


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Introduction

The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) is the source and supplier of the majority of terrorist groups that hide behind the religion of Islam. Since it was founded by Hassan Al-Banna in 1928, the Brotherhood has been working in the field of politics, often indirectly because it is either politically banned or it hides behind the curtain of daawa, raising the slogan “Two Swords” for its daawa.

The Muslim Brotherhood is a political group from the very first moment of its establishment, relying on organized secret activity, violence, and social networks to ensure its survival, strengthen the resolve of its members, and renew their vows of blind obedience at times of weakness and defeat.

The group continued to alternate between “jurisprudence of empowerment” and “jurisprudence of vulnerability” throughout its history, according to the requirements of the stage it is going through. After the group was able to rule – or seize power in – Egypt for the first time in its history in 2012, it unveiled its true face and sought to control state institutions and divert their orientations at the expense of the Egyptian people.

With the people’s rejection of the group’s rule, its violence was manifested in the terrorism it practiced against the Egyptian people and their symbols, aiming at threatening their security and denying them opportunities for growth and stability.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s work against the Egyptian state is the fact that is being confirmed daily since the organization’s ouster from power in 2013. This terrorist group fights development and stability, seeks to destroy, spreads chaos, and has networks of communication, funding, and violence that enable it to spread and have influence. The organization has historically proven to learn from its mistakes, which is telling of what its networks can do in the next stage to achieve its goals.

This is why the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies presents this publication that provides an analytical study of the factors of the Brotherhood’s spread and influence and an outlook for the future of the group and its potential strategies.



The Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies



Editorial

The Muslim Brotherhood announced since its inception that it hovers in the middle between daawa and politics. The fact of the matter is that it is a political group from the very first moment of its founding, relying in its survival on hiding behind religious preaching, organized secret activity, violence, and social networks that have developed over time, to ensure its survival, strengthen the resolve of its members and renew their vows to listen and obey in moments of weakness and fracture.

The group continued to fluctuate between “empowerment jurisprudence” and “jurisprudence of vulnerability” throughout its history, according to the requirements of the stage it is going through. After the group gained access to the governing departments of several countries, it was able to rule in Egypt - the origin country - for the first time in its history in 2012. However, the Brotherhood worked to empower their group in state institutions and divert its orientations to the group’s interests only at the expense of the Egyptian people. When Egyptian rejected the rule of the Brotherhood, the group resorted to violence and terrorism against Egypt and its people. Since then, it sought to take revenge on the homeland, threaten its security and deny it opportunities for growth and stability.

The Brotherhood would not have had the ability to continue its destructive endeavors without countries and agencies that support it to achieve its project. This raises the question of the motives and interests of these supporting states. How far does this support extend? How can the Brotherhood spread in many countries and have a clear impact on them, even though these countries are largely different? How does it spend on its proliferation? There are a dozen more questions that this study seeks to answer, by addressing the following main axes:

The first axis is concerned with the sponsors and supporters of the Brotherhood. Two topics are presented, the first is entitled “The Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey: Intertwining Interests”. The paper explains the interdependence between the Brotherhood project in the region and the Turkish project, as well as the common interests of the two parties. The second topic, entitled “The Relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar”, attempts to analyze the evolution of the Brotherhood’s presence in Qatar, the role of their leaders and their relationship with the international organization, and Qatar’s role in financing the organization.

The second axis, concerning the organization's network of activities, studies the factors that help the Brotherhood survive, which are several qualitative networks that enable the organization to spread and make an influence. This axis includes four topics, the first is entitled "The MB's Secret Cell and its Relationship with Intelligence apparatuses" which explains the roots of the Brotherhood's organized secret activity, its hidden means of violence, and other secret practices in the economy, information, and connections. The second topic, entitled "The Muslim Brotherhood's Funding Networks", reviews the organization's most important funding resources, showing their penetration into the economies of countries in the region and beyond. The third topic is entitled "The Media: The Muslim Brotherhood's Weapon against States", which highlights the Brotherhood's media network as the most dangerous means on which they currently rely to direct public opinion in favor of their interests. The fourth topic, "The Role of Women "The Sisters" in Muslim Brotherhood strategy", shows the invisible role of women in the Brotherhood and their impact, past and present, emphasizing the dual role of women within the group.

The final axis with one topic is "The Muslim Brotherhood's Challenges of Presence and Exclusion", which is a vision of the reality of the group and the challenges it faces from within and in the surrounding environment.

The Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey:

Intertwining Interests


Dr. Dalal Mahmoud

Director of the security and defense program at the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies

The Egyptians' revolution against the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) rule on 30 June 2013 was the moment of exposure for the group in the state where it originated. Violence and fights to acquire power are the original goals of the MB. The ideology of the group shows the intertwining of religion, political power and violence. This was apparent since Hassan Al-Banna founded the group in 1928. He established it as an Islamic political organization that aims at applying Islamic law in daily life and restoring Islamic rule based on his views and thesis in understanding contemporary Islam, where he said: "Islam is a doctrine and worship, nation and nationality, religion and state, spirituality, and Quran and the sword". Therefore, the scope of the group's movement was always ambiguous, and they declare that they represent the borderline between daawa and politics, but their history proves that they use daawa to practice politics and assume power.

Since the exposure of the group in Egypt, a new chapter in a historically repeated strat-





egy that combines apparent vulnerability and underground conspiracy has started. The removal of the Brotherhood from power and the declaration of their group as a “terrorist” group marked the beginning of a major phase of fracture. Its impact was doubled by the relative success of the Egyptian state’s efforts in striking many of the Brotherhood’s network veins in Egypt and, which affected its basic structure.

Consequently, the group tended to show weakness and claim it is a daawa group and has nothing to do with politics, while at the same time it has become a basic participant in the Egyptian state counter-axis, headed by Turkey, in an attempt to besiege Egypt with crises, conflicts, practicing psychological warfare against its people aiming at undermining the state and its regime and destabilizing it, until there is a new opportunity for the group and its sympathizers to jump into the political scene once again.

Turkey’s Motives against Egypt

It is possible to understand the Brotherhood’s hostility to the Egyptian state (regime and people) after their ouster from power in 2013. The people’s rejection of them till now is apparent in the absence of response to their calls for demonstrations against the regime. But understanding Turkey’s targeting of Egypt raises questions, and understanding this targeting requires going back to 2002, when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) assumed power in Turkey. This was when it was a parliamentary system and Recep Tayyip Erdogan was the head of government. This government had a regional project, which is to extend Turkey’s influence in the Arab region, taking advantage of the regional leadership vacuum and the Arab countries’ involvement in their domestic issues and intra-regional conflicts.

The Turkish project aims at enhancing Turkey’s status for the United States and the European countries by expanding its influ-

ence in the region, as the region represented an expanding, open and limited competitive market for Turkey with its strong and diversified economy at that time.

Turkey's project is based on three pillars: Its economic strength that depends on the centrality of its role in energy projects run by major countries to transport gas from the Arab region or from the Caspian region via Turkey, which means that Turkey was planning to be the regional center of gas transport to Europe, in addition to its strategic importance both regionally and internationally. The historical relations that made Turkey (the former Ottoman Empire) bear some features of Arab identity, albeit more arrogant, is the ideological framework based on the rule of political Islam, although this framework did not appear clearly in the early years of Erdogan's rule, but was confirmed after the June 2013 revolution.

This project went through two phases concerning the policies that Turkey relied on to implement it. The First Phase (2002-2013): During this phase, Turkey followed new internal and external policies; a new reformative economic policy to revive the Turkish economic conditions, reorganization of localities and trade and students unions and restructuring state institutions until it finishes with the military institution. Externally, the principle of the Turkish policy was to have "zero conflicts" regionally and start a new phase with all countries in the region based on cooperation and peace, with a serious tendency to join the European Union. Along these policies the Turkish soft power had a role in promoting the Turkish model in the region. The Turkish media and drama – with their contents that do not all agree with Arab values and traditions – were widespread on Arab screens.

This policy helped Turkey achieve internal empowerment (according to the Brotherhood's ideology), and regional influence.

With the events and changes witnessed in the region, known as the "Arab Spring Revolutions," the Turkish regime's chances of implementing its regional project increased. Conflicts spread in several Arab countries, and the Brotherhood came to power in the biggest Arab country in 2012 and Egypt came close to containing them. The Brotherhood accepted the Turkish ruler to be a caliphate to the Muslims, and the indications of his caliphate to the Muslims and his Brotherhood trends appeared in his visit to Cairo in 2011, where he called on Egypt to follow the Turkish secularist model. The Muslim Brotherhood called on him in the same meeting to become the caliph. Two official meetings were held between him and former President Mohamed Morsi in the year in which Morsi ruled, during which he concluded 27 agreements with Egypt, most of which were not of common or equal interests for the two countries.

The Second Phase (June 2013-present):

The repercussions of the June Revolution, that extended to the efforts of the reconstruction of the national state and increasing its capabilities, were not welcomed by the Turkish state. The repercussions didn't only affect Egypt's domestic affairs, but extended to hinder the progress of the previously mentioned Turkish project.

The June Revolution hit the three pillars of the Turkish project, which made the Turkish regime reveal its true intentions and its extreme ideological nature. Thus, it changed its policies to achieve the Turkish project in the region, which had a negative impact on all of Erdogan's ambitions and his Western and Arab aspirations. The goal of the Turkish regime is to weaken Egypt and destroy its national project, so that the opportunity will once again arise to implement Turkey's project.

Turkey's relationship with the MB




Provides financial support to Turkey to garner support for Brotherhood members




The Brotherhood established several associations and institutions in Turkey



Became a haven for Brotherhood fugitives



Uses regional Brotherhood branches to implement his expansionist plan



Egypt an obstacle against the Turkish project in the Arab Region

What took place in Egypt after 2013, in terms of reform, development, realizing stability, increasing citizens' sense of security, and the successful fight against terrorism, shows Egypt's determination to regain its regional position, which makes it the objective equal to Turkey, but a more acceptable option to be the most influential power regionally and perhaps internationally at a later stage. The Turkish regime considered this situation a defeat for the Turkish project of regional hegemony and a blow to its pillars. On the ideological level (the rule of political Islam), the rule of the Brotherhood – the source of extremist ideology – in Egypt meant the continuation of the Turkish project under the caliphate of Erdoğan as a caliph of Muslims accepted by the group, and the revival of the Ottoman Caliphate, as a summoning of the historical dimension in relations between Ar-

abs and Turks. Consequently, the defeat of the Brotherhood in their stronghold and home of origin, Egypt, and then the pursuit of them in other Arab countries was a defeat for the ideological principle of the Erdoğan project.

On the historical level, Egypt's restoration of its power enables it to regain its leadership in the region and the difficulty to contain it, whether alone or with an alliance of effective and influential Arab countries in the region as well. This undoubtedly contradicts with the dream of the new Ottoman caliphate, and perhaps the historical memory of Turkey does not forget its military defeat by Egypt during the rule of Mohamed Ali Pasha with the forces of the Ottoman Sultan Mahmoud II in the first wars of the Levant (1831-1833), during which the Egyptian forces reached eastern Anatolia, and almost took control of Astana had it not been for European intervention to preserve the sick man of Europe. With the building of

the modern Egyptian state during the rule of Mohamed Ali, it was strongly believed in Turkey and other countries that the Egyptian state, if strengthened, would threaten the interests and influence of the greedy ones.

On the economic level, the continuation of regional conflicts in the region and their various developments hinder the stability of economic conditions and the completion of projects to supply Europe with gas. This, in addition to other factors, limits the openness of Arab markets to Turkey and forces it to search for alternative markets in Africa and Asia on one hand. On the other hand, the gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean region, and the relatively stable security and economic conditions in Egypt, increase its chances of being a regional center for liquefying natural gas and supplying it to Europe, in conjunction with the reservations of Eastern Mediterranean and European countries on Turkish military harassment in Cyprus, and its efforts to impose its presence as an actor in this region to benefit from these discoveries.

The Muslim Brotherhood leads political Islam groups for the interest of the joint project with Turkey

To achieve its goals in Egypt after 2013, Turkey relied on two basic methods. **The First Method** is access to the Egyptian vital sphere, especially in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, but it was unable to achieve its goals in this area easily, and Egypt made no concessions before Turkey. The Egyptian deterrence was completely successful in curbing Turkish ambitions in Libya, and the Egyptian diplomacy with international actors – especially the Europeans – succeeded in pushing for a settlement, whether in Libya or in the Eastern Mediterranean, which shows the efforts made to curb Turkey's ambitions that are at the expense of the

countries in the region and their interests. **The Second Method** is the Brotherhood. Turkey used the group to revive the idea of the “caliphate” and lead political Islam groups in the region, either to gain power or participate in it. By all means, the Brotherhood is an extension of Turkish influence in regional countries.

The common interests and visions between the Brotherhood and the ruling regime in Turkey towards Egypt were the basis of confirming the correlation between the two parties, and the dimensions of this relationship appear in several aspects, most notably:

The ideological dimension: It shows the intellectual background of Erdogan and his affiliation with the political Islam movement, influenced by his upbringing in the schools of imams and preachers, and his apprenticeship at the hands of Najmuddin Erbakan. His acceptance of the Brotherhood was announced on 17 February 2017 during a speech in which he said, “The Muslim Brotherhood is not considered a terrorist organization, because it is not an armed organization, but rather an intellectual organization.” He was working to improve the group's image and gathering its leaders in the region to start a new path to achieve clear and specific goals under his leadership.

Utilitarian dimension: There is one goal agreed upon by the two parties; the group found in Erdogan a leader who could help it in its project to establish an Islamic caliphate and “mastering the world” as Hassan Al-Banna said, and Erdogan wants to restore the “Ottoman Caliphate” project through the Islamic project.

The widespread popular protests that took place in several Arab countries in 2011 provided the opportunity to achieve this goal, from the Turkish-Brotherhood point of view. But with the group's frustrations regarding the collapse of the project to escalate politi-

cal Islam to power, Turkey sought to expand its influence in the region, taking advantage of the Brotherhood, its popular bases, spurred branches, and wide capabilities.

On the other hand, Erdogan's use of the group to realize the expansionist dream of the caliphate meets the Brotherhood's benefit. The Brotherhood realizes Turkey's regional and international position and its symbolism related to the group's historic project for the leadership of the modern Islamic caliphate, and they see in Turkey the way to their ultimate goal – power.

Therefore, the Brotherhood's association with the various circles of power in Turkey is a fundamental goal of the group, and Erdogan provides the Brotherhood with this opportunity, to the extent that he is described as the executor of the Islamization process for the Turkish regime. The MB is a group that desires the state and not a relationship with the leader. This has always been the case, according to Arab experiences. The Islamization and consolidation of the religious model in Turkey is the Brotherhood's bet, not Erdogan.

The future of interdependence between Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood:

The previous dimensions show that the relationship between the Brotherhood and the Turkish regime is based on interdependence. There are several manifestations of this, including:

1. Erdogan is using the spurred branches of the Brotherhood in the region to implement his expansionist policy in the Middle East and make tangible achievements that he builds on domestically in light of the decline of his popularity and the deteriorating Turkish economy. Erdogan backs the Brotherhood to allow

them to play the roles assigned to them that help achieve Turkey's interests. The relationship between Erdogan and the Brotherhood's branches to achieve Turkish interests is manifested in several examples, such as in Libya, where the Government of National Accord allows Turkey to explore for gas and the military cooperation between the two sides. Another example is Rachid Ghannouchi, head of the Tunisian parliament. The Brotherhood also has some influential roles in other countries such as using the Reform Party in Yemen to negatively influence the work of the Arab coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen, and their role as communication channels between Turkey and various terrorist organizations in Syria, Libya and Asia.

2. The danger of the Brotherhood in Turkey is increasing for its attachment to the head of the regime, opine observers who monitor the Brotherhood's penetration into and growing influence in Turkish society, to the extent where some Turkish officials fear that the group threatens the secular democratic system in Turkey, given the presence of many aspects of Islamization along with the regime's oppression, suppression of freedoms, and persecution of the opposition. These aspects are in line with the desired Brotherhood ruling model. Some Turkish opposition parties believe that Erdogan is gifting the Brotherhood with a polarized and divided nation and social vacuum that is being charged with extremist ideology, in addition to undermining the prestige of the military institution. This enables the organization to take advantage of state institutions in a way that is difficult to get rid of.
3. In previous years, Turkish authorities allowed the establishment of multiple Brotherhood associations and institutions in Turkey, the most prominent of



which are: The Social Weaving Association, which is led and managed by Turkish preacher Nur Al-Din Yildiz, known as the Mufti of Erdogan, and the Al-Hikma Association, headed by the Egyptian member of the Brotherhood Abdul-Aziz Ibrahim, one of the leaders of the Education Committee in the group, whose goal is to recruit Turkish and Arab youth, especially the refugees in Turkey and job seekers.

Turkey also established the Union of Islamic Civil Organizations, which includes more than 350 Brotherhood-affiliated organizations in the world, and is entrusted with receiving relief funds, donations and zakat. The union is the link between Brotherhood institutions to move the group's funds in the Middle East and the Islamic world. The union also partners with the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, the Federation of Islamic Organizations in France, and other international institutions affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in the West.

These Brotherhood institutions have a dual role. They consolidate the presence of the Brotherhood in Turkey, deepen their pen-

etration into Turkish society, and pave the way for a Turkish foreign policy to access Arab societies and countries through Brotherhood branches already located in these countries and have their own grassroots in.

The future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey

Despite Turkey's embrace of Brotherhood members who fled Egypt and the group's media platforms in Turkey that uses Brotherhood elements against the Egyptian state, this safe haven faces many challenges that may threaten the future of the Brotherhood in Turkey. The most significant challenges are:

1. The increasing strength of the domestic opposition against Erdogan. Turkey's opposition forces agree on the need for Erdogan to relinquish power for Turkey to return to a parliamentary system with a strong economy, because Erdogan works to concentrate power in his hand by placing his relatives and family members in leading positions. Erdogan is facing rifts among the ranks of the Justice and Development Party in objection to his administration.

Turkey's economic deterioration was exacerbated by Erdogan's irrational management of the Covid-19 pandemic crisis, which made the Turkish economy vulnerable to the repercussions of the pandemic, particularly because the Turkish economy depends on the tourism and transport sectors, which were dealt a deafening blow by the crisis, according to a European Commission report. The regime's relationship with the Brotherhood and their harm to Turkish relations with Egypt and other Arab countries are key files for the opposition, especially with their penetration in the Turkish institutions, as previously stated.

2. International opposition against Turkey's hostile and provocative policies is taking shape. France is leading a European trend to curtail Turkey, Egypt is working to distance Turkey from Libya, and recently tensions between Turkey and Russia have been renewed due to its stance towards the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as it is almost out of American control. Erdogan has relied heavily on his hostile foreign policy – towards the Arab region and the Eastern Mediterranean – to make an achievement that raises his popularity or solves Turkey's internal problems, without making a clear achievement that reaps quick results. He damaged the Turkish image and foreign relations to the extent that he may resort to make compromises to settle its tense regional

“The Muslim Brotherhood's continued attempts to harm the Egyptian state would not have continued throughout the past seven years without their relationship with Turkey.

relations, the Brotherhood being one of them, especially in relation to Egypt.

3. The Brotherhood realizes that staying in Turkey is not a permanent alternative. Therefore the group adopts two methods to overcome this dilemma. The First Method: Searching for alternative places for the group where they have influence or friends, such as South Korea, where some of the group's youth moved due to the presence of some of the group's investments in the country, which gives them relative freedom of movement. The Second Method: It is the serious work to integrate into Turkish society, and the race to obtain Turkish citizenship, for fear of deportation in the future or Turkish rapprochement with the Egyptian regime which may result in their extradition.

In sum, the Muslim Brotherhood's continued attempts to harm the Egyptian state would not have continued throughout the past seven years without their relationship with Turkey, and the Turkish project towards the Arab region could not have materialized without its relations with the Brotherhood and their penetration into Arab societies. This means that the consequences of these correlations still exist. They did not, and will not, disappear except with a change in the Turkish regime or its orientations and policy tools towards the Arab region. But the most important aspect is the existence of a strong public awareness that supports the state's efforts to confront this counter-axis and its destructive policies and undermines its efforts to harm Egypt.

The Relationship between

the Muslim Brother- hood & Qatar

Tharwat Al-Kharbawi
Islamic thinker

Looking into the motives that prompted Qatar and its emir to take hardline stances against Egypt, some analysts suggested the move was the result of Qatar's affiliation to the US. After all, Qatar is a base for American forces, from which the US launches some operations.

This affiliation was not denied, therefore there are much deeper roots, with links leading directly to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the terrorist organization that has close ties with the US and even closer relations with the UK.

For those who do not know, the British intelligence is a pioneer in the fields of espionage and the establishment of dependent and loyal regimes. The American intelligence is a follower in methods and style, and even in the leadership to British intelligence. After losing the United Arab Emirates (UAE) following the emirate's unity under the leadership of Sheikh Zayed, the British intelligence transferred the bid to Qatar as a dependent emirate in terms of loyalty and management. The UK oversaw oil exploration in the



emirate when black gold wells were discovered. When the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia demanded in the 20th century to annex Qatar as part of the Al-Ahsa region in Saudi Arabia, the UK rejected; as it used to consider Qatar its base through which it controls the entire Gulf region. Qatar's independence from Saudi Arabia and the UAE makes it a tool for UK – and the US, of course – to threaten the entire Gulf region whenever it wants. For the UK to create a permanent state of tension in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it handed over three UAE islands to Iran when it ended its occupation of the UAE, and these islands are still under Iranian sovereignty.

UK was the beginning, and the US was the end, and in between was the Brotherhood. It is not surprising that the Brotherhood follows in terms of its formation and auspices the British Kingdom and in terms of management and direction the US. This analysis is not a personal point of view; historical facts attest this conclusion. When Brotherhood members fled Egypt in the 19650s and 1960s, many of them went to Qatar, and there the Brotherhood established a strong organization that turned into a mainstream for the ruling and influential elite there.

The Beginning of the Muslim-Brotherhood Organization in Qatar

The situation of the Brotherhood in Egypt worsened after the rise of Gamal Abdel-Nasser and the revolutionary regime. The British ordered the Brotherhood to go to Qatar to



Yusuf Al-Qaradawi (the Brotherhood's mufti)

- 1 He was born in 1926 in Gharbiya governorate. He graduated from the Faculty of Fundamentals of Religion, Al-Azhar University. He is former chairman of the International Union of Muslim Scholars.
- 2 He joined the MB in 1942 and is the group's first ideologue. He was offered the position of MB supreme guide several times.
- 3 He attended meetings of the International Organization of the MB as representative of the MB in Qatar
- 4 He was arrested several times in Egypt between 1949 and 1961 due of his anti-government activities with the MB.
- 5 In 1961, he traveled to Qatar where he served as the director of the Secondary Religious Institute. Nevertheless, he remained as a spiritual leader of the MB in Egypt.
- 6 In 1977, he laid the foundation for the Faculty of Sharia and Islamic Studies in the University of Qatar and became the faculty's dean until 1990. In 1989, he founded the Research Center of Sunna and Biography of the Prophet at the University of Qatar.
- 7 He participated in developing the educational and cultural structure of the Brotherhood, and his articles were published in MB magazines.
- 8 He authored books on "Islamic education," the most important of which are "Islamic Education and Hassan Al-Banna's School" in 1979, and "The Muslim Brotherhood's Seventy Years in the Call, Education and Jihad" on with the history of the group since its inception to the end of the 20th century.
- 9 He has many inciting fatwas that call for violence. He stated that suicide operations against civilians are "heroic acts of martyrdom". He also stated in his book "The Jurisprudence of Jihad" that "fighting aggressors" is a "duty" for Muslim masses.

mid-1980s Al-Ansari arrived with Al-Qaradawi in Egypt, and they met with Sheikh Omar Al-Telmesany, the Brotherhood's supreme guide. The Brotherhood welcomed Sheikh Al-Ansari, and gave a lesson in the presence of Sheikh Al-Qaradawi at the Khedr Al-Touni Mosque in Nasr City, which was a new mosque that the Brotherhood took control over.

During the visit, Al-Ansari pledged allegiance to the supreme guide on behalf of the Brotherhood of Qatar, and Al-Telmesany instructed him to receive the allegiance of the Brothers of Qatar on his behalf. Thus, Qatar's Brotherhood became members of the International Brotherhood Organization. I have attended part of this visit at the Brotherhood's headquarters in Souk Al-Tawfiqiya Street, when later I took Sheikh Abdullah to meet a "Brotherhood battalion" in the neighborhood of Zaytoun, where he gave a lesson mostly about his history, education and memorizing Quran when he was a child, where he learnt it with the help of some scholars in the Noble Sanctuary. He admired Hassan Al-Banna and expressed his desire to meet him. The meeting never took place, nonetheless. Then he talked about his admiration of Omar Al-Telmesany and how he felt he was like a brother from a different mother.

One of the most important Qatari Brotherhood figures is Jassim Mohamed Sultan, one of the Brotherhood's top leaders in Qatar, who joined the Faculty of Medicine in Cairo in the mid-1970s and was a colleague of Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh and Essam Al-Arian, through whom he knew about the Brotherhood. He was not interested in studying medicine, but more interested in the study of humanities, philosophy and history. He had an organized mindset. He had a passion for reading,

acquiring knowledge, and exchanging ideas with senior writers and intellectuals. When he returned to Qatar in the early 1980s he joined the Brotherhood and got acquainted with Yusuf Al-Qaradawi. But he stood against some actions in the history of the Brotherhood, like the assassinations carried out by the group in the 1940s, and their disagreement with Gamal Abdel-Nasser, not conducting intellectual reviews, not discussing the ideas of Hassan Al-Banna, and he was influenced by the ideas of Sayed Qutb. He believes that the ideas of Sheikh Mohamed Abdo could be a good start for the Brotherhood in the



1970s, because if they had adopted and developed them, the Brotherhood would have become a regenerative intellectual movement, in his opinion, but they did not, because their upbringing did not allow them to renew at all.

The Muslim Brotherhood's shift from an organization into a stream Qatar

Sultan believes that the idea of an organization has become outdated, and that the Brotherhood should abandon the political work and start over from the innovative intellectual work.

He also believes that the idea of bringing down the state



adopted by Sayed Qutb is an evil idea. Sultan demands in his intellectual project that the modern state start from its understanding of Islam from the viewpoint of “Maslaha”, or public interest. Wherever the Maslaha is, God is present, which is why copying must be abandoned and replaced by reasoning.

The importance of Sultan is that he began to think in the later 1990s about the necessity to dissolve the Brotherhood Organization in Qatar, and said that it was not necessary. Sultan was at that time occupying a major leadership position in the organization in Qatar. Later, he hosted a group of leading Islamic thinkers from all over the world, whom he held fruitful conversations with. Among them was Dr. Abdullah Al-Nafisi, the Kuwaiti thinker who broke from the Brotherhood ranks and made the mother group in Egypt furious with his book “Papers in Self-Criticism.”

Al-Nafisi held a series of meetings with a number of Qatari Brotherhood youth in the presence of Sultan and concluded that the decision to dissolve the Brotherhood in Qatar is the greatest decisions taken by the group throughout its history. Al-Nafisi wrote about this experience. In 2000, Sultan and a group of Qatari Brotherhood youth announced the decision of dissolving the Brotherhood organization in Qatar. The number of Qatari members during that period was more than 500 regular brothers, in addition to supporters, sympathizers, and their families. What was important is that the decision was issued by the consultative council of the group in Qatar. Dr. Al-Qaradawi objected, resented their decision,



and supported the Qatari group that decided to continue in the organization. The MB in Egypt objected too, saying the decision was hasty and unwise. Essam Al-Erian issued statements against Sultan and accused him of being reckless. The MB in Egypt claimed, in statements by many of its leaders, that the Qatari Brotherhood was not an organization in the common sense, but rather a current admiring the Brotherhood's intellectual model, and that the Brotherhood has no organization in Qatar. These statements were announced to belittle the matter before the Brotherhood's youth, and to frustrate any separatist movements. Thus, Sultan is considered the first dissident from the Brotherhood organization in the modern era, and in the Gulf state in general, followed by the Kuwaiti Abdullah al-Nafisi. It is believed that Sultan succeeded in dissolving part of the organization.

After the organization was dissolved in Qatar, the Guidance Bureau convened in Egypt in 200 to discuss the matter. The final say at that time was to Hajj Mustafa Mashhour "Abu Hani," who decided that the matter should be as in Kuwait, meaning that the Qatari Brotherhood who rejected the decision to dissolve the organization would remain in the organ-

ization, seek to restore the organization once more and include new members. The responsible person would be called "the deputy", as he will be the deputy for the supreme guide in Egypt in managing the Qatari organization, and the popular name of the deputy brother who was chosen in 2000 was "Abu Abdullah".

There is another Brotherhood organization that has nothing to do with the Qatari organization called the "Egyptian Organization". First, brother Sami Abdel-Jawad Al-Haram, Al-Qaradawi's brother-in-law, was the head of the Egyptian Brotherhood there, and when he returned to Egypt, Sheikh Essam Talimah became Al-Qaradawi's secretary and in charge for a short period of time. There is also the unified organization that includes brothers from different nationalities, including Palestinians, Sudanese, Yemeni, Nigerians, Algerians, Tunisians, and so on.

The Brotherhood succeeded in containing this disintegrating rebellion, and pushed the ruler of Qatar to give them wider powers and appoint them to sensitive government positions. The influence of Yusuf al-Qaradawi helped them there, especially as he raised and educated the current emir of Qatar when

he was a young boy. This is an old custom of emirs, to bring a polite educator and teacher to their children, teaching them elementary education until they grow up, and that is why the emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad, was so close to his mentor Sheikh Al-Qaradawi and considered him his spiritual father.

Qatari Brotherhood leaderships

The details of MB members who fled Egypt are known. They include Al-Qaradawi, Wagdi Ghoneim, Assem Abdel-Maged, Ayman Abdel-Ghani, and others, but we do not know yet the leaders of the Qatari Brotherhood. They were headed by Sultan, who was close to Essam Al-Erian, Abul-Fotouh and Helmy Al-Gazzar. Sultan joined them in the Qasr Al-Aini Faculty of Medicine. Among the leaders who later appeared and had a remarkable influence was Sheikh Abdullah bin Turki Al-Subaie, the father of Khalifa, who was on the lists of terrorists. Also among them was Sheikh Eissa bin Hareb, who was the minister of Islamic affairs and endowments, and who died about a year ago, and Mohamed bin Salem Al-Kuwari, the head of the supreme judiciary and the minister of justice, who is also the son of one of the previous leaderships, Sheikh Salem Al-Kuwari, who was a Qatari ambassador. Mohamed Al-Kuwari is the cousin of one of the Brotherhood's leaders included in the terrorists lists, Salem Hassan Khalifa Al-Kuwari. Abdul-Latif Al-Kuwari, is also on the terrorists lists. Other members include Mohamed bin Abdullah Al-Ansari, the son of the sheikh and founder of the Brotherhood of Qatar, who held leadership positions in the Qatari



Abdullah Al-Ansari

(the nucleus of the MB in Qatar)

1

He was born in Al-Khor, northeast of Doha, in 1914.

2

He memorised the Quran at an early age by his father, and he studied the basic principles of Sharia.

3

He traveled to Saudi Arabia where he worked as a teacher, an imam, a preacher, and an assistant to the Qatif judge. Then he was appointed as a teacher and director of a school in Saudi Arabia.

4

He returned to Qatar in 1948 and established the first religious institute in Qatar. He also occupied a number of positions, including manager of the first primary school in Qatar, and the last of which was the director of the Religious Affairs Department.

5

He joined the MB due to his close relationship with Al-Qaradawi.

6

In the mid-1980-s, he came to Egypt with Al-Qaradawi to meet Sheikh Omar Al-Telmesani, supreme guide of the MB at that time, and pledged allegiance to him on behalf of the group in Qatar.

7

He was a member of the founding council of the Muslim World League, a member of the International League of Islamic Literature, and a founding member of the Islamic Daawa (Calling) Organization and Islamic Council of South Africa.

8


He passed away in 1989 in Doha.

Ministry of Education, and he is the one responsible for education in the Qatari Brotherhood organization.

But does the Brotherhood have a fixed headquarters in Qatar? The answer will seem strange concerning the inclusion of the rulers of Qatar, as the Brotherhood has no fixed headquarters. The headquarters are mostly in the homes and palaces of some brothers, or in the headquarters of companies they own, especially contracting companies, doctors' clinics, and charity and education associations' headquarters and companies operating in these fields. Most of these companies and societies are already included on terrorism lists, but the Muslim Brotherhood has worked in Qatar in three circles: the Qatar Brotherhood circle, the Egyptian Brotherhood circle, and the Unified organization circle. Each circle has its own headquarters, but the three work under the same administration.

Al-Jazeera was created by Intelligence Services

It is not a simply regular relation between the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar. This correlation should play an active role in bringing down the Arab world, so the Brotherhood's media administration's plans were to control the collective mentality of the Arab peoples. There was a role for both Qatar and the Brotherhood to bring down Arab regimes. British intelligence developed a plan for this matter, and in 1994 it presented it to Sheikh Khalifa the father, but he rejected it. So, immediately the UK ordered the overthrow of the rejectionist sheikh and replaced him with



his son Hamad bin Khalifa to start the most dangerous game in the modern era.

The game is mastered by two of the most dangerous institutions in the world in the modern era: The Tavistock Institute and Chatham House, both of which are affiliated to the British intelligence. **Tavistock** Institute specializes in the sciences of mental programming and managing the collective mindset of the masses and peoples. This institute actively contributed to prepare the ground for the January 1979 Khomeini revolution against Shah Reza Pahlavi in Iran. Through the experiences of the Tavistock Institute, a system was set for Qatar to manage Al-Jazeera channel. It provided the Qatari government with its leading experts in the fields of influencing masses and managing their collective movement. Egyptians who worked in that channel know the media courses the channel provides with the aim of influencing the masses.

The original name of the Chatham House Institute, which has the upper hand in laying the groundwork for Al-Jazeera in terms of analyzing news and documentary filmmaking, is the Royal Institute for International Affairs. The institute is based in London and is affiliated to the British Intelligence. Its mission is to analyze information and prepare researches on the

Middle East. It includes a group of Brotherhood members led by Maha Azzam, and it gives an annual international award, which was given to some leaders of the international Brotherhood organization, such as Rachid Ghannouchi, Sheikha Mozah. The award was once given to Hillary Clinton.

The Chatham House developed the media plans of all the documentaries prepared by Al-Jazeera, and during the Arab Spring revolutions, it was the one that devised the analysis for news bulletins, whereby Al-Jazeera broadcasters read them according to the way they were trained.

The Tavistock Institute provided Al-Jazeera with two leading Israeli media experts who, along with a social psychologist, Stephen Herschel, led the “media invasions” of Al-Jazeera during the Arab Spring revolutions and the presidential elections in Egypt, where all their efforts were aimed at directing the masses to vote for Mohamed Morsi.

Rooting the Relations between the MB and Qatar

Qatari rulers were greatly influenced by the Brotherhood under the auspices of the British intelligence. The relationship between Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad, who assumed power in Qatar from 1972 to 1995, and Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi and Sheikh Abdul Halim Abu Shaqqa was bolstered before he became the emir of Qatar. When Khalifa became crown prince, he brought Al-Qaradawi and Abu Shaqqa to educate and raise his son, Hamad bin Khal-



Jassim Mohamed Sultan

(ideologue of intellectual reviews)

- 1 He is a prominent former leader in the Brotherhood in Qatar.
- 2 He joined the Faculty of Medicine, Cairo University in the mid-1970s. He was introduced to the Brotherhood's ideology due to his close relations with Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh and Essam Al-Erian.
- 3 He was well cultured and mainly interested in the study of humanities, philosophy, and history.
- 4 He returned to Qatar in the early 1980s to join the Brotherhood due to his close relationship with Al-Qaradawi.
- 5 He criticized the Brotherhood's ideas, especially concerning violence and assassinations, and their failure to carry out intellectual reviews and their adherence to the ideas of Hassan Al-Banna and Sayed Qotb.
- 6 In the late 1990s, he discussed the necessity to dissolve the Brotherhood in Qatar, and he was able to do so in 2000.
- 7 He is the first dissident from the Brotherhood in modern times.

ifa. So, the Brotherhood took advantage of this opportunity and brought up Sheikh Hamad on the Brotherhood's ideology. They taught him the history of the group and the messages of Hassan Al-Banna. The book Al-Qaradawi wrote explaining



the letters of Al-Banna was a compilation of the lessons that he gave to Sheikh Hamad.

When Sheikh Hamad became the emir of Qatar after he had turned against his father, he brought Al-Qaradawi and the Brotherhood sheikhs with him to the palace to raise the young prince Tamim, born in 1980. Tamim's absorption of the Brotherhood's ideas was intense. He lived for the idea of the caliphate and he was convinced he was more entitled to the caliphate than any other ruler, as if the caliphate would be given to "Al Khali-fa." Tamim turned against his father, Hamad, and a year ago, Tamim brought Sheikh Al-Qaradawi to the palace to raise and educate his son Hamad bin Tamim, born in 2008, following the Brotherhood style, and to prepare him to be the crown prince of the Muslim caliph Tamim bin Hamad. The old sheikh Al-Qaradawi seems not to tire of those tasks.

Funding the Muslim Brotherhood in Qatar

The Brotherhood's funding in Qatar comes

from several parties and means, the first is the monthly contributions, which is about 10 percent of each individual's total income. Then zakat money and charities on the basis that the work of the Brotherhood, as they say, is for the sake of God and it is one of the channels of spending zakat. The third source is donations from rich individuals and business leaders, with an annual rate of five percent of the profits of the companies to which the group contributes, which are distributed on the three organizations according to the needs of each organization. It should be noted that the Brotherhood of Qatar sends the Brotherhood of Egypt 30 percent of its budget, and to the international organization 10 percent.

During Tamim's rule, the circumstances drastically changed. Financing increased to \$2 billion, and the billions pumped by Tamim played a big role in supporting terrorists in the region, as if Tamim was with one hand controlling the billions of gas to ignite wars, kill, and finance terrorist camps in Sudan and Libya, and with the second hand controlling the Brotherhood and moves it to break up the region, while the British intelligence is controlling Tamim himself.



“
The Muslim Brotherhood has worked in Qatar in three circles: the Qatar Brotherhood circle, the Egyptian Brotherhood circle, and the Unified organization circle. Each circle has its own headquarters, but the three work under the same administration.

It is worth mentioning that there was an old Brotherhood project, based on the financing of Saudi Shiite movements secretly, to help change the form of government in Saudi Arabia. The aim of the Brotherhood was to make Saudi Arabia a constitutional monarchy, and the triangle of the Brotherhood's plan was a spearhead, which is the leadership of the international organization of the Brotherhood in London, because it is the mastermind and the international organization is the one that coordinates directly with the intelligence services, the focal point, which depends on Qatar and its financing, and the management of the movement, which is based on the Iranian intelligence and its movement with the Houthis and the Shiites of Bahrain.

In conclusion, the issue is not, as some imagine, about human connections or even organizational links between the Brotherhood and Qatar, but a correlation that has a common goal of controlling and destabilizing the region. The Brotherhood follows Qatar that provides them with shelter, and both are tools for a larger scheme to dismantle the region.

The Brotherhood is supported by a number of intelligence services and Qatar doesn't belong to the Arab world because of its emir Tamim Al Thani.

The MB's Secret Cell

And its Relationship with Intelligence Apparatuses

Dr. Mohamed Megahed El-Zayat

Academic adviser at the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies

Secret activities are carried out to keep an organization safe from confrontations with rivals and security forces. Secrecy helps entities protect certain measures from being known in and outside their group.

Covert activity occurs when individuals create exclusive cells in which they exchange ideas that may be illegal or inconsistent with the norms of society. They gain new supporters by contacting them individually. They are subject to leadership and administrative structures that govern their work. They also avoid revealing these ideas to ensure control over the members.

Religious groups have resorted to organized secret activity, justifying this with several reasons, including:

A. Avoiding arrests and security prosecution, and providing protection for the organization's leaders and the organization itself from the regimes that consider the organizations' activities a threat to the state's national security due to their adoption of radical ideas.





- B. Building confidence among the members of the organization, ensuring that the members of the organization respect their leaders and obey them blindly, as well as ensuring unity and immediate summoning and response.
- C. Making their supporters believe that they are distinguished from the rest of society.
- D. Guaranteeing the leadership's domination over the members, and not giving them the opportunity to discuss ideas contrary to theirs.

Types of secret activities of terrorist organizations

Covert military activity:

Military secret activity is an integral part of terrorist groups' work. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was one of the first groups to pursue military secret activities by establishing a secret cell, or a special apparatus, in 1939, which relied mainly on armed force in

achieving the group's objectives. The idea of military secret activity came back strongly in the 1970s, especially after the emergence of the Jihad Group and Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya (the Islamic Group), which was revealed after the assassination of president Anwar Al-Sadat, when armed secret activity became an essential part of the work of extremist Islamic groups. The secret activity has impressed many groups, from the MB to the Islamic Group and Jihad, the organizations of Yehia Hashem, Mohamed Al-Borai, Saleh Seria, Shukri Mustafa, and other groups.

Clandestine economic activity:

The funding of terrorist groups relies on secret economic activity via companies established in one country and transferring funds to other countries to evade monitoring. Terrorist organizations also rely on donations received under the cover of charity and cashed by associations established by the MB as a cover to receive funds abroad to transfer them to the countries where their activities take place. These organizations also rely on the donations of several loyal businessmen

or those who believe in their ideas to fund their activities.

To explore the nature of the Brotherhood's secret activity, its economic and military work are herein addressed.

First: The MB and its surreptitious economic activity

1. The group's keen interest in providing funds since its emergence goes back to Hassan Al-Banna who said that money is the mainstay of the daawa, and that there is no daawa without its leaders and soldiers sacrificing their money. So, money was associated with the continuation of missionary work in the group's ideology, and many experts' estimates were reflected according to this rule from the beginning to present. Economic expert Abdel-Khalek Farouk confirmed in his book on the economies of the Brotherhood in Egypt and the world, that the resources of the Brotherhood are estimated at EGP 8 billion annually.
2. The Brotherhood and its supporters have established a so-called financing portfolio. In short, it is the establishment of commercial projects in the name of an unpopular member who does not occupy an administrative position, and through its revenues individuals or previously determined goals by the group's leadership are funded.
3. The group does not announce the amount of its financial transactions to be out of the reach of the oversight of bodies in all countries it is present in, due to the presence of suspicious financial operations that take place in the group, which makes them strongly insist on maintaining the secrecy of their financial accounts, especially because expenditure items are related to being spent in secret activities that

no one knows about, even though regulations are governing the group's activities, expenditures, and objects of expenditure. Further below, we demonstrate the most important funding sources of the Brotherhood that are used to finance its overt and secret activities.

4. The Brotherhood relied on several sources from outside its elements to fund its secret activities. Since the inception of the movement, it used all available means to continue its activity, applying the saying "the end justifies the means", to the extent that it relied on funding from outside parties that the Brotherhood considers hostile. This was revealed by British researcher Mark Curtis in his book "Secret Affairs: Britain's Collusion with Radical Islam", where many documents, declassified by the British government, explain Britain's relationship with the group. Many sources also refer to multiple relations with the intelligence agencies of several countries, especially the British and American agencies in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, it is indicated that the group was carrying out intelligence and espionage work for the benefit of the two countries.

All of this means that the Brotherhood does not oppose any source of funding from any party to achieve its objectives through secret activity, whether to obtain funds or disburse them.

The MB's sources of funding for covert operations

Many sources confirm that the Brotherhood runs a hidden financial network around the world that is little known about. On this scale, names of some of those responsible for funding the group have come to light, including Ibrahim Kamel, founder of Dar Al-Maal Al-Islami Trust, and its offshore companies in the Bahamas. There is also

Religious groups worked secretly to

Build trust among group members.

2

3

Avoid arrests and security pursuits.

1

Convince their supporters they were distinguished from the rest of society.



Ensure hegemony over members

Youssef Nada, Ghalib Hemmat, and Idris Nasreddin with Akida International Bank in the Bahamas. It should be noted that some of these leaders are not only active in the Bahamas but also spread their companies in other regions, especially Western and African countries.

In this regard, several points should be noted:

A. The Brotherhood has relied mainly on the economic and commercial projects it has established in many countries, especially those that lack regulatory bodies, such as some African and Asian countries, Latin

America, and through associations that provide cover for these projects.

B. The Brotherhood also depends on the donations it receives under the guise of charitable work and the International Islamic Relief. The main goal of these associations is to collect contributions and donations from members to finance the cell's activities the world over. This is proved by the Brotherhood's establishment of charity associations as a cover to collect funding abroad to transfer them to countries in which it practices its activities. Some sources confirmed that the MB has established 13 associations in the UK which are controlled by leaders of the

group, on top of them: Essam Al-Haddad, Ibrahim Al-Zayat, and Ibrahim Mounir, as well other associations in Switzerland, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Africa, Nigeria, and Ghana. Some reports indicate that money transfers from one country to another were carried out through travelers from these countries, and thus money is delivered hand-to-hand, to prevent monitoring the transfer of these funding through the global financial system, which confirms the use of these funds in illegal activities.

C. Charities and zakat represented an important part of funding for the group following the security clampdown. MB sheikhs issued a fatwa (religious edict) that whoever wanted to give charity or pay the zakat from their own money, the group was a priority, the money being spend in a cause for the sake of God, and that the group works for this cause, thus the group has allowed taking money from the poor and those in need for funding its activities and getting out of the impasse of security restrictions on group activities.

D. Funding secret activities of the group also depends on donations of several businessmen loyal to the MB and those who believe in its ideology, through do-



nations from some companies operating abroad. These funds are used in their overt and secret operations by the secret cell. Brotherhood businessmen's foreign investments are also relied on to present the Islamic model in managing projects and economics and to obtain support to help the group in its activities. The most prominent countries in which the group invests its money are Qatar, Korea, Japan, London, Switzerland, and Turkey.

Generally speaking, the Brotherhood's financial network of holding and affiliated companies, shell banks, and other financial institutions run across many countries, most notably: Panama, Liberia, Switzerland, Cyprus, Nigeria, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Ghana, and Nigeria. Most of these institutions are registered under the names of people such as Yusuf Nada, Idris Nasreddin, and Ghalib Hemmat, who present themselves as MB leaders. It is noticeable that some of these institutions are run by individuals from countries in which the group does not have much activity, which is in line with its approach of covering up its secret activities.

Second: The MB and covert military activity:

The secret cell of the Brotherhood was known in the circles of power as the secret apparatus, and the public image of the MB was linked to this secret apparatus, which the government media portrayed as a terrifying terrorist organization, especially after the paramilitary organization of the Muslim Brotherhood's attempt to assassinate late president Gamal Abdel-Nasser in 1954. The plan was prepared since the emergence of the group in 1928 and it was to contain individuals who approached the group regardless of their affiliation or capabilities. The main goal was to draw the largest possible number of members to the group. This apparatus is a military system es-



established by the MB in Egypt in 1939, and its goal is “to prepare selected elite of the Muslim Brotherhood to carry out special missions, train for military operations against the external enemy and to eradicate the military literacy of the Egyptian people at that time.” The founders aimed at creating the organization to fight the British occupation in Egypt and to confront the Zionist-Jewish project in Palestine.

During the MB’s first years of creation, it set several goals, the most important of which are:

- A. Fighting for the sake of Allah. This is the battles the Mujahideen carried out against Zionists in the battlefield on Palestinian land.
- B. Fedaayi (risking life voluntarily) actions that were carried out by an individual or a group against the enemy (British colonialism), which were called by some as political assassinations.
- C. Protecting the daawa from the attacks against it by parties and plans to eliminate it.

The relationship between Qotbism and MB clandestine operations

The Brotherhood has raised the slogan of “Hakmia” (meaning that God is the only one who can judge every single action of people as He wills), which is the literal application of the ideas of Sayed Qotb and Abul-Ela Maududi. The Hakmia adhere to the rule of the Brotherhood, believing that if they rule then it will be the rule of God, but the way to reach this goal remains the real criterion and the missing link to understanding the extent to which the MB is influenced by the ideology of Sayed Qotb. The declaration of adopting these ideas or refusing them is not reliable proof to confirm that the MB embraced jihadism or not, for three main reasons:

- I. The diversity of the members of the MB and their cultures made some of them believe in these ideas, while others rejected them. Therefore, some members were completely immersed into the ideas of Qotbism, others were not. Thus, the Brotherhood witnessed many defections and disagreements concerning this ideology and its penetration into the ranks of the group at all levels, whether from leaders or ordinary members.

2. Denying the ideas of Sayed Qotb from the approach and ideology of the Brotherhood, because of their fear of the security prosecution for adopting takfiri ideas and that these radical ideas have reduced the allure of the group to include and recruit new members. This was obvious in the low rate of recruitment in the Qotbist current, which affected their presence and spread on the ground, unlike the MB and Salafists at the time, so the group is hiding its inner side which is contrary to its appearance.
3. It is possible to embrace parts of the ideas of Sayed Qotb and not all of it. Therefore, rejecting all and not the part is what is appearing before the societies in which they live, while there may be a rejection of a part and not all of the ideas. So, some leaders, including Dr. Mahmoud Ezzat, were interested in defining their relationship with the ideology of Sayed Qotb. They told the media that they cherish and respect his ideas, but they do not disbelieve the ruler, which means that they are committed to the basic line of the MB.

Regarding the relationship between Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya and the MB and the ideas of Sayed Qotb, Dr. Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh (a co-founder of the Islamic Group) emphasized in his book “A Witness to the History of Egypt’s Islamic Movement” that after joining the MB, some differences appeared concerning some religious matters between members of the two groups, especially since the group saw that the MB is not conservative enough in some issues, and those who made the atmos-

“**Observing the nature and style of the secret activity of the MB throughout its history in Egypt, some recurring characteristics can be noted.**”

phere less tense between the two parties were the fundamentalist leaders of the special apparatus, who were associated with the extremist ideas of Sayed Qotb. Abul-Fotouh stressed that during this period there were two main currents in the MB: The special apparatus, and a current that follows the ideas of Hassan Al-Banna. The existence of these two currents in the MB continued until 1984, when the group decided to abandon violence and walk a path of peaceful action for reform, which is a clear evidence of the continued adoption of extremist Qotbism within the MB group since 1965.

It is clear that the role of Sayed Qotb in changing the group’s ideology cannot be overlooked. Qotb drove the group to resort to violence as a means to reach its goal. Thus, the recipient and implementer of this ideology was the group’s secret cell responsible for the use of violence to achieve the interests of the group. Violence was abandoned due to the control of the ruling regimes at that time. The MB realized the necessity of the secret cell. As a result, all information related to it became largely unavailable due to its special nature and its tasks that are based on Sayed Qotb’s ideology in using violence as a first means to achieve the goals of the MB.

Observing the nature and style of the secret activity of the MB throughout its history in Egypt, some recurring characteristics can be noted, the most important of which are:

The duality of movement between overt and covert operations at all levels (political, economic, and military).

- The opportunism to conclude interim alliances with political forces to benefit from and then bypass them in later stages.
- Welcoming the engagement in the plans of global intelligence services, creating common interests, presenting themselves as a local ally, and carrying out intelligence work for their benefit.
- The method of secret military activity throughout the history of the group's special apparatus was based on creating sub-organizations to practice terrorist acts and later holding them responsible for violence and claiming the MB is a peaceful group. This has been repeated in recent years, from Jihad and the Islamic Group to Hasm Movement and Lewaa Al-Thawra terrorist organizations.
- Through its secret military arms, the MB has been party to all of the conflicts and crises in the region; in Libya, Yemen and Syria, and it became more involved in Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Ottoman strategy and is still betting on British and American intelligence.

All the terrorist military methods of the terrorist factions in Sinai and Syria in particular repeat the same approach of using explosive belts, explosives, and car bombs that the group has been pioneering in since it has emerged.

History has proven that whenever the Egyptian state releases detainees from the Brotherhood and offers a measure of understanding, this does not prevent the MB from the duplication of covert and overt actions at the same time.

- **Recently**, new stages of the Brotherhood's secret activity have been developed, especially after the 30 June Revolution, including the establishment of what is

called a "portfolio" in villages and popular neighborhoods through individuals who were previously not monitored by security teams, and the formation of small projects, through which unmonitored activities are funded (pensions for detainees' families or funding, etc).

— **Security services monitored the development of a new practice called "the organization's transport facility," which is the recruitment of individuals to carry out operations of transferring information or materials used in terrorist operations through various means of communication. It also monitored the funding of certain Brotherhood members working abroad (Saudi Arabia) to buy tuk-tuks in villages and popular neighborhoods to do that job. In general, the strong security strikes that were directed at the group by the Egyptian security forces, such as the killing of Mohamed Kamal, and the arrest of the mastermind who oversees the Brotherhood's secret activities on the economic and military levels, Mahmoud Ezzat, have shaken the group's cohesion and dealt the group's military activities a deafening blow the repercussions of which will emerge later.**

The Muslim Brotherhood's

Funding Networks

Amr Farouk

Researcher specializing in Islamist groups

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has been spending tens of millions of dollars on terrorist activities, its channels and electronic committees to bring down the Egyptian state since the 30 June 2013 Revolution. Earlier it had spent tens of millions of dollars to assume power and implement its empowerment project, to reach “Mastering the World”, as proposed by Hassan Al-Banna, and complete the scheme of the international organization to infiltrate the Arab region and Europe.

The group worked, since its founding by Al-Banna, to find various financial paths that would give it the ability to survive, through collecting donations, charity funds, and establishing projects and economic institutions, until its budgets has become almost equal to the budgets of major countries, as it gained huge amounts of money over tens of years.

The Brotherhood found Islamic associations, centers, and mosques at home and abroad an important means to make money, by exploiting religious sentiments, and



55 million euros Qatar's support for MB terrorism in Europe



Koen Metsu

President of the Belgian Temporary Parliamentary
Committee for the Fight Against Terrorism

“ Qatar pumped more than 55 million euros to the MB in Europe, to continuously finance mosques and schools that spread extremism. ”

obtaining the lion's share of the donations, grants and charity funds in the Arab and Islamic world, in addition to using various political issues and covering them with religious concepts, such as the Palestinian cause, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kashmir, Kosovo, and other policy junctures in which the group found its way to induce Islamic and Arab societies to their illegitimate orientations.

Sources of the Brotherhood's financial network

The group's large sums of funds and the variety of its sources have made it use many legitimate and illegal methods to complicate the route and movement of the sources of funds away from security and political control by decision-making circles in various Arab and European countries, and to make tracking the funding of its suspicious activities difficult, as well as its support for extremist and radical movements that are often acting on its behalf and carrying out acts of armed violence consistent with its subversive agenda in the region.

The financial and economic empire of the Brotherhood went through many stages for

the main group in Cairo, and the international organization, which was officially announced to be formed in 1982 by Mustafa Mashhour, and was the beginning of the launch of charitable and social institutions that became the means to raise funds and recycle it through economic projects that generate continuous profits which support the group's orientations and various activities in the West.

First: Monthly contributions

Since the founding of the MB organization, Al-Banna worked to expand the ways of raising funds from the members of the organization under a number of various designations, as a kind of domination and control of their financial capabilities, and to make them under the command of the organization, relying on the so-called "monthly contributions" taken from members, estimated at about 8-10 percent of the per member income. This way apply to various organizational regulations, except certain individuals stipulated in the group's financial regulations.

According to a study by Dr. Hussein Shehata, professor of accounting at Al-Azhar Uni-

versity, who is responsible for managing the financial and accounting affairs of the Brotherhood, the group's funds amounted to nearly EGP 0.5 billion per year from the members' contributions alone. This is the first item in the group's budget, paid by 400,000 regular working members in the activities of the Brotherhood families and divisions spread in all governorates, according to the latest internal statistics of the group in 2008.

Second: Donations and charities

Throughout the group's history, Hassan Al-Banna and Brotherhood leaders have been interested in obtaining Muslims' money, both its members and from outside the regulatory framework, under various designations, from donations, charities, zakat (alms), and grants, in order to promote the group's activities at home and abroad, according to legitimate advisory fatwas authorizing such financial practices.

Perhaps the beginning was with what was presented by Abdel-Hakim Abdin, a member of the Guidance Bureau, and what was approved by Al-Banna within the organization's financial regulations, under the name "Dawa Share," which is a financial policy for members of the group and sympathizers. It is based on taking out a regular share from the financially capable individuals on a monthly or annual basis, or at least 20 percent from the financially capable revenues, in addition to the monthly contributions.

This project was not successful at the beginning, but since the expansion of the international organization, it was approved in a way that allows those financially capable to spend on the group's activities and projects, due to the difference in the financial capabilities of individuals, and the joining of businessmen, merchants, and

rich figures with the ability to donate continuously.

According to the study of Dr. Hussein Shehata, the group receives a percentage of the profits of the Brotherhood businessmen's companies, that are listed under the item of donations, which reached EGP20 million in 2012, paid by Khairat Al-Shater, Hassan Malik, Medhat Al-Haddad, Mamdouh Al-Husseini and Ahmed Shousha. On the other hand, Dr. Abdel-Khalek Farouk revealed, in his study on the economy of the Brotherhood, that the total zakat turnout from the organization members and sympathizers amounted to EGP5 billion in 2012.

Third: Islamic institutions and organizations abroad

After the death of president Gamal Abdel-Nasser, the group worked openly to establish Islamic centers abroad under dozens of banners, which allowed it to collect funds and obtain donations, charities and financial grants from Arab and Islamic minorities and supporters of various Islamic currents, to support the Brotherhood's activities, covert or otherwise.

The Islamic and social centers and associations were established in the West, and they were concerned with fundraising in general, as well as the Islamic organizations operating under the relief item. They represent an important part of funds and donations in more than 72 countries around the world, in addition to the money coming from the countries that sponsor the Brotherhood, and the money coming from some institutions and entities supporting the Brotherhood abroad and have a relationship with the intelligence services and international decision-making circles, which use the Brotherhood as a tool to achieve interests in the Middle East and the Arab region, most notably:

The MB's Sources of Funding



- A number of organizations were established in Europe for these goals, and they raised funds through members' contributions, donations and grants from European citizens, including: The Centre Socio Culturel des Musulmans de Lausanne [Muslim Cultural Center in Lausanne] in Lausanne, Switzerland, established in 2002; the Foundation for Cultural and Social Impact, established in 2010; and Föderation Islamischer Gemeinschaften in der Schweiz (Federation of Islamic Communities in Switzerland), established in 2006.
- In the US there is the MAS Foundation,

CAIR and ISNA, which are legitimate institutions that represent the Brotherhood in the US. There is also the Muslim Youth Organization. The Brotherhood depends on these institutions to collect funds.

- The international organization established the Islamic Relief, which is one of the most prominent Brotherhood institutions in collecting funds from various countries in the world. Its activity extends in about 40 countries, and many international reports said it is one of the most prominent arms that fund the Brotherhood's terrorism in the world. Egyptian authorities refused to establish a branch of the Islamic Relief in Cairo during the period of former president Hosni Mubarak, which prompted them to employ the Islamic Relief Committee of the Egyptian Medical Syndicate and the Arab Doctors Union, and to use that committee as an alternative to the organization's branch in Cairo. The work of that committee was supervised by Dr. Ahmed Al-Malt, the Brotherhood's deputy guide at the time, Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh, and Ashraf Abdel-Ghaffar, former assistant secretary-general of the Doctors Syndicate and one of those charged in the case of money laundering of the Brotherhood's international organization.

Fourth: Investment and economic projects

(A) In Egypt:

The Brotherhood's sources of fundraising were not limited to the monthly contributions by its members or donations and charity, but they tended to recycle and develop these funds to achieve their goals, including: concealing the truth about the

sources of capital, concealing the financial movement and the aspects of the activities that the money is spent on, as well as propagating the Islamic economic model according to the group's vision and orientations. Al-Banna worked since the group's foundation to establish companies and factories, such as the Islamic Transactions Company, which established a copper plant and another for tiles and cement, the Arab Company for Mines and Quarries, the Arab Advertising Company, the Spinning and Weaving Company, and the Trade and Engineering Works Company.

With the return of the Brotherhood to the scene in Egypt in the 1970s, they worked to make the financial empire of the organization by expanding the establishment of companies, factories, and popular trade enterprises. This led to the freedom of movement, daawa, and political and economic activities. That stage witnessed the birth of businessmen affiliated to the Brotherhood and its project, as well as the establishment of a large number of companies, factories, private schools, educational centers, hospitals, printing and publishing houses, and information technology companies. According to some writings on the economy of the Brotherhood, the annual revenue collected for the Brotherhood organization in Egypt from private projects is estimated at no less than EGP 8.2 billion.

(B) Abroad:

Following the clash between president Gamal Abdel-Nasser and the Brotherhood, the group tended to open large areas in the Arab region and in Europe, as it worked on horizontal and vertical expansion in making the Brotherhood's system of entities, whether intellectual, political or economic in the West in general.

The international organization has a number of companies and economic institutions in different continents supervised by the international organization members, the most well known of whom is Ibrahim Kamel, founder of the Dar Al-Maal Al-Islami Trust (DMI). Its headquarters is in Nassau, the Bahamas. Yusuf Nada, Himat Ghalib and the Yusuf Al-Qaradawi family established Al-Taqwa Bank, which was closed after the attacks of 11 September. Its headquarters was also in Nassau in the Bahamas. Likewise, Idris Nasreddin established the International Bank of Al-Aqida and Akida International Bank in Nassau.

The Brotherhood made this network of banking companies, insurance companies, and marine companies a cover for opening bank accounts, and facilitating money transfer and laundering, due to the difficulty of tracking the paths of these funds, which are protected by banking secrecy laws. That is in addition to several companies across the European continent, including the company Stahel Hardmeyer AG in Nachlassliquidation, which was founded in March 1967, and its capital exceeds 18.3 million Swiss francs. The company operates in the field of wholesale trade and cotton textiles, and it has subsidiaries in a number of countries, including Britain and the British Virgin Islands. Also, the BS Altena AG company, which was established in 2010, works in the field of long-term real estate, according to a report published by the Center for Assistance and Strategic Studies in Washington.

Parallel to the beginning of the modern Islamic banking occurrence, the Brotherhood succeeded in building a solid structure of "offshore" companies, which have become an integral part of their ability to conceal and transfer money around the world. These are companies that are established in a country other than the country in which they operate. These companies

Christian | Georges
CHESNOT | MALBRUNOT

QATAR PAPERS

How Doha finances the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe

are shrouded in ambiguity which makes them far from censorship.

The Brotherhood's financial network includes holding and subsidiary companies, shadow banks, and other financial institutions spread in Panama, Liberia, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Switzerland, Cyprus, Nigeria, Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay.

Many European intelligence reports warned from the growing influence of the Brotherhood in Europe, due to the expansion in establishing economic and social projects that aim at infiltrating European Union countries and influencing them.

It is impossible to ignore the document revealed by the Western security services, known in the media as "The Conquest

of the West: The Secret Project of the Islamists", that were found in the villa of Yusuf Nada, dating back to 1982, and published by the Swiss Sylvain Besson. The document included provisions on funding and financial support, such as collecting sufficient funds for the continuation of the jihad, seeking to possess most of the bank's capital, which enables them to manage and control it and create cover within a legal framework for investments to maintain the secrecy of financial transactions.

These projects were also stated in the Muslim Brotherhood's "Civilization Jihad" document, which was written in 1991, under the title "An Explanatory Memorandum: On the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America", stressing the necessity of adopting the concept of empow-

ering the Brotherhood in Europe, which requires the presence of institutions affiliated to the group in the media, political parties, and economic entities, such as banks and companies.

— **Fifth: The pattern of owning economic projects**

The movement of funds and financial assets in the Brotherhood, according to the open and hidden ownership, falls under several levels within the organization, the most important of which are:

1. Economic entities, institutions and projects that are 100 percent owned by the group, and their representatives manage them with “counter deeds”, whether they are members of the MB or not, to evade confiscation and security prosecutions by Egyptian agencies.
2. Entities, institutions and economic projects in which the group’s funds are mixed with the money of its leaders from businessmen, or sympathetic businessmen, and in which representatives of the group’s funds also have “counter deeds”.
3. Entities, institutions and economic projects that belong to the leaders of the organization in particular, but the group has a share in them from the profits, which ranges between 7 percent and 10 percent. So, the organization becomes part

“**The Muslim Brotherhood’s financial file is one of the most important factors in combating terrorism and extremism. Financial resources gave the organization the ability to penetrate societies and its institutions.**”

of these funds in the profit accumulation, or the recycling of funds.

Since the 1980s, the Brotherhood has adopted in its economic institutions what is called “counter deeds”, as a legal formula to escape from the financial confiscation in case a clash takes place with the political regime by concealing the affiliation of some economic entities and transferring the ownership of its companies and institutions to businessmen close to the organization, provided that the group owns the largest portion of its shares, or to be divided equally, and a large percentage of its profits are directed to funding its activities in Egypt and abroad.

Since the fall of the MB rule in June 2013, the group’s designation on terrorism lists, and the confiscation of its property judicially, following its involvement in funding terrorist activities, Egyptian security agencies have been discovering many companies and institutions that are directly affiliated to the Brotherhood, and are considered an important source of money transfer through multiple and devious ways to hide their true identity and loyalty to the Brotherhood and their associates.

— **Sixth: Qatari funds**

Doha has played an active role in funding the Brotherhood and its affiliated centers and institutions at home and abroad. According to a number of studies and surveys



that have tracked the funding of a number of organizations affiliated with the international organization, it revealed the size of these funds and re-spending them on intellectual projects that are being implemented with the aim of passing the Brotherhood project in the West, and in the Arab region, such as the European Institute for Human Sciences and the Union of Islamic Organizations of France.

Islamic institutions funded by Doha played a dual role in receiving funds and re-passing them on to other entities, with the aim of complicating the difficulty of accessing real capital and its source, through the official arm of the “Qatar Charity”, and contributing to funding extremism and terrorism in European countries and dozens of French cities.

According to the book “Qatar Papers”, by French journalists Georges Malbrunot and Christian Chesnot, Qatari funds are not carried out through illegal operations, but they use crooked and complex methods that make it difficult to track the movement of these funds, especially since the recipient institutions use these grants in economic projects with the aim of laun-

dering these funds through exchange companies, real estate companies, and educational institutions.

In April 2016, Doha established Jusoor Fund in France with the aim of diversifying the funding institutions of the Brotherhood centers, which became an active partner in the implementation of the Qatar Charity strategy, and is a key partner with Amal Association, a Brotherhood organization in Europe responsible for overseeing the construction work of these organizations.

Ayoub Abul-Iashin, one of the Qatari regime’s men in Europe, supervised the establishment and management of the Jusoor Fund. He also serves as a Qatari intermediary in the funding operations of a large number of Brotherhood organizations in France and Europe.

The main donors of Jusoor are: Ahmed Al-Hammadi, director of the Al-Ghaith project, Sheikh Mishaal bin Salman, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem Al Thani, Sheikh Hammad Abdul-Qadir, director-general of the Islamic Dawah Organization in Qatar, Salah Al-Hammadi, and a

number of Kuwaiti personalities as well. Besides, about 10 women are involved in collecting donations, zakat and charities.

In summer 2017, disputes flared between French banks, the Amal Association, and the Jusoor Fund as a result of the refusal to accept financial transfers from the Gulf, especially Kuwait, due to their suspicion regarding the source and objectives of these funds.

By the end of 2017, French officials severely criticized the Jusoor Fund, and its director Ayoub Abul-Yaqin, for directing some of the funded activities to competitive economic activities, such as: establishing shops, medical clinics, educational institutions, and other profitable institutions, which is in violation of the French law.

Following the Arab Quartet boycott of Qatar, and the inclusion of the Qatar Charity in Doha on terrorist lists among 12 Qatari organizations, as well as the US administration's tendency to put Qatar Charity under surveillance, suspected of funding terrorist activities, Doha decided to change the name of the Qatar Charity branch in Britain, which Ayoub Abul-Yaqin is responsible for, to Nectar Trust, at the end of 2017, to escape security pursuit, and to track the movement of Qatari funds and funding abroad.

Intelligence documents revealed that Qatar Charity had funded the activities and movements of Yemeni societies and organizations, foremost of which were the Qatari Al-Karamah Organization, and Rights Radar organization, run by Khaled Al-Hammadi, as well as the SAM Organization for Rights and Liberties, run by Tawfiq Al-Hamidi and Nabil Al-Salahi, and Tawakkol Karman Foundation. These organizations provide human rights and legal cover for Al-Qaeda and extremist groups in international forums.

That is in addition to the Qatari Bank, Masraf Al-Rayan, funding a group of centers and institutions affiliated with the Brotherhood in Britain, in addition to a bank account that funds satellite channels belonging to the Brotherhood and owned by an imam of a mosque in Britain.

Seventh: Islamic slaughterhouses

Since the beginning of the Brotherhood's presence in Europe, the group has invested "halal butcheries," or "halal slaughterhouses," most of which are affiliated to Islamic associations and centers affiliated with the international organization.

The halal slaughterhouse is subject to fees and taxes that are shared by the supervising societies with the local authorities and other authorities in the countries of immigration and Muslim communities, with revenues of about \$7 billion annually. Halal slaughterhouses have become a huge network in Europe controlled by leaders of the organization, and ultimately pouring the profits into the treasury of the group and its international organization.

Eighth: International scholarships

The Brotherhood took advantage of freedoms in the West, and proceeded to establish organizations and institutions that receive funds from some parties that support the promotion of human rights paths and political orientations, in addition to the fact that some decision-making circles have used the Brotherhood and its leaders abroad to garner the votes of the electorate.

The right-wing I&D Party in the European Parliament revealed that the European Union has paid 36.5 million euros to groups with links to the Brotherhood, whose agenda includes the Islamization of Eu-



rope. A member of the European Parliament's Budget Committee, Joachim Kuhs, said, "The European Union funds organizations that have close ties with extremists organizations linked to terrorism such as the Brotherhood."


This was discovered by I&D Vice President Nicholas Bay by researching the European Union's Financial Transparency System for the years 2014-2019 on the main European Brotherhood organizations, and in these five years, the European Union paid a total of 5,422.678 million Euros to the European Network Against Racism, which includes in its membership the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations (FEMYSO), an organization affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Financial corruption in the Muslim Brotherhood

Despite the existence of formal regulations governing the group's activities and expenditures, these regulations did not prevent the Brotherhood's leaders from ensuring the secrecy of their resources and spending, which opened the door

for members to expose many violations on social media platforms and accuse the leaders responsible of seizing a large amounts of money as a result of the absence of oversight and accountability. The former member of the Brotherhood's Shura Council, Dr. Abdel-Sattar Al-Meligi, believes that there is mystery surrounds the sources of the Brotherhood's funding and the real budget, as a result of some leaders of the Guidance Bureau controlling it, and that the group receives huge donations from abroad and at home, and no one knows anything about it. There are no committees to count and oversee these donations and grants.

The most important chapters on the violations and financial embezzlement of the Brotherhood organization are related to the movements of the Egyptian Brotherhood office abroad through the media activity represented in benefiting financially from holding political conferences and seminars, and door-knocking campaigns for official and unofficial entities in European capitals with the aim of promoting Brotherhood issues with the Egyptian regime.



Qatari Funding: A Bank Check From The Charity Qatar Association To An Extremist Association In Europe

In addition, communication meetings with decision-making circles and politicians in the West to defend the group’s issues are made, as well as contracts with public relations companies to improve the image of the group abroad in exchange for distorting the Egyptian state, and legal consulting firms are contacted to file a lawsuit against the Egyptian political regime.

The file of establishing satellite channels, electronic committees, and news sites targeting the Egyptian state is also considered among the files that witnessed major financial violations, coordination and contracting with international human rights centers and organizations with the aim of issuing reports and fabricated statements against the Egyptian state, as well as the file for establishing media offices for the Egyptian Brotherhood league abroad to promote for the Muslim Brotherhood file in Egypt.

Financial differences a cause of splits in the group

Financial corruption in the Brotherhood is one of the most important reasons for

the split of many of its members, which was witnessed by Brotherhood members on many occasions. The corruption that began in the early years of the group increased with the increase in the size of the organization, as well as its investments and funds, until it became the subject of discussion recently. The most prominent examples of these splits are:

- Amir Bassam: Brotherhood members loyal to the “Kamalyin” front leaked an audio recording attributed to a member of the Brotherhood’s Shura Council, Dr. Amir Bassam, who fled Egypt, in which he revealed the extent of financial irregularities within the Egyptian Brotherhood organization fleeing to Turkey.
- Essam Sultan: In the mid-1960s, there were a number of key Brotherhood cadres who questioned the Brotherhood’s financial file, including lawyer Essam Sultan, who spent 16 years as a member of the Brotherhood and one of the closest members to the group’s historical symbols, as he said in an interview: “Of course, there is a huge financial corruption in the organization, because there is no control over the sources of ex-

penditure, there is no fixed budget, and there are no exclusive figures on the size of the contributions, donations, or transfers that come from abroad.”

- Abdel Sattar Al-Meligy: He is one of the Brotherhood’s leaders who split from the group and a leader of its Shura Office, who detected financial irregularities and collected them in a letter entitled “Brotherhood funds from where and to where?”, and sent it to the Guidance Bureau demanding to know the outlets for disbursing the group’s funds.

In conclusion, the Brotherhood’s financial file is one of the most important factors in combating terrorism and extremism. Financial resources gave the organization the ability to penetrate societies and its institutions and work to change its intellectual, cultural and religious identity in a manner that is identical and consistent with the literature of the Brotherhood project.

It is necessary to follow financial and economic systems and modern technological foundations that enable the state to track and prosecute Brotherhood money and the confiscation of its funding and spending. Security cooperation and coordination with all countries to form platforms for financial monitoring and following-up with the modern means the Brotherhood uses to collect, recycle and spend money in its terrorist activities is necessary to besiege Brotherhood financial flows that support terrorism, while continuing to boycott the countries that sponsor extremism and terrorism and expose them before the international community.

The Media:

The Muslim Brotherhood's Weapon against States

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Amid the global, regional, and national crises, the coronavirus pandemic and its repercussions, climate change, and regional conflicts, the ideological and fundamentalist discourses – which are also in crisis in the Arab and Islamic worlds and on an international level – were able to manipulate these predicaments for their own benefit.

The Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) extremist media discourse is not confined to the group's statements or its official platforms only. It has become a vast network of satellite channels and agencies amid severe regional polarization, in which the axis of moderation – at its core lies Egypt – is present on one hand, and the axis of extremism on the other functions in a wide space of funding, sponsors and harboring states, such as Qatar, Turkey, and Iran, each extending from satellite channels to various social networking sites, in the hotbeds of conflict, from Libya to Syria to Yemen and Sudan, to achieve its own and shared agendas. The organization's many voices, discourse patterns and functions of this discourse vary amid combined and complex global and





regional developments, and a difficult and unprecedented Arab phase, in particular.

Despite the multiple and diverse sources and patterns of the media discourse of the terrorist Brotherhood group and the multiplicity of its arms and media partners, from Qatari and Turkish sources, that share them in the contents and objectives of the discourse and its functions, their priorities may differ. They might share or distribute roles, but the central goal remains disrupting the image of legitimacy, fabricate news and incite protests to question the performance of the Egyptian regime, its leadership, president, government, and parties – opposition or otherwise.

The content of the media discourse of these platforms and various media organizations may differ, but they share one goal: sensationalism, confusion, distortion, attempts to incite protests and revolutionary sentiments, integrate the Brotherhood into the Egyptian opposition and go beyond its recent history, as presented here:

First: Incitement – Exploiting crises to provoke public opinion

The MB lies in wait for any new government decision or statement on the economic, social and political situation to fuel public opinion, regardless of how logical the decision is, the logic of its supporters, or the legal and regulatory violation sought by the decision.

Of course, some government decisions, especially those related to society, economy, and life, are prone to criticism, just anywhere in the world, in light of globalization, market laws, and the ongoing global and financial crises. Perhaps some decisions might be incorrect and inaccurate in their implementation and the official and government media may fail to convince the public opinion with these decisions, despite public awareness of the ambush of the counter-media networks to create a state of protest and insurgency against the regime through persistent interpretations, fallacies, and exaggerations.

The MB has exploited and employed various media platforms (satellite channels or social

media, in addition to dozens of news websites funded by Qatar and Turkey), taking advantage of the implications of some decisions, such as the economic reform program, to provoke and incite the masses.

Second: Attempt to undermine confidence

The Brotherhood's media discourse, with its direct and indirect platforms, has been trying to question any political path or position of the state, calling for a popular boycott, and trying to discredit the relationship between the state and society, which is portrayed as a rejection of the regime or its legitimacy and a prelude to the revolution against it, which is what the group is used to do since their ouster from power. The Senate elections were a new means for the Brotherhood's continued approach to distort the image of the state and obstruct the constitutional and electoral entitlements by promoting several statements, most of which revolved around the low rate of participation in the elections, and their attempt to focus on the idea of public reluctance to participate. However, the National Elections Authority announced turnout was 14.23 percent in the House of Representatives elections and seven percent in the Shura Council elections.

Here are some examples of the opinion of the traditional and new Brotherhood media and platforms:

- Egypt signed the maritime demarcation agreement with Greece on 6 August 2020 that angered Turkey and considered it a violation of its sovereign and maritime rights. So, the Brotherhood media supported by Ankara questioned the importance of the agreement for Egypt, and said that the agreement violates and harms Egypt's rights in the Mediterranean in favor of Greece and was signed only to annoy Turkey. The MB media also claimed that Egypt has given a

large part of its wealth-rich borders to counteract the legitimate Turkish influence. This was seen, for example, in a video on the YouTube channel of the Al-Sharq TV channel, in which a Brotherhood member, Hisham Abdullah, talks about documents allegedly leaked from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealing Egypt's transfer of its rights in the Mediterranean, under the title "Exclusive: Leaked documents from the Egyptian Foreign Ministry" regarding the border demarcation agreement with Greece.

- Shedding light on some electoral propaganda that insults the candidates and elections, such as the sentences "words, not actions" or some electoral symbols, such as "the banana fruit symbol", in addition to the focus on some electoral conferences that included a large audience despite the preventive measures due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
- Promoting the notion that the Senate represents a waste of state resources, saying that it cost EGP 4.5 billion and was established to distribute loyalty and that the media for seven years has been talking about the Shura Council being of no use and just a waste of money before the current tone changed.

Thus, there are many forms of selectivity aimed at questioning the contents of the Muslim Brotherhood's discourse and media message towards the internal and external political path, which continues in all channels.

Third: Distraction, the regional arena, and multiple goals

Another important example is the distracting and distorting discourse that uses issues in the region (Libya, Syria, Yemen, the Gulf, and the Arab Maghreb) and the world to distort the Egyptian regime and its policies, in an attempt to distract the viewer and hold

MB media discourse

Incitement

Exploiting crises to incite public opinion.

Doubt

Questioning any path or political position by the state and discrediting the relationship between the state and society.

Distraction

Distracting citizens and delivering messages that the state cannot adequately set priorities.

Revolt

inciting citizens to rebel against the state and security institutions through the continuous call for revolution.

Religion

Employing religion to incite the public and gather the masses at times of MB crises.

the Egyptian regime accountable for all crises and issues, as if it has a magical solution to all the issues of the nation and the region. Examples include:

- The use of some sensitive issues like the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, where MB media seeks to draw the Egyptians' attention towards it as the only important issue, with no regard to other important regional issues that Egypt deals with in various directions. The MB media does not hesitate to portray a contradiction between itself and the interest in the Libyan affairs, highlighting it as the priority, echoing their famous phrase "The Egyptian national security is in the south, not in the west." It is no secret the MB media supports Turkish actions in the Libya through continuous attempts to distract Egyptians away from

them, as if they are of no importance compared to the issue of the Renaissance Dam.

- Broadcasting exclusive photos to Al-Jazeera channel about the final shape of the dam and the advantages that Sudan will reap from the dam in an attempt to split the Egyptian-Sudanese ranks and cause a rift between them.

Fourth: Inciting revolution

Perhaps this pattern is the one that combines the various media messages provided by the Brotherhood's different platforms, both the direct and indirect, in an attempt to motivate people to go out on the street, turn against the state and clash with the state and security apparatus, by calling for



a revolution and revolutionizing the state of anger and tension that afflicts the Egyptian street towards some crises, such as the state of economic stagnation, which followed the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic worldwide, in an attempt to mobilize public opinion. The MB exploits economic reform measures, which had a clear outcome, by calling for revolution and breaking the law.

The Brotherhood's committees began, in what could be described as an annual habit, its calls to incite public opinion and to demand their supporters to come out against the Egyptian state. Among the features of these calls was the attempt to return fugitive contractor Mohamed Ali to the scene again through his calls to demonstrate and bring down the regime despite his lack of influence, his intellectual, political and strategic weakness, and the weak presence in the elite or public consciousness in Egypt, which also shows the state of hopelessness among the pro-Muslim Brotherhood arms who were unable to propose a suitable person for their goal. It is as if the group lacked leadership, and exhausted its alternatives.

Fifth: Employing religion

In light of the crisis of the Brotherhood and its different wings and generations, the manifestations of its crisis multiplied in the

accusatory speech between the various leaderships, youth, and wings, which forced the group to return to the missionary religious discourse, betting on the religious sentiments and ideological belief of these rules. In its struggle with the state, the group tries to employ religion to stimulate the masses. There are many examples of this pattern, the most prominent of which are:

- The group tries through its media outlets to distort the minds of simple people by spreading the rumor that the state is fighting Islam and its heritage, employing the state's serious attempts to revise and renew the heritage in a way that does not violate the constants of the Islamic religion or its righteous jurisprudence.
- The draft law on the independence of Dar Al-Iftaa from the Al-Azhar institution has been exploited, and transferring its subordination to the Council of Ministers was raised in the House of Representatives. The group considered this an attempt to demolish the mecca of Islam in Egypt, Al-Azhar Al-Sharif.
- The MB's acting Supreme Guide Ibrahim Mounir said on 19 September 2020 that the group's work and jihad against the Egyptian regime are part of the religion of God and in its defense and a jihad for all the divine religions, and that the an-

guish and affliction the group suffers is divine and they will be rewarded for it.

Finally: The media between draining the state and draining the group

It is important to pay attention to the fact that the MB's media discourse is trying to restore the group's effectiveness and existence in the Egyptian political life, to fabricate a revolutionary state of a coup against the regime, distort it and undermine it, not only before its citizens but also in its relations with the region and the world. For this purpose, it uses all possible tools of distortion, fabrication, contradiction, and national slogans that hold Egypt responsible for every mistake or problem in the region. It also uses religion, its sentiments, and sectarianism to confront the regime and target Egyptian peace.

Despite the broad content of the Brotherhood's media message and its partners, it shares a major goal that its supporters declared after the fall of their rule on 30 June 2013, and that is "to drain the state until it falls." Everything that its satellite channels, platforms, and social media accounts provide targets Egypt, but this is what hope looks like for a group in crisis.

To face the MB's media discourse, a counter-drainage strategy is not required. Rather, good media management of the crisis is needed, by adopting diversified, counter-media arms, and paying attention to the regional and international affairs that the group and its supporters employ at home and abroad against Egypt with slogans holding Egypt responsible for everything, ignoring the contexts of reality, its laws, changes, and challenges.

The group is deeply involved in harming Egypt. Although it has dozens of branches around the world, it employs all its supporters and arms to target the Egyptian core that overthrew its rule and aborted its dreams, and employs all the contexts of the region to confront it, which enables the use of the same contexts against the group and its allies. The Brotherhood is a group with many faces and practices. Its position in Afghanistan is in support of the US against the Taliban, and in Iraq, it supports the US and Iran's extremists against the Sunnis and Arabs. Added to its position in Egypt, with the Palestinians, there is its different position on Syria and Algeria. If anything, these contradictions show the Brotherhood's distance from clarity.



The Role of Women

“The Sisters” in Muslim Brotherhood Strategy

Tokka El-Naggar


Researcher at the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has recognized the pivotal role of women in the organization at an early stage. Hassan Al-Banna established the Muslim Sisters branch in 1933 and since then the role of women in the organization has evolved from missionary activity, through recruitment, to confronting Egyptian security forces after the 30 June 2013 Revolution, participating in terrorist attacks by inciting violence, providing funds, and delivering information.

In light of Egypt's decisive measures against the MB, the group is likely to increase its dependence on the Muslim Sisters in a desperate attempt to target the security and stability of Egypt. This raises important questions about the perils of women joining terrorist organizations, as well as the evolution of the role of the Sisters within the terrorist Brotherhood group, and the escalation of their terrorist activities following the 30 June Revolution.



Zainab Al-Ghazali



The perils of women joining terrorist organizations

The real danger of women joining terrorist organizations is the central relation between women and society. Women form a network in which they lie at the center. They play multiple roles, including the role of a mother, sister, daughter, or wife. They have the ability to communicate with and influence half of society. Women are more likely to accept radical or extremist ideas than men, due to their reliance on the driving emotion of vengeance and the desire for revenge.

Terrorist groups are aware of the symbolic and strategic importance of women, so they have used them optimally, by undertaking multiple roles such as recruiting, collecting donations, delivering information, and sometimes carrying weapons. The symbolic importance of women contributes to legitimizing terrorist groups, due to their success in attracting a large number of women, while the strategic importance of women is evident in women's embrace of the ideas of the organization, which means the ideological transfer of these ideas to future genera-

tions when they raise their children. Not to mention they can avoid many searches that men are exposed to, as there is a different treatment of security to women, due to religious, cultural and social considerations. In Arab and Islamic societies, women enjoy privacy that keeps them above suspicion.

The Brotherhood developed an organizational structure for the Muslim Sisters to activate their roles and organize their work in pursuit of the group's interests. Accordingly, a number of committees were formed, most notably: the Education and Families Committee, which is responsible for the educational rehabilitation of sisters, by teaching a number of religious curricula related to the group's literature. The Individual Daawa (Calling) Committee is the key driver of the sisters' activity. It is where they are trained to attract other women to the group. The committee comprises two important divisions: The first is the "Al Zahrawat" division, specializing in attracting females in the early stages of life, such as primary and middle school students. The second division is the "Fatayat", or girls, which targets high school and university students in an effort to spread the group's extremist ideology.

Experts argue that among the most important reasons for the survival of the terrorist Brotherhood, despite all the security and political blows it has suffered, since its fall in Egypt on 30 June 2013, is the presence of a large group of women in the organization, representing the backbone of the MB, as their ranks did not witness any significant defections. In other words, despite the occurrence of many historical and contemporary fissures among the ranks of the MB, it did not affect the ranks of the Muslim Sisters, taking into account their pivotal role in the organization on one hand, and their increasing numbers on the other. In short, the Sisters is a second defense line that ensures the survival of the movement in times of crises.

The Muslim Sisters: A parallel path

The Muslim Sisters forms a large section in the terrorist Brotherhood, but there are no available statistics about their numbers. Some estimates put them at about 30 percent of the group's members, while other estimates indicated that they are more than 40 percent. By tracing the stages of the development of the role of the Sisters within the organization, the first Muslim Sisters department was established in 1933 from Brotherhood women, their daughters, and their female relatives.

The formation of a Sisters branch is a clear contradiction to the ideas of Hassan Al-Banna, who refused to give women their rights and worked on undermining their freedom. Al-Banna said that "Women do not need to study different languages, and they do not need special technical studies. They will soon know that women have to stay at home." This can be explained in light of the pragmatism that characterizes Al-Banna. Although he is not convinced of the importance of women's rights, he found an imperative to use them in order to achieve the group's goals.

The first female head of that division was Labiba Ahmed, followed by Amal Al-Ashmawi, Naima Al-Hudhaibi, Fatima Abdul-Hadi, and Zainab Al-Ghazali. With the beginning of the establishment of the Sisters branch, the role of women was limited to raising children and caring for the family. However, this role witnessed a later development towards political action in 1944, which saw the launch of the first executive committee of the Muslim Sisters, which played an active role in the extension of the Sisters' daawa in public places, streets, institutions, government agencies, and more.

In this context, it is worth mentioning one of the most important female terrorist leaders within the organization at that time, Zainab Al-Ghazali, who raised an ostensible slogan for charitable work, joined in executing a number of terrorist operations, the most important of which was the founding of Organization 65, which was accused of planning the assassination of the late Egyptian president Gamal Abdel-Nasser, and striking vital installations with the aim of seizing power. She was sentenced to death by hanging in this case, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, and then she was released during the era of the late president Mohamed Sadat. After her release, she issued her book "Days of My Life", which was welcomed by the Muslim Brotherhood who transformed the writer into an "icon" and a jihadist feminist symbol. The book is a biography of jihadism full of Qutbist concepts and stories about the Brotherhood being victims of injustice.

The 1950s and 1960s represented two of the most difficult periods in the Brotherhood's history due to the arrests of the most important leaders of the group, and here the role of the Muslim Sisters shifted to collecting donations and delivering them to the homes of imprisoned or fugitive Brotherhood members. The social activities of

the Sisters contributed to the establishment of a strong and vast network among Brotherhood families, which provided financial and moral support for the families of imprisoned members.

At the beginning of the establishment of the Sisters division, its basic roles were focused on daawa and healthcare and social activities. However, these roles took a strategic dimension when there were direct confrontations with the authorities, as the essence of the Sisters' mission was to help the movement survive harsh security strikes against its leadership.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, the role of the Sisters emerged in mobilizing women to vote in the election and standing before committees to make propaganda for their

candidates. The Sisters also worked on attracting all girls who are eligible to vote. There is no doubt that 2005 witnessed a development in the role of the Sisters; a role that led the Brotherhood to win 88 seats in the People's Assembly elections at the time.

With the events of January 2011, the sweeping emergence of the Sisters began. The Guidance Bureau saw it was inevitable to push and use women in parliamentary and municipal elections, due to their high number, which is close to twice the male voting mass. With the beginning of 2011, a large number of the Sisters ran for the Shura Council elections, and not a few of them succeeded, in addition to the participation of nearly three Muslim Sisters members in the Constituent Assembly for the drafting of the 2012 constitution, not to mention the participation of some of them in the parliament of 2012, which was subsequently dissolved.

Hence, the role of women in the organization is determined according to the ruling context and the circumstances surrounding the group. Women's role shifted from caring for the family at the beginning of the group's founding, to daawa, mobilization, and expansion. It developed into moral and material support in times of adversity, and has emerged strongly in election mobilization during the organization's political rise. It has recently been apparent in participating in terrorist operations following the overthrow of the rule of the terrorist Brotherhood.



The role of the “Bloody Sisters”

Following the 30 June Revolution, the violence of the Sisters emerged. They began to be employed in terrorist operations against the Egyptian state, their tasks were apparent in several roles:

Violence and incitement:

The Sisters’ violence escalated dramatically in the wake of the 30 June Revolution, and this was evidenced by their intense activities in universities, especially Al-Azhar University, where the Sisters carried out many manifestations of violence in the university, the most notable of which were: Surrounding the deans’ offices, closing the main university gates with chains, attacking police officers, and clashing with a number of professors. A woman named Samia Shehan participated in the “Kerdasa massacre” by mutilating the bodies of officers after their death at the Kerdasa police station, encouraging gunmen to vandalize police armored vehicles and setting fire to the police station. In February 2015, the Cairo Criminal Court sentenced her to death, but the court accepted an appeal and commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. That is not to mention the renewal of detention of Aisha Khairat Al-Shater in August 2019 for inciting violence and sabotage against the state, and incitement to harm the national economy.

Worth mentioning is the statement of Azza Tawfiq (Khairat Al-Shater’s wife), after the 30 June Revolution. She said the Egyptian army has 20 hours to work on restoring the Brotherhood leaders to power, otherwise Egypt will turn into a pool of blood. She added that 20,000 mujahideen on the Egyptian border were ready to move in.

Electronic committees:

The Sisters sought to target and devastate state institutions by spreading rumors. Investigations in Supreme State Security case 485/2015, known in the media as the case of the “Electronic and Media Committees of the International Brotherhood Organization,” in which a number of Muslim Brotherhood women were involved, revealed an agreement between leaders of the International Brotherhood Organization, who fled the country, to incite against state institutions and public facilities, aiming at overthrowing the existing regime. Within this framework, the organization’s electronic committees were activated to implement this scheme by spreading rumors to disturb peace and public security, and to incite terrorist operations against judges, police personnel and officers, the Armed Forces, and public and vital installations.

Establishing connections:

In the current period of the group’s history, the Sisters acts as a link between the terrorist organization’s elements at home and abroad in order to deliver assignments and information. The Sisters also carry out the task of coordinating between the Brotherhood’s free cadres and locked up leaderships.

These women include Sundus Essam Shalabi, the daughter of Brotherhood leader Essam Shalabi, who was sentenced to death in the intelligence case, as well as Basma Refaat Abdel-Moneim Mohamed Rabie, who was involved in the assassination of the prosecutor-general “Hisham Barakat.” Rabie was in charge of communicating with Brotherhood member Yehia Moussa, who fled to Turkey and assigned the members of the group to assassinate Barakat. The Cairo Criminal Court sentenced her to 15 years in prison.

Funding terrorism:

The Sisters play a pivotal role in gathering the necessary funding for operations under the guise of charitable works and receiving funds from abroad through bank accounts away from eyes of the security forces. A number of active female elements in the organization were arrested, most notably Ola Al-Qaradawi, who is accused of funding the terrorist organization and participating in implementing a scheme prepared by the Brotherhood to fund violent groups in Egypt. Investigations conducted by the Supreme State Security Prosecution in Egypt in case 316/2017 revealed that she was in charge of direct support for the group's members and funding their arming. She was receiving direct assignments related to the financial statements and bank account numbers unknown to a large number of leaders of the group.

Terrorist schools:

Brotherhood members' mothers have turned into "terrorist schools" that nurture extremism in the minds of their children and plant the seeds of terrorism in them, motivated by feelings of hatred for the state and the desire to disrupt its stability and security. After the ouster of Mohamed Morsi, Brotherhood members' mothers appeared to praise their sons who participate in terrorist operations, the most prominent of whom are: the mother of terrorist Abdel-Rahman Khaled Mahmoud, who carried out the attack against the National Cancer Institute, which left more than 20 martyrs and nearly 50 wounded. The Ministry of Interior revealed a video that showed a meeting between Mahmoud and his mother as she encouraged him to carry out the terrorist operation. Likewise, the mother of terrorist Ahmed Mohamed Al-Degwi praised her son's role in the assassination of former prosecutor-general Hisham Barakat, in a

call-in with one of the Brotherhood's channels. There are others who bless their sons for carrying out terrorist and suicide operations.

In sum, terrorist organizations resort to relying on women when they go through a period of decline and retreat. The Brotherhood has recently followed a method of relying on women to implement the Brotherhood's terrorist plans in the Egyptian society. Hence, a distinction must be made between women's participation in terrorist activities and the societal perception of her. In other words, our view of the terrorist women's scene should not be subject to customs and traditions, but rather viewed as a threat to the security and fate of the nation. Likewise, the role of women in terrorist organizations should not be limited to the role of the victim only by highlighting the violent practices towards them, and neglecting their role as a terrorist actor who decided to join terrorist organizations with their own free will.

In light of the structural challenges the Brotherhood is experiencing, the Brotherhood is likely to increase its reliance on the female elements in the mobilization against the Egyptian state during the coming period by establishing a number of pages on social media to stir incitement against state institutions and call for the mobilization in the street.

The Muslim Brotherhood's

Challenges of Presence and Exclusion

Maher Farghali

An expert on terrorist organizations


Profound changes have taken place in the nature and degree of the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) presence in Egyptian society. The group's future is ambiguous due to several challenges that rendered it excluded at home and weak abroad. It is important to study these challenges to determine their course in light of the decline of political Islam, not in Egypt alone, but in the entire Arab region.

The Brotherhood has been relying, in the years following its overthrow from the government, on several issues, including: random mobilization tactics, intensified operations of terrorist organizations against the Armed Forces and the police, especially at hot spots in Sinai, as well as reigniting divisions in state institutions, especially the bureaucratic ones, in which the Brotherhood succeeded in placing a number of its members among their second-tier leaders.

The main objective of these tactics is to prolong the conflict, impede the economic progress of the state, maintain the cohesion of the organization, prevent a review of the lead-



Terrorist Brotherhood leaders



ership's mistakes, and engage in a negotiation process that will lead them to return to the forefront by working on several levels (political, public daawa and armed operations).

The group has faced a series of challenges despite the logistical support of the international organization. With the sudden and rapid transition from the organized secret and semi-secret political activity into armed activities and working in the Diaspora. Following the successive internal blows, circumstances of the external blockade, and different international and regional context, the group had major organizational dilemmas, which varied after June 30, until it became complete a failure during the last two years.

Challenges within the MB

There Brotherhood has faced external and internal challenges. This study delves into the details of the internal challenges and the structure and practices of the group. The MB doesn't have a clear, realistic vision, and its detailed programs and tools have failed to reach the desired reality. The challenges include:

Social rejection:

This is the group's most difficult challenge. In recent years the MB was able to mobilize masses, then it lost this ability due to its

absence from the street. The organization became unable to make a breakthrough concerning this challenge despite the huge amount of money it has spent on propaganda and the media.

In the face of social rejection, the group did not find anything but an active organizational latency, which allows it to treat its internal crises, renew faces, and start a new media strategy, which is what it has already started in its plan (re-evaluation and construction), but it has also failed, for reasons related to its presence in power in the populist mentality of the Egyptian people, the systematic violence carried out by its terrorist groups, and the state of total rejection.

Despite the group's denial of its own system and its military wing represented by the Hasm movement, and its rejection of any talk about having specific groups affiliated to it, during the years following its removal from power and until the last two years, it has not been able to shift from a strategy of comprehensive confrontation with the regime to a policy of coexistence or adaptation. This was due to the continued social rejection of the idea of the organization.

Divisions within the group:

After 30 June, the Brotherhood continued to move from a state of political and ideological consensus to conflict, discord and division. Being toppled on 3 July 2013 contributed to the creation of Brotherhood lineups, which was further clarified after the failure to mobilize the masses, forcing the group to stop its armed terrorist operations, the continuation of the state of stagnation of the group at the Egyptian level, and the successive collapse of group leaders or ranks inside prisons.

The group has three currents, each centered around the organization. The first is

the traditional current, which is now represented by Ibrahim Mounir after the fall of Mahmoud Ezzat. The second is the “Qaradawiyin” current, represented by Essam Talimah and a group of young people. The third is the “Kamaliyin” current, in reference to the killed leader Mohamed Kamal. The latter trend is close to Salafi jihadism.


Differences within the group were evident in the recent speech by head of the Center for the Training of Islamic Scholars (Markaz Takwin Al-Ulama) in Mauritania, Sheikh Mohamed Al-Hassan bin Al-Dedow Al-Shanqiti, on Al-Jazeera channel. The speech was about the transfer of Mahmoud Ezzat's powers to Ibrahim Mounir. Al-Shanqiti indicated that the group is going through a critical stage, and that an intellectual review has become necessary with regard to the leadership, regulations and priorities and the issues of governance, politics, internal splits, and the link between the Brotherhood at home and abroad. He added that now is the time for reviewing the Brotherhood in Egypt and the Levant.

The overall context of the group now in Egypt is that it has so far failed to reunite, reconstitute and take position or create a new image. Its current aim is to survive.

This became clear when Ibrahim Mounir was declared acting supreme guide, replacing Mahmoud Ezzat who was arrested, and when some Brotherhood sectors criticized the recent incidents. These included the successive defeats of the organization, the dangers it was exposed to due to the consolidation of the Egyptian regime, the reoccurrence of organized secret activity and violence by members of the group for revenge, the cooperation of some MB members with the Islamic State and involvement in armed action, and then the merger of some of the group's supporters with the Salafi currents, which negatively affected the popularity of the organization, and the absence from the



Fugitive **Amr Darrag** disavowed the Brotherhood, stating that the situation within the group is confused and full of crises



Essam Talimah affirmed the failure of the Brotherhood's leaders, and that the rifts within it have reached a dangerous level.



Traded accusations among Brotherhood leaders

Mohi Issa stated that **Mahmoud Ezzat**, the Brotherhood's former secretary-general, committed immoral crimes for which he must be tried.



street during the past years, which is considered as an unbearable difficulty.

During the last two years, severe organizational splits and fissures took place, groups of young people moved to be more open to other political currents, and radicals dissociated from those less radical, which all led to more splits and reviews of the old organization.

Recently, the ideological gap between the group and its allied organizations has widened, and the successive statements of Assem Abdel-Majid are a stark example. The fall of strategic interactions between the Islamists and their opponents, including secularists, nationalists, liberals, leftists and Copts, widened the gap between them.

Perhaps the main source of failure is due to the dispute over the way of work and management, the failure to mobilize, how to hold the leadership accountable for their

crimes by the organization, the control of the conservative generation over leadership and sources of power, namely funding, financial and moral corruption, and how to integrate the organization based on efficiency and experience, not on claims of purity, piousness and sanctity.

Reconstruction and restructuring:

A prominent young leader, Abdullah Ezzat, head of the Students Unions of the MB, revealed in more than one article what is happening in the corridors of the organization, criticizing the practices of the old generation in an article entitled "Students of the Brotherhood in Sudan: Bring down the Sponsor". Ezzat exposed the dark secrets of the organization, and attempts to restructure the group, which is now taking place in the UK under the banner of Reassessment and Reconstruction.

The first decision in reconstruction was to consider that the external office, led by Ahmed Abdel-Rahman, was responsible (in coordination with all concerned parties, inside and outside the Brotherhood) for the tasks entrusted to it and approved in its plan, and not responsible for the educational, living, or administrative part of the Egyptian Brotherhood abroad. These, he said, are affiliated to the supervision of the Brotherhood students association, and in the event that problems or disputes arise between the parties abroad, an investigation committee is formed to conduct reconciliation and disengage while adhering to the rules. If one or some of the members of the administrative committee submitted the so-called appeal signed by himself, this meant that those who filed the appeal lost their membership in the Supreme Administrative Committee, and the head of the committee and the members committed to the decisions of the Shura Council should carry out their work with the help of members of the Shura Council and administrative offices to communicate with spots not represented in the committee. In addition, the administrative offices should not accept any administrative decisions except those signed by the chairman of the Administrative Committee.

Many of those decisions, including Ibrahim Mounir's assumption of the duties of the acting supreme guide, were not welcomed by many, and leader Ahmed Abdel-Rahman stated that solutions based on beliefs during political crises increase their complexity and reflect useless traditional ideas.

It has now become clear that Qutbist generation and the traditional leaders have restored their control over the organization. The new construction, as usual, is built on

the expulsion of some leaders and maintaining others who tend to preserve the organization more than anything else.

Slipping into the Salafi-jihadi quagmire

The group has slipped into the quagmire of Salafi jihadism. The logistical and social support for these groups reached a great extent it took advantage of the presence of some disaffected extremist Islamists, and put them in a strategy for hostilities. It envisioned that destabilizing the country for the longest possible period might shift the balance of power in its favor, but that it is not possible to separate a group from its history, just as it cannot be suddenly moved from the bottom to the top, because fissure will take place, and this is exactly what happened. The group's support for the Salafi-jihadi groups caused a great Brotherhood fissure in terms of ideological and strategic convergence, and many young people turned to these groups.

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It clearly indicates that the group is already in crisis and faces difficult internal challenges.

Media discourse:

Although the Brotherhood's media, represented in their satellite channels, contributed to maintaining the public display of their absent presence in the Egyptian street, it also contributed to weakening the group, as many confused the Brotherhood's media with the message and discourse, which are misleading and defective. This has limited the impact of this media policy, and among the most important defects were: unification between ideology and religion; confusing the object and subject; interpreting all phenomena by attributing them to a primary principle or cause like social or natural phenomena; and relying on the authority of the predecessors, or heritage,



after converting the heritage texts which are secondary texts, into primary ones that enjoy a tremendous amount of holiness not less than the original texts. That is in addition to the mental certainty and the intellectual determination and refusal of any intellectual disagreement.

A Brotherhood dissident, Tarek Al-Bashbishi, said that he believes the influence of the Brotherhood's channels has diminished somewhat, due to the passage of time and the failure of the organization to achieve any goal it has promised. This added a new challenge to the group, that recently believes that its media caused the decline of the number of its allies who are opposed to the Egyptian regime, because they completely gave up on achieving any goal the group promised them. One of the reasons for the decline in the momentum of these channels, according to Al-Bashbishi, was the strength of the Egyptian state institutions and their full control, which caused the despair of many of those who bet on their inflammatory slogans, and the exposure of the size of funding and internal conflicts.

In sum, the group tried to reassess and build its media anew at a meeting in London, under a strategic goal that reads: "Cohesion, building and development of the group to be prepared and able to effectively influence society," as described by the powerful international organization media man, Azzam Al-Tamimi, who advises the media officials of the organization to return to the ranks of the group and contribute to its restoration and unification. But so far, the plan has achieved no tangible results. The group lives on the impact of divisions and not splits, and it clearly indicates that the group is already in crisis and faces difficult internal challenges, in addition to other external challenges that may bring it to its demise, or make its future fraught with danger.



The Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies (ECSS), established in 2018 as an independent think tank, seeks to introduce different perspectives and alternatives regarding strategic shifts taking place on the national, regional and international levels. The ECSS is particularly focused on incidents important to national security and Egyptian interests.

The ECSS targets decision-makers, by providing choices and alternatives when dealing with domestic, regional and international challenges, as well as researchers and experts specialized in the political, economic, social, and security fields, in Egypt and abroad. Through its wide array of services, the ECSS aspires to contribute to enlightening and guiding debates and public opinion in Egypt and the Middle East, as well as to enrich the principles of thinking and scientific research. The ECSS does a variety tasks, activities and provides services such as assessments, political analysis, workshops, forums, and conferences, in addition to monthly publications in Arabic and English. The ECSS website publishes analyses of the different developments taking place on the Egyptian, regional, and international fronts, as well as the production of different research programs.

Programs and sections

First: The International Relations Program

It focuses on studying the Middle East and global strategic shifts and their effects on Egypt's interests and security. The program comprises specialized units in American, European, Asian, African, and Arab studies.

Second: The Security and Defense Program

It analyzes national security issues with their multi-faceted dimensions through its units dedicated to cyberspace security, armament, extremism, terrorism, and armed conflicts studies.

Third: The Public Policy Program

It is interested in studying public policies cases and shifts through its units: economics and energy unit, public opinion unit, and woman and family unit.

The research units are flexible, reflecting the research agenda adopted by the ECSS during a specific period of time, according to an objective assessment of the reality on the ground on the national, regional and international levels, as well as the existing challenges and threats.

In addition to the research programs, the ECSS houses the "**Egyptian Observatory**", concerned with issues that occupy the Egyptian and international public opinion. It provides accurate and analytical follow-up on the issues of concern to decision-makers in the Middle East and the world. The ECSS also has a blog for young researchers and contributing writers from different nationalities to express their views and ideas about the accelerating world events.

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