roles and organize their work in pursuit of the group's interests. Accordingly, a number of committees were formed, most notably: the Education and Families Committee, which is responsible for the educational rehabilitation of sisters, by teaching a number of religious curricula related to the group's literature. The Individual Daawa (Calling) Committee is the key driver of the sisters' activity. It is where they are trained to attract other women to the group. The committee comprises two important divisions: The first is the "Al Zahrawat" division, specializing in attracting females in the early stages of life, such as primary and middle school students. The second division is the "Fatayat", or girls, which targets high school and university students in an effort to spread the group's extremist ideology.

Experts argue that among the most important reasons for the survival of the terrorist Brotherhood, despite all the security and political blows it has suffered, since its fall in Egypt on 30 June 2013, is the presence of a large group of women in the organization, representing the backbone of the MB, as their ranks did not witness any significant defections. In other words, despite the occurrence of many historical and contemporary fissures among the ranks of the MB, it did not affect the ranks of the Muslim Sisters, taking into account their pivotal role in the organization on one hand, and their increasing numbers on the other. In short, the Sisters is a second defense line that ensures the survival of the movement in times of crises.

The Muslim Sisters: A parallel path

The Muslim Sisters forms a large section in the terrorist Brotherhood, but there are no available statistics about their numbers. Some estimates put them at about 30 percent of the group's members, while other estimates indicated that they are more than 40 percent. By tracing the stages of the development of the role of the Sisters within the organization, the first Muslim Sisters department was established in 1933 from Brotherhood women, their daughters, and their female relatives.

The formation of a Sisters branch is a clear contradiction to the ideas of Hassan Al-Banna, who refused to give women their rights and worked on undermining their freedom. Al-Banna said that "Women do not need to study different languages, and they do not need special technical studies. They will soon know that women have to stay at home." This can be explained in light of the pragmatism that characterizes Al-Banna. Although he is not convinced of the importance of women's rights, he found an imperative to use them in order to achieve the group's goals.

The first female head of that division was Labiba Ahmed, followed by Amal Al-Ashmawi, Naima Al-Hudhaibi, Fatima Abdul-Hadi, and Zainab Al-Ghazali. With the beginning of the establishment of the Sisters branch, the role of women was limited to raising children and caring for the family. However, this role witnessed a later development towards political action in 1944, which saw the launch of the first executive committee of the Muslim Sisters, which played an active role in the extension of the Sisters' daawa in public places, streets, institutions, government agencies, and more.

In this context, it is worth mentioning one of the most important female terrorist leaders within the organization at that time, Zainab Al-Ghazali, who raised an ostensible slogan for charitable work, joined in executing a number of terrorist operations, the most important of which was the founding of Organization 65, which was accused of planning the assassination of the late Egyptian president Gamal Abdel-Nasser, and striking vital installations with the aim of seizing power. She was sentenced to death by hanging in this case, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, and then she was released during the era of the late president Mohamed Sadat. After her release, she issued her book "Days of My Life", which was welcomed by the Muslim Brotherhood who transformed the writer into an "icon" and a jihadist feminist symbol. The book is a biography of jihadism full of Qutbist concepts and stories about the Brotherhood being victims of injustice.

The 1950s and 1960s represented two of the most difficult periods in the Brotherhood's history due to the arrests of the most important leaders of the group, and here the role of the Muslim Sisters shifted to collecting donations and delivering them to the homes of imprisoned or fugitive Brotherhood members. The social activities of the Sisters contributed to the establish-

ment of a strong and vast network among Brotherhood families, which provided financial and moral support for the families of imprisoned members.

At the beginning of the establishment of the Sisters division, its basic roles were focused on daawa and healthcare and social activities. However, these roles took a strategic dimension when there were direct confrontations with the authorities, as the essence of the Sisters' mission was to help the movement survive harsh security strikes against its leadership.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, the role of the Sisters emerged in mobilizing women to vote in the election and standing before committees to make propaganda for their candidates. The Sisters also worked on attracting all girls who are eligible to vote. There is no doubt that 2005 witnessed a development in the role of the Sisters; a role that led the Brotherhood to win 88 seats in the People's Assembly elections at the time.

With the events of January 2011, the sweeping emergence of the Sisters began. The Guidance Bureau saw it was inevitable to push and use women in parliamentary and municipal elections, due to their high number, which is close to twice the male voting mass. With the beginning of 2011, a large number of the Sisters ran for the Shura Council elections, and not a few of them succeeded, in addition to the participation of nearly three Muslim Sisters members in the Constituent Assembly for the drafting of the 2012 constitution, not to mention the participation of some of them in the parliament of 2012, which was subsequently dissolved.



Hence, the role of women in the organization is determined according to the ruling context and the circumstances surrounding the group. Women's role shifted from caring for the family at the beginning of the group's founding, to daawa, mobilization, and expansion. It developed into moral and material support in times of adversity, and has emerged strongly in election mobilization during the organization's political rise. It has recently been apparent in participating in terrorist operations following the overthrow of the rule of the terrorist Brotherhood.

The role of the "Bloody Sisters"

Following the 30 June Revolution, the violence of the Sisters emerged. They began to be employed in terrorist operations against the Egyptian state, their tasks were apparent in several roles:

Violence and incitement:

The Sisters' violence escalated dramatically in the wake of the 30 June Revolution, and this was evidenced by their intense activities in universities, especially Al-Azhar University, where the Sisters carried out many manifestations of violence in the university, the most notable of which were: Surrounding the deans' offices, closing the main university gates with chains, attacking police officers, and clashing with a number of professors. A woman named Samia Shenan participated in the "Kerdasa massacre" by mutilating the bodies of officers after their death at the Kerdasa police station, encouraging gunmen to vandalize police armored vehicles and setting fire to the police station. In February 2015, the Cairo Criminal Court sentenced her to death, but the court accepted an appeal and commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. That is not to mention the renewal of detention of Aisha Khairat Al-Shater in August 2019 for inciting violence and sabotage against the state, and incitement to harm the national economy.

Worth mentioning is the statement of Azza Tawfiq (Khairat Al-Shater's wife), after the 30 June Revolution. She said the Egyptian army has 20 hours to work on restoring the Brotherhood leaders to power, otherwise Egypt will turn into a pool of blood. She added that 20,000 mujahideen on the Egyptian border were ready to move in.

Electronic committees:

The Sisters sought to target and devastate state institutions by spreading rumors. Investigations in Supreme State Security case 485/2015, known in the media as the case of the "Electronic and Media Committees of the International Brotherhood Organization," in which a number of Muslim Brotherhood women were involved, revealed an agreement between leaders of the International Brotherhood Organization, who fled the country, to incite against state institutions and public facilities, aiming at overthrowing the existing regime. Within this framework, the organization's electronic committees were activated to implement this scheme by spreading rumors to disturb peace and public security, and to incite terrorist operations against judges, police personnel and officers, the Armed Forces, and public and vital installations.

Establishing connections:

In the current period of the group's history, the Sisters acts as a link between the terrorist organization's elements at home and abroad in order to deliver assignments and information. The Sisters also carry out the task of coordinating between the Brotherhood's free cadres and locked up leaderships.

These women include Sundus Essam Shalabi, the daughter of Brotherhood leader Essam Shalabi, who was sentenced to death in the intelligence case, as well as Basma Refaat Abdel-Moneim Mohamed Rabie, who was involved in the assassination of the prosecutor-general "Hisham Barakat." Rabie was in charge of communicating with Brotherhood member Yehia Moussa, who fled to Turkey and assigned the members of the group to assassinate Barakat. The Cairo Criminal Court sentenced her to 15 years in prison.

Funding terrorism:


The Sisters play a pivotal role in gathering the necessary funding for operations under the guise of charitable works and receiving funds from abroad through bank accounts away from eyes of the security forces. A number of active female elements in the organization were arrested, most notably Ola Al-Qaradawi, who is accused of funding the terrorist organization and participating in implementing a scheme prepared by the Brotherhood to fund violent groups in Egypt. Investigations conducted by the Supreme State Security Prosecution in Egypt in case 316/2017 revealed that she was in charge of direct support for the group's members and funding their arming. She was receiving direct assignments related to the financial statements and bank account numbers unknown to a large number of leaders of the group.

Terrorist schools:

Brotherhood members' mothers have turned into "terrorist schools" that nurture extremism in the minds of their children and plant the seeds of terrorism in them, motivated by feelings of hatred for the state and the desire to disrupt its stability and security. After the ouster of Mohamed Morsi, Brotherhood members' mothers appeared to praise their sons who participate in terrorist operations, the most prominent of whom are: the mother of terrorist Abdel-Rahman Khaled Mahmoud, who carried out the attack against the National Cancer Institute, which left more than 20 martyrs and nearly 50 wounded. The Ministry of Interior revealed a video that showed a meeting between Mahmoud and his mother as she encouraged him to carry out the terrorist operation. Likewise, the mother of terrorist Ahmed Mohamed Al-Degwi praised her son's role in the assassination of former prosecutor-general Hisham Barakat, in a call-in with one of the Brotherhood's channels. There are others who bless their sons for carrying out terrorist and suicide operations.

In sum, terrorist organizations resort to relying on women when they go through a period of decline and retreat. The Brotherhood has recently followed a method of relying on women to implement the Brotherhood's terrorist plans in the Egyptian society. Hence, a distinction must be made between women's participation in terrorist activities and the societal perception of her. In other words, our view of the terrorist women's scene should not be subject to customs and traditions, but rather viewed as a threat to the security and fate of the nation. Likewise, the role of women in terrorist organizations should not be limited to the role of the victim only by highlighting the violent practices towards them, and neglecting their role as a terrorist actor who decided to join terrorist organizations with their own free will.

In light of the structural challenges the Brotherhood is experiencing, the Brotherhood is likely to increase its reliance on the female elements in the mobilization against the Egyptian state during the coming period by establishing a number of pages on social media to stir incitement against state institutions and call for the mobilization in the street.



Finally,

The Brotherhood is facing multiple challenges from within and from the surrounding conditions that may drive it to adopt different procedures than its basic course sometimes. Despite the importance of external challenges stemming from the change in the positions of some major countries, such as France, and the change in the regional and international environment, especially after the exposure of the relationship between the Brotherhood and the Turkish-Qatari project, the group has to rethink its moves, whether changing the policies of regional and international powers active in the region or the balances of preserving the interests of the Brotherhood in these countries and the ability of the international organization to deal flexibly with this critical stage. But the biggest impact on the future of the Brotherhood is tied to the challenges from within. These challenges are dangerous because they undermine the structural sustainability factors on which the organization relied during its major breakdowns.

This is further deplored in the final topics:

- **The Muslim Brotherhood's Challenges of Presence and Exclusion**
- **The Muslim Brotherhood: What's Next?**





The Muslim Brotherhood's

Challenges of Presence and Exclusion

Maher Farghali
An expert on terrorist organizations

Profound changes have taken place in the nature and degree of the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) presence in Egyptian society. The group's future is ambiguous due to several challenges that rendered it excluded at home and weak abroad. It is importance to study these challenges to determine their course in light of the decline of political Islam, not in Egypt alone, but in the entire Arab region.

The Brotherhood has been relying, in the years following its overthrow from the government, on several issues, including: random mobilization tactics, intensified operations of terrorist organizations against the Armed Forces and the police, especially at hot spots in Sinai, as well as reigniting divisions in state institutions, especially the bureaucratic ones, in which the Brotherhood succeeded in placing a number of its members among their second-tier leaders.

The main objective of these tactics is to prolong the conflict, impede the economic progress of the state, maintain the cohesion of the organization, prevent a review of the leadership's mistakes, and engage in





a negotiation process that will lead them to return to the forefront by working on several levels (political, public daawa and armed operations).

The group has faced a series of challenges despite the logistical support of the international organization. With the sudden and rapid transition from the organized secret and semi-secret political activity into armed activities and working in the Diaspora. Following the successive internal blows, circumstances of the external blockade, and different international and regional context, the group had major rganizational dilemmas, which varied after June 30, until it became complete a failure during the last two years.

Challenges within the MB

There Brotherhood has faced external and internal challenges. This study delves into the details of the internal challenges and the structure and practices of the group. The MB doesn't have a clear, realistic vision, and its detailed programs and tools have failed to reach the desired reality. The challenges include:

Social rejection:

This is the group's most difficult challenge. In recent years the MB was able to mobilize masses, then it lost this ability due to its

absence from the street. The organization became unable to make a breakthrough concerning this challenge despite the huge amount of money it has spent on propaganda and the media.

In the face of social rejection, the group did not find anything but an active organizational latency, which allows it to treat its internal crises, renew faces, and start a new media strategy, which is what it has already started in its plan (re-evaluation and construction), but it has also failed, for reasons related to its presence in power in the populist mentality of the Egyptian people, the systematic violence carried out by its terrorist groups, and the state of total rejection.

Despite the group's denial of its own system and its military wing represented by the Hasm movement, and its rejection of any talk about having specific groups affiliated to it, during the years following its removal from power and until the last two years, it has not been able to shift from a strategy of comprehensive confrontation with the regime to a policy of coexistence or adaption. This was due to the continued social rejection of the idea of the organization.

Divisions within the group:

After 30 June, the Brotherhood continued to move from a state of political and ideological consensus to conflict, discord and division. Being toppled on 3 July 2013 contributed to the creation of Brotherhood lineups, which was further clarified after the failure to mobilize the masses, forcing the group to stop its armed terrorist operations, the continuation of the state of stagnation of the group at the Egyptian level, and the successive collapse of group leaders or ranks inside prisons.

The group has three currents, each centered around the organization. The first is the traditional current, which is now represented by Ibrahim Mounir after the fall of Mahmoud Ezzat. The second is the "Qaradawiyin" current, represented by Essam Talimah and a group of young people. The third is the "Kamaliyin" current, in reference to the killed leader Mohamed Kamal. The latter trend is close to Salafi jihadism.

Differences within the group were evident in the recent speech by head of the Center for the Training of Islamic Scholars (Markaz Takwin Al-Ulama) in Mauritania, Sheikh Mohamed Al-Hassan bin Al-Dedow Al-Shanqiti, on Al-Jazeera channel. The speech was about the transfer of Mahmoud Ezzat's powers to Ibrahim Mounir. Al-Shanqiti indicated that the group is going through a critical stage, and that an intellectual review has become necessary with regard to the leadership, regulations and priorities and the issues of governance, politics, internal splits, and the link between the Brotherhood at home and abroad. He added that now is the time for reviewing the Brotherhood in Egypt and the Levant.

The overall context of the group now in Egypt is that it has so far failed to reunite, reconstitute and take position or create a new image. Its current aim is to survive.

This became clear when Ibrahim Mounir was declared acting supreme guide, replacing Mahmoud Ezzat who was arrested, and when some Brotherhood sectors criticized the recent incidents. These included the successive defeats of the organization, the dangers it was exposed to due to the consolidation of the Egyptian regime, the reoccurrence of organized secret activity and violence by members of the group for revenge, the cooperation of some MB members with the Islamic State and involvement in armed action, and then the merger of some of the group's supporters with the Salafi currents, which negatively affected the popularity of the organization, and the absence from the



Fugitive **Amr Darrag** disavowed the Brotherhood, stating that the situation within the group is confused and full of crises

Essam Talimah affirmed the failure of the Brotherhood's leaders, and that the rifts within it have reached a dangerous level.





Traded accusations among **Brotherhood leaders**

Mohi Issa stated that **Mahmoud Ezzat**, the Brotherhood's former secretary-general, committed immoral crimes for which he must be tried.



street during the past years, which is considered as an unbearable difficulty.

During the last two years, severe organizational splits and fissures took place, groups of young people moved to be more open to other political currents, and radicals dissociated from those less radical, which all led to more splits and reviews of the old organization.

Recently, the ideological gap between the group and its allied organizations has widened, and the successive statements of Assem Abdel-Majid are a stark example. The fall of strategic interactions between the Islamists and their opponents, including secularists, nationalists, liberals, leftists and Copts, widened the gap between them.

Perhaps the main source of failure is due to the dispute over the way of work and management, the failure to mobilize, how to hold the leadership accountable for their crimes by the organization, the control of the conservative generation over leadership and sources of power, namely funding, financial and moral corruption, and how to integrate the organization based on efficiency and experience, not on claims of purity, piousness and sanctity.

Reconstruction and restructuring:

A prominent young leader, Abdullah Ezzat, head of the Students Unions of the MB, revealed in more than one article what is happening in the corridors of the organization, criticizing the practices of the old generation in an article entitled "Students of the Brotherhood in Sudan: Bring down the Sponsor". Ezzat exposed the dark secrets of the organization, and attempts to restructure the group, which is now taking place in the UK under the banner of Reassessment and Reconstruction.

The first decision in reconstruction was to consider that the external office, led by Ahmed Abdel-Rahman, was responsible (in coordination with all concerned parties, inside and outside the Brotherhood) for the tasks entrusted to it and approved in its plan, and not responsible for the educational, living, or administrative part of the Egyptian Brotherhood abroad. These, he said, are affiliated to the supervision of the Brotherhood students association, and in the event that problems or disputes arise between the parties abroad, an investigation committee is formed to conduct reconciliation and disengage while adhering to the rules. If one or some of the members of the administrative committee submitted the so-called appeal signed by himself, this meant that those who filed the appeal lost their membership in the Supreme Administrative Committee, and the head of the committee and the members committed to the decisions of the Shura Council should carry out their work with the help of members of the Shura Council and administrative offices to communicate with spots not represented in the committee. In addition, the administrative offices should not accept any administrative decisions except those signed by the chairman of the Administrative Committee.

> **"It clearly indicates that the group is already in crisis and faces difficult internal challenges.**

Many of those decisions, including Ibrahim Mounir's assumption of the duties of the acting supreme guide, were not welcomed by many, and leader Ahmed Abdel-Rahman stated that solutions based on beliefs during political crises increase their complexity and reflect useless traditional ideas.

It has now become clear that Qutbist generation and the traditional leaders have restored their control over the organization. The new construction, as usual, is built on the expulsion of some leaders and maintaining others who tend to preserve the organization more than anything else.

Slipping into the Salafi-jihadi quagmire

The group has slipped into the quagmire of Salafi jihadism. The logistical and social support for these groups reached a great extent it took advantage of the presence of some disaffected extremist Islamists, and put them in a strategy for hostilities. It envisioned that destabilizing the country for the longest possible period might shift the balance of power in its favor, but that it is not possible to separate a group from its history, just as it cannot be suddenly moved from the bottom to the top, because fissure will take place, and this is exactly what happened. The group's support for the Salafi-jihadi groups caused a great Brotherhood fissure in terms of ideological and strategic convergence, and many young people turned to these groups.

Media discourse:

Although the Brotherhood's media, represented in their satellite channels, contributed to maintaining the public display of their absent presence in the Egyptian street, it also contributed to weakening the group, as many confused the Brotherhood's media with the message and discourse, which are misleading and defective. This has limited the impact of this media policy, and among the most important defects were: unification between ideology and religion; confusing the object and subject; interpreting all phenomena by attributing them to a primary principle or cause like social or natural phenomena; and relying on the authority



of the predecessors, or heritage, after converting the heritage texts which are secondary texts, into primary ones that enjoy a tremendous amount of holiness not less than the original texts. That is in addition to the mental certainty and the intellectual determination and refusal of any intellectual disagreement.

A Brotherhood dissident, Tarek Al-Bashbishi, said that he believes the influence of the Brotherhood's channels has diminished somewhat, due to the passage of time and the failure of the organization to achieve any goal it has promised. This added a new challenge to the group, that recently believes that its media caused the decline of the number of its allies who are opposed to the Egyptian regime, because they completely gave up on achieving any goal the group promised them. One of the reasons for the decline in the momentum of these channels, according to Al-Bashbishi, was the strength of the Egyptian state institutions and their full control, which caused the despair of many of those who bet on their inflammatory slogans, and the exposure of the size of funding and internal conflicts.

In sum, the group tried to reassess and build its media anew at a meeting in London, under a strategic goal that reads: "Cohesion, building and development of the group to be prepared and able to effectively influence society," as described by the powerful international organization media man, Azzam Al-Tamimi, who advises the media officials of the organization to return to the ranks of the group and contribute to its restoration and unification. But so far, the plan has achieved no tangible results. The group lives on the impact of divisions and not splits, and it clearly indicates that the group is already in crisis and faces difficult internal challenges, in addition to other external challenges that may bring it to its demise, or make its future fraught with danger.

The Muslim Brotherhood:

What's Next?

The Brotherhood has formed an unofficial alliance with Turkey and Qatar to impose hegemony on the Arab region. The three partners target the forces that oppose their project, primarily Egypt. This is why they rely on their various means of secret relations with intelligence services, their expansion and economic and social penetration in European society, and their financial and media networks to evade security prosecutions, whether through financial evasion, relying on the Muslim Sisters, and in some cases through the employment of children.

Why does the Muslim Brotherhood survive?

Egypt has been combating the terrorist group since 2013, practicing violence and endangering the safety of the state. Since then, security efforts have intensified against the Brotherhood's terrorism. There is no doubt that great successes are achieved, as many of them have been arrested, fled Egypt, and were threatened by security prosecution to return them to Egypt to be tried for their terrorist practices. However, one of the most important achievements is the weakening of the organizational structure of the Brotherhood and its networks, not only in Egypt but abroad as well too.

The path of combating group terrorism continues, and it should not be expected that locking up the group's senior leaders or their hiding is the decisive end of the Brotherhood. The group had suffered great defeats and was able to return to make influence depending on four factors, namely:

The first: Maintaining the organization's institutions and organizational structure despite the presence of subsidiary cells of the Brotherhood in Egypt and branches outside Egypt. There remains a central authority that defines the general directions of the group's work, helped by its reliance on organized secret activity. Indeed, the group saw weaknesses before, but not as much as it is weak now.

The second: The group maintained its strong financial network in its previous moments of weakness and failure. The financial network became strong in Europe, specifically with the group's fleeing from Egypt during the rule of president Gamal Abdel-Nasser. Since then, the group has relied on its penetration into the economies of countries, whether in Europe or the Arab region. This helped it achieve multiple benefits. The penetration of Brotherhood companies and banks into the economies of countries ensures that it retains the ability to influence and finance secret business and terrorist activities.

The third: Ceasing to follow the group's members and their activities after its official dissolve and apparent defeat allowed the group to recover, develop its performance and have more influence. After it announced its return to the "daawa" track, maintaining a distance from the "political" track, and making itself appear vulnerable and

victimized, efforts to control the group relatively decreased. This happened after the group was dissolved in 1948, and then later in the 1950s and 1960s.

The fourth: The group has the ability to change its means of work, as it practices violence and destructive activities in Egypt and Arab countries, and does not do the same in European countries or the US. Instead it conducts charitable activities in the framework of civil activity and sneaks to the ruling elite, so the international community continues to disbelieve the group's violence and terrorism.

The future of the Muslim Brotherhood

By carefully examining these factors, it becomes clear that the Brotherhood learns from its mistakes, which enabled it to survive for more than 90 years. The future of the Brotherhood depends on the success of efforts to confront the Brotherhood's network, which requires:

1. Continuing efforts to combat the Brotherhood, despite the major challenges in and out of the group, it should not be provided an opportunity to hide or rearrange its cards. The best way to do this is to continue to strike the organizational structure and communication networks of the group and to dry up its sources of funding.

2. Work to continue uncovering the truth about the group, its practices, and goals. Exposing the organization in European countries may help to undermine its movement and limit its activity.

3. When the Brotherhood fled Egypt, they looked for safe havens and found them in Turkey, Qatar, and some European countries, but with the change of political considerations, there may be a threat to return them to Egypt. Just as the Brotherhood in Turkey is striving to obtain Turkish citizenship to secure their presence there, they are also striving to have new safe havens in Asian countries and Canada, which requires intensifying efforts to follow them and reduce the chances of them settling in these societies.

4. The expansion of the role of the international organization at the present time and the multiplicity of its activities warn of the necessity of following up on this role, rendering collective confrontation and anticipation of the group's secret activity action and violence necessary.

In sum, confronting the Muslim Brotherhood should be comprehensive and collective. Intellectual, economic, social, and security confrontation of the group at home and abroad has become imperative.

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Programs and sections

First: The International Relations Program

It focuses on studying the Middle East and global strategic shifts and their effects on Egypt's interests and security. The program comprises specialized units in American, European, Asian, African, and Arab studies.

Second: The Security and Defense Program

It analyzes national security issues with their multi-faceted dimensions through its units dedicated to cyberspace security, armament, extremism, terrorism, and armed conflicts studies.

Third: The Public Policy Program

It is interested in studying public policies cases and shifts through its units: economics and energy unit, public opinion unit, and woman and family unit.

The research units are flexible, reflecting the research agenda adopted by the ECSS during a specific period of time, according to an objective assessment of the reality on the ground on the national, regional and international levels, as well as the existing challenges and threats.

In addition to the research programs, the ECSS houses the "Egyptian Observatory", concerned with issues that occupy the Egyptian and international public opinion. It provides accurate and analytical follow-up on the issues of concern to decision-makers in the Middle East and the world. The ECSS also has a blog for young researchers and contributing writers from different nationalities to express their views and ideas about the accelerating world events.

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